

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LETTERS ON AMPHIBIOUS WARS

LETTERS ON AMPHIBIOUS WARS

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL G. G. ASTON, C.B.

ROYAL MARINE ARTILLERY

GENERAL STAFF

WITH MAPS AND PLANS

'Per mare per terram'

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1000000

LONDON

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET

1911

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ABSORPTION

TO
THE STAFF COLLEGE AT CAMBERLEY
AND TO
ALL THE GOOD FRIENDS I MADE THERE AMONG
STAFF AND STUDENTS

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PREFACE

AN attempt has been made in these pages to illustrate from recent examples the direction of naval and military force against a common objective. Courses of lectures delivered at the Staff College at Camberley have provided the material from which the letters have been compiled, and the book has been written in response to requests received by the writer from officers, both naval and military, who attended the courses.

In many writings on war the tendency has been to consider the operations by sea and land in 'watertight compartments,' and an attempt is here made to show the interdependence of the two services upon each other in all wars in which both are employed. In the old days, when wind provided the motive power for fleets, the question of blockading vessels in defended harbours, or rather of watching for them to come out, was a more simple one, because of the difficulty of getting ships out of harbour without a favourable breeze; but the introduction of steam has facilitated their exit in all conditions of weather. Locomotive torpedoes, submarines, and sub-

marine mines have added still more to the difficulties of 'blockade.'

Even in the old days, we have examples of fleets being selected as the objectives for combined expeditions, and, under modern conditions, the tendency seems to be for action of this nature to be considerably developed. Thus we get several examples of the combined action of fleets and armies for the destruction of hostile war vessels.

Then again, we find constant use made of the comparative rapidity of movement of armies by sea, and we notice the importance of naval co-operation with such armies, both tactically, in battles within range of the coast, and strategically, in guarding communications, in landing supplies for the armies, and in bewildering the enemy by making feints in other localities.

To students of war in a world-wide Empire like our own, the consideration of amphibious wars cannot fail to be of value, and it is hoped that this volume may be found useful as an introduction to such study. Technicalities have been avoided as far as possible, in the hope that the public may be interested in the subject, not only in the United Kingdom, but also in the overseas Dominions.

In conclusion, the writer wishes to acknowledge the great assistance he has received from

many officers of both services, at sea and on land, and especially from those with whom he was associated at the Staff College at Camberley, the Naval War College, and the Royal Naval College at Greenwich. Free use has been made of lectures delivered by students at the Staff College, especially in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Letters.

G. G. A.

PRETORIA, *April* 1910.

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LETTERS ON AMPHIBIOUS WARS

FIRST LETTER

THE WAR IN CHILE IN 1891

MY DEAR TOM,—

Do you remember the letters you wrote to me last year when you were reading up for the Staff College examination? I had no leisure to answer them properly at the time, but they have travelled with me, and I have always intended to answer them at length as soon as possible. You say in one of the letters that the more you read the more you realise how absorbingly interesting the career of a soldier in the British Empire can be, as long as he does not allow himself to get into a groove, and to deaden his faculties by doing nothing but routine work, without looking beyond it and realising what it all means. You add that what strikes you especially is the wonderful variety in the military problems which confront a British soldier who thinks beyond this daily routine work, and considers how much he has to learn, especially if he aspires ultimately to a high command. But the letter which struck me most was the one in which

you wrote: 'There seems to have been two schools of thought on the army question in this country ever since the Elizabethan era, and doubtless before that. One school wants to provide and to organise and train an army for what used to be called "La grande guerre" on the continent of Europe; the other wants an army to be used, in conjunction with the fleet, for operations against an enemy's oversea possessions, and also against his home coastline in certain cases.' Then you added that you had just found in the United Service Institution library a quaint old book dated 1759, and called *Conjunct Expeditions*, and after reading it you were inclining to the tenets of the latter school. I know the book well, and its general teaching is summed up in the sentences: 'The Fleet and Army, acting in concert, seem to be the natural Bulwark of these Kingdoms'; and 'We don't mean to lessen the dignity of the Army, but to encourage it to make the Conjunct War their great Object. . . .' In the same letter you quote Napoleon's saying: 'The political greatness of England consists in her Navy, and not in those small armies which she has sent to the Continent in the train of the large armies of Russia, Austria, and Prussia.'

All this seemed to have unsettled you; but on the general question you referred to me, my advice to you was to beware of all schools, especially polemical ones. Their tendency always

is to overstate their case, and to engage in controversies which leave one very much where they find one. I thought you would find it very much more interesting, and far more valuable to yourself, to think the question out, and come to your own conclusions. What may be good policy in one age may be a bad one in another, and in considering the British army problem of the present day we have to remember the extension of the empire over vast areas of land, which march with the territories of great military powers. The strategical problems in such areas require the application of land strategy, and provide plenty of opportunities for the employment of large armies in ‘*La grande guerre*.’ Granting this, we must still remember that no British military problem exists in which the sea has not to be taken into consideration by one side or the other, and no far-seeing British soldier will confine his studies of war to purely land operations. Whether preparations for ‘conjunct war,’ as the old book calls it, should be the basis for organising and training our army or not, it is at least conceivable that British military forces will be employed in operations of this nature in the future, as they were in the past; and in reply to the last letter received from you a few weeks ago, I propose to send you what I have been able to gather about recent amphibious wars. You ask me to do this because you have found it difficult to get help towards any such special study, and I

will do my best to do what you ask. It is not an easy task, because the places of interest in these wars are so remote that it is impossible for us to visit them, and without doing so it is difficult to realise the local conditions well enough to write with any authority on the subject. Shall we begin, then, with the Revolutionary War in Chile in 1891 ?

This war is full of interesting lessons about landing expeditionary forces on a hostile coast, and about their subsequent operations on land. It illustrates very well a principle you will have read about last year in that old book on *Conjunct Expeditions*. The words used are : ‘ The conjunct armament goes against the enemy like an Arrow from a Bow. It gives no warning where it is to come, and leaves no traces where it has passed. It must wound too where it hits, if rightly pointed at a vulnerable part. When this is done, a new aim is directed. The enemy in the meantime, like a man in the dark labouring under an unwieldy shield, moves slowly to and fro, distracted and at a loss which way to go to guard against the stroke of the invisible hand.’

The advantage of beginning our examples as late as 1891 is that steam was then employed for the propulsion of ships, and railways could be used for movements on land. This makes it easier for us to realise the time problem, without which the study of strategy is useless, and the

conditions being similar to those of the present day, we can more easily apply the lessons we may learn to the problems with which we may ourselves be confronted.

You will find a good many details about the Chilian War in a small book called *Four Modern Naval Campaigns*, by W. Laird Clowes, and in an official War Office publication called *The Capture of Valparaiso in 1891*; and, if you have read these, it is not necessary to remind you that the conflict originated in antagonism between President Balmaceda and a Liberal majority in the Congress. The Congressionalists were supported at the outset by practically the whole of the Chilian navy, and the Balmacedists by the army, so it was a case of a 'whale against an elephant,' as a possible conflict between ourselves and a European power was described a few years ago.

Until the Congressionalists could organize some sort of a military force they could not attain their object, because with war vessels only at their disposal, they were powerless to do anything but bombard defenceless coast towns, a somewhat futile operation which could never bring the war to a close, and which would not be likely to enlist the sympathies of the population with the Congressionalist cause. It is true that industries could be interfered with by interruption of sea communication, but not to an extent likely to force the war to an end. An

effective blockade of so long a coast with so many harbours was not possible with the naval force at their disposal, and friends as well as foes would be injured by such a course. Moreover, there were land routes between Chile and neighbouring countries, and such routes could not be closed by a fleet, however strong.

If you study the map of Chile,¹ you will notice that it is a narrow strip of country with a very large proportion of coastline. Countries like this afford special opportunities to an attacking force moving by sea, because an army can move by water about twenty times as fast as it can move by land, and, if its destination can be kept secret, the strategical effect of such a rapidly moving force is enormous. However large the forces defending such a country may be, the tendency will always be to disperse them, in order to meet the enemy wherever he may land, and we all know that dispersion of force in strategy is suicidal. When he does land, there are great difficulties in rapidly concentrating a superior force to deal with him, and even if overpowered, he has every chance of re-embarking his force, and descending upon the coast elsewhere, after striking the blow. It will at once occur to you that Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the British Islands are similar countries from this point of view, and, of course, there are several others in which the same conditions obtain;

¹ See Map I. in pocket in cover.

but we must remember another condition, and that is, the facility for moving the defending forces by land, the railways and good roads which may be available.

If you study further the map of Chile as it was in 1891 you will notice that such facilities could not be called very good. It is true that Valparaiso was connected by railway with the interior, with Santiago the capital, with Concepcion on the coast, and with Angol, but most of the railways were short mineral lines running from the mountain ranges to the sea. These mountain ranges are close to the coastline, and render all lateral communication difficult. All this was very much in favour of an expeditionary force which could move by sea and disembark at any point selected.

We must be careful not to take a purely geometrical view of strategy when we are studying amphibious wars from the military point of view, and we must not confine our notice to the fact that a force on the sea can move much more quickly than a force on land. We have to remember that fairly smooth water is required for disembarkation, and on some coastlines heavy surf makes such an operation impossible. The Japanese in 1904 certainly accomplished wonders in landing forces under unfavourable conditions, but harbours are usually required, and the country inland must be suitable for military movements. It is not necessary, there-

fore, to consider the whole coastline, but only the suitable parts of it. You will notice that there are many towns on the coast of Chile and many good harbours, so here again the local conditions favoured a landing force.

I have drawn attention to these points, for fear that you should think that the lessons we shall try to draw from the operations in 1891 are applicable to wars in all countries, with even short bits of coastline offering no such facilities. As long as we avoid such generalisation, I think it will be safe to comment freely upon the incidents of the campaign which we will study together, as far as we can get information about them. The worst of it is that I have not been able to find for you any account from the Balmacedist point of view, and we must bear this in mind when we draw our deductions from the facts as they have been presented to us.

Our chief interest in the war begins with the operations of the Congressionalist army, after they had had time to organise and to equip one, and this took them until August 1891, although the war began early in January. We must first go shortly through the preliminary phases of the conflict, as several lessons may be gathered from the incidents which occurred during the first few months.

On January the 5th the bulk of the Chilean fleet was at Valparaiso, one of the two battleships, the *Cochrane*, being at Quintero Bay, about

twenty miles to the northward of that town ; a gun vessel called the *Pilcomayo* at Magellan ; and two new torpedo gun vessels, the *Lynch* and *Condell*, in the Atlantic, on their way out from the builders' yard in England.

The sympathies of the officers and crews of the fleet were with the Congressionalist cause, and on the 6th of January the leaders of the movement embarked in the war vessels which were in commission at Valparaiso under the command of Captain Montt. These ships moved to Quintero the same day, and returned on the following morning to seize the *Huascar*, an old monitor which had not been taken at first.

The situation, therefore, on the evening of the 7th of January, was that the Congressionalists had nearly the whole of the fleet, while the Balmacedists had the whole of the army on their side. The troops numbered about 32,500, distributed about the country. The exact distribution will be studied in detail when we come to the later stages of the war ; but it is important to note that 2300 Balmacedist troops reached Patillos and Arica, in the north of Chile, by sea between the 8th and 11th January, although the only naval force at the Balmacedists' disposal consisted of a few small torpedo craft which remained at Valparaiso.

These troops must have been of some assistance later on, in delaying the attempts of the Congressionalists to obtain a footing on land, but

why I ask you to pay special attention to this point, is on account of the controversy which sometimes rages about the question whether the troops of a weaker naval power can be moved by sea at the outbreak of a war. Remember that in this case the destinations of the troops that were moved were friendly harbours, as this fact affects the situation very materially. What I am quite certain about is that, when you have studied other amphibious wars, you will never be tempted to dogmatise on the question, either on one side or the other. We find many recent examples of military expeditionary forces crossing the sea, both to friendly and hostile destinations, before their own navies had succeeded in obtaining definite sea command even in local waters, and it seems to be mainly a question of nerve on the part of those responsible for ordering such movements. What one can be fairly certain about is that, if a transport meets a man-of-war she will be captured or sunk, as the *Kowshing* was by Japan in 1894, and as several Japanese transports were by the Russian cruisers which sallied from Vladivostok in 1904.

Between the 12th and 21st of January the Congressionalist fleet blockaded the seaports of Arica, Pisagua, and Iquique, and succeeded in occupying Zapiga¹ and Pisagua with such landing parties as they could spare. These landing parties were very weak, and on the 22nd of

¹ Not shown on map.

January a Balmacedist force from Iquique drove them out of Zapiga. On the 26th of January Pisagua also had to be abandoned, and was occupied by the Balmacedists.

With the exception of an attack by a Congressionalist picket boat upon the *Imperial*, an unarmed Balmacedist merchant steamer lying at Valparaiso, there was no serious fighting by sea or land in January, as far as I have been able to ascertain.

The Congressionalist fleet was employed during the month in blockading the northern ports of Chile, and in seizing merchant ships off the coast. We shall see later what good use was made of these merchant ships for the transport of military forces in the later stages of the campaign.

At the commencement of the war no such military forces existed, and we have seen the result, in the failure of the Congressionalists to hold a good harbour on the Chilian coast as a base for their fleet. During the month of January a small military force was being raised among the opponents of President Balmaceda's policy in the northern districts of the country, and this force formed the nucleus of the small army which was employed at a later stage.

Other important events in January were, the removal of the Balmacedist gun vessel *Pilcomayo* from Magellan to Monte Video out of reach of the Congressionalists, and the safe arrival of the new Balmacedist torpedo gunboats, *Lynch* and

Condell, at Valparaiso, in spite of an attempt by the Congressionalists to seize them in the Straits of Magellan.

The headquarters of the Congressionalist fleet were stationed off Iquique for most of the month of January, and they did not leave that station until the 4th of February, on which day the battleship *Blanco Encalada* bombarded the Iquique fort, before leaving for sea. On the 6th of February the fleet arrived off Pisagua, recaptured the place, and landed a garrison. The Congressionalists on this occasion obtained their first permanent footing on land, and Pisagua was held by them until the end of the war, and afforded a most valuable base of operations. You will see by reference to the map that the want of land communications made it impossible for the Balmacedists to exert their strength on land to recapture the place.

On the 15th of February the Congressionalists occupied Iquique, apparently without opposition, but three days afterwards the Balmacedists attacked from the land side, and succeeded in driving the invaders to the custom-house on the landing-place. This post was not captured, the defenders being assisted by the gunfire of their ships in the bay. We thus get, on the evening of the 19th of February, a situation of some considerable interest to us. On the one hand, we have a town occupied by a strong military force, lying open to bombardment which would

hurt the population as seriously as the troops; on the other hand, we have a fleet armed with heavy guns and anchored securely in the bay, with no hostile naval force to be feared. A friendly but small force still holds a position at the landing-place, from which the strong military force of the enemy has been unable to drive them.

A conference was held, and the result was that the Congressionalists were allowed to occupy the town of Iquique, which they held for the remainder of the war. The Balmacedist troops withdrew into the neighbouring country.

We find, therefore, that by the end of February the Congressionalists had seized two harbours which were available as bases for the fleet, and they now began to get a grip of the neighbouring territories, which afforded facilities for raising a small army from among those who sympathised with their cause. On the 22nd of April they occupied Caldera and Carrizal, and by the beginning of June they held most of the country on the coast from Huasco northwards.

There was, of course, an urgent need for arms and equipment for the military forces which they were raising; and in the early months of the year this need had been foreseen, and the steamers *Itata* and *Maipo* had been sent off to procure them. The *Itata* was sent to San Francisco, where she shipped her cargo, and reached Iquique safely on her return journey on the 3rd

of June. Here she was seized by the United States war vessels in the harbour.

This is an incident of some considerable interest in international law. I think that if you have read many of the learned books that have been written on that subject you will have come to the conclusion that, for all practical purposes, they may be summed up in the words, 'Might is right,' when applied to incidents of this nature.

I remember being at Malta some years ago when the French were sending an army to Madagascar. A British ship flying the red ensign came into the harbour with an armed French force on board on their way to the war. She was in urgent need of repairs, having been run down by another British merchant ship near the Straits of Messina, and she was allowed to go into dock. Then the French authorities, being anxious to get the troops to their destination, sent a French ship to Malta to embark them and take them on, and this was done without any protest being raised. If Madagascar had been a strong and independent power I do not know how the case would have been decided under international law.

The *Maipo* was sent to the southwards, and returned to Iquique in June with ten thousand rifles and field gun equipment, transferred to her at sea from another vessel off Magellan. The safe delivery of her cargo was a dominating factor in the ultimate issue of the conflict.

FLEET OF THE CONGRESSIONALISTS 15

The naval events during the period under review were of considerable interest. On April the 18th the two Balmacedist torpedo gun vessels, *Lynch* and *Condell*, left Valparaiso, with the ss. *Imperial* as parent ship. On the 21st to 22nd of April they were at Huasco, and on the following day they attacked and sunk the battleship *Blanco Encalada* at Caldera. On the 17th to 19th of May they made further attacks upon Congressionalist war vessels at Iquique, but without success. The naval situation in June was somewhat different to that in January, because the Congressionalists had lost one of their two battleships, and the Balmacedists had two new torpedo gun vessels, in addition to the old torpedo craft at Valparaiso. I am enclosing in this letter a list of the vessels on both sides,¹ from which you will see that they were not very formidable, but there was no doubt about the relative strength of the sides in sea-going ships and transports.

The Congressionalists now had—

1 battleship, 3370 tons (1874),

1 monitor, 1130 tons (1865),

1 protected cruiser, 2810 tons (1884),

2 old corvettes, 1000-1700 tons (1864-6),

1 gun vessel, 772 tons (1874).

1 gunboat, 145 tons (1889),

besides 19 merchant steamers of 80 to 2600 tons, and a sailing vessel and two tugs.

¹ See page 41.

The Balmacedists had at their disposal—

1 gunboat (1882),

2 new torpedo gun vessels, 750 tons (1890),

9 small torpedo boats (1881-6),

and two merchant steamers of about 420 and 2000 tons respectively. With the exception of the two new torpedo gun vessels, there is no record of there having been any trained personnel available to man the Balmacedist vessels, and to this fact we must probably attribute the inactivity of the small torpedo craft. They were at best only small torpedo boats, and they were incapable of action excepting at a very short distance from the port where they were stationed. At all events, they made no attempt to take any active part in the war, even by interfering with the movement of hostile transports.

To return to the military forces. We have seen that by the month of June the personnel for a small army had been raised by the Congressionalists in the Northern provinces, and the *Maipo* brought some necessary arms and equipment during that month. I understand that they had 4000 Mannlicher (·315) rifles, quite the latest arm available at the time, and superior to anything in the hands of the Balmacedists. There were also some 5000 Gras (·43) rifles and about two million rounds of ammunition for them. How much Mannlicher ammunition they had I do not know. The artillery had 6 Krupp field

guns and 10 mountain guns, with 1700 common shell and 1000 shrapnel.

Having the men and the arms, a certain number of horses, and some transport, the next question to be considered was how to organise and train a force capable of offensive action. This was done by the first week in August, and I only wish I could tell you how they did it. Better an army of stags, it is said, led by a lion, than an army of lions led by a stag, and those who led the small Congressionalist army must have been lions of the best type, or they never would have attained the results they did in face of the difficulties before them.

The name of the Commander-in-Chief was Colonel del Canto, and that of his Chief of the Staff, Don Adolfo Holley. Among the other names on the Congressionalist side one stands out conspicuously—the name of Colonel Körner.¹ This officer appears to have suppressed his individuality as much as possible, and only to have been called ‘Secretary General’ on the staff, but his influence seems to have been great, and traces of it can be found throughout the operations. We hear of him at this stage giving lectures to the officers, and teaching them their duties in a marvellously short space of time; and for want of a lecture hall and diagrams, we hear of his having to scratch on the ground his plans of tactical operations and of the hostile

¹ Now General of Division in the Chilian army.

harbours. To him was entrusted the formation of the plan of action, and its explanation to all concerned, and the most important orders which have been preserved bear his signature.

The task before Colonel del Canto's force at the beginning of August was a formidable one. He had succeeded in keeping his objective so secret that the Balmacedist army was much divided. A movement by land of Congressionalists from Huasco had had the effect of causing the enemy to reinforce the garrison of Coquimbo and raise it to a strength of 8437. There were 7038 Balmacedist troops at Valparaiso, 7153 at Santiago, 7074 at Concepcion, 775 at Angol, and 775 at Valdivia, and 669 elsewhere, making a total of 32,516. Of these troops the number stationed at Valparaiso, Santiago, Concepcion, and Angol, 22,075 in all, were grouped within reach of a railway line which could be used to accelerate their movements to support each other in case of attack.

The total force at Del Canto's disposal was probably about 9500, of which number about 660 were cavalry, and 7700 were infantry. There were 6 field and 10 mountain guns, and a naval brigade of about 100 with 14 machine guns.

I should recommend you now to refer to the map which I send you with this letter; you will find that I have marked upon it the distribution of the troops on both sides. The numbers representing the Congressionalists are shown in red,

and the Roman numerals represent the brigades or 'divisions' to which the different troops belonged, Congressionalist numerals being in red, and the Balmacedists in black.

You will notice that Del Canto's small army, was even more scattered than the Balmacedist forces were, one of his brigades (2nd) being at Iquique, one brigade (3rd) at Caldera, and the other (1st) at Huasco. But] bear in mind that these troops could be moved safely by sea, and transports were available to carry them, while the larger forces to which they were opposed could only be moved safely by land. Situations of this nature give the study of amphibious wars a special interest, because one is constantly impressed by the fact that it is not the distance apart of forces that counts in strategy, it is the time they require to concentrate. In your studies of land strategy you must have constantly noticed the effect of obstacles such as mountains, rivers, and marshes upon the time required for the movement of armies; and here we have the same principle on a larger scale, the forces moving by sea being able to move about twenty times as fast as those moving by land. You will remember Napoleon's saying, 'Ask me for anything but time,' and every student of war must realise the disastrous effect of losing even minutes in carrying out a strategical plan, when once the forces have been put in motion.

It was my good fortune some years ago to go

over the quartermaster's stores of some barracks on the Continent. There were large pigeon-holes in rows, with a passage between them. The pigeon-holes contained complete new kits to be served out to the men at the outbreak of war, and on the top of each kit was a folded blanket. I asked the reason of this, and was told that they were so arranged to save a certain number of minutes—I forget how many—on mobilisation. You must often have seen men draw their kits, including probably a pair of new boots each, and you must have seen the whole line of men checked, perhaps for several minutes, by one man dropping a boot or something of the sort. The object of putting the blanket on the top was in order to save such delays. Each man on arrival at his pigeon-hole picked up the blanket, swept the other articles into it, and marched straight on without dropping anything. It is by paying attention to details such as these that time is saved, and the initiative is obtained by armies in modern war. In amphibious war one ought to go further, and to count the time, not from the moment when movement commences, but from the moment when the plan is known to the enemy. As soon as he does know it he can make his own dispositions, and it is hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of secrecy on the part of those who plan an attack, as well as of speed in carrying it out.

Here, again, an expeditionary force moving

by sea has a great advantage over one moving by land. When once embarked its direction of movement is unknown, and it probably is not heard of again until it appears at its destination.

We are fortunate in having access to many details about the staff arrangements made by the Congressionalists to save time in embarking and concentrating their forces by sea, in readiness to strike the blow upon which they had determined.

The organisation of the Congressionalist force at the beginning of August was as follows :—

First Brigade—Lieut.-Col. Fries (at Huasco) :

2102 Infantry.

280 Cavalry.

80 Mountain Battery.

50 Engineers.

12 Ambulance, Ammunition column, etc.

2524 Total.

Second Brigade—Colonel Vergara (at Iquique) :

2449 Infantry.

260 Cavalry.

150 Mountain Battery.

40 Engineers.

180 Ambulance, Ammunition column, etc.

3029 Total.

Third Brigade—Lieut.-Col. del Canto (at Caldera) :

3125 Infantry.

120 Cavalry.

849 Artillery.

37 Engineers.

100 Ambulance, Ammunition column, etc.

3781 Total.

Together with extra hospital details, general ammunition column, and baggage column, making about 9500 officers and men in all.

Having kept secret the destination of the expeditionary force, and having, since the 10th of July, made demonstrations by land to the southward from Huasco in order to mislead the enemy, the next operation was to embark the whole force as rapidly as possible, and concentrate at a secret rendezvous at sea. You will notice that there was no question of saving time by rapid mobilisation in order to obtain the initiative, because the two sides had been at war since January; but everything depended upon rapid embarkation and concentration, and upon secrecy, if they expected to strike a successful blow against the far superior numbers at the disposal of the Balmacedists.

We have much to learn from the dispositions made by the staff in order to ensure these favourable conditions. Firstly, as regards the number of transports and their tonnage. The fewer vessels that are used, the better the chances of avoiding observation, and the easier it is to find suitable anchorages. The smaller they are, the closer they can anchor to the shore and so save time in the operation of landing. But there are limits to the extent to which men, horses, and transport can be crowded into ships.

Do you remember the controversy that raged on this subject a few years ago? It began in 1905,

when the Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, explained in the House of Commons the data upon which the military defence policy of the British Islands was based. The whole argument hinged upon the amount of tonnage required, and available in continental ports, to transport hostile armies across the Channel. The controversy culminated in a special inquiry conducted by the Committee of Imperial Defence, under the auspices of the Government, and led, I believe, to some modification in our defence policy. But the amusing feature of the correspondence in the Press was that, although many experts took part in it, none of them, as far as I can remember, explained what sort of tonnage they were referring to. Whether displacement tonnage, which is expressed in weights, or in the various other sorts of tonnage such as gross, register, or net, or freight tonnage, which are measurements either of 100 cubic feet, or 40 cubic feet per ton.¹ It is not surprising that the experts contradicted each other with some warmth about the subject!

¹ If you should at any time want further information on the subject you will find it in *Lloyd's Register*, and also in our *Field Service Pocket-Book*.

Gross tonnage (100 cubic feet per ton) is a measurement of the total cubic space below deck, and of the closed spaces above deck.

Register or net tonnage is a measurement (100 cubic feet per ton) of the nominal cargo space, after deducting space for crew, engines, bunkers, etc.

Freight tonnage (40 cubic feet per ton) is the measurement of the actual cubical capacity of the cargo space.

Displacement tonnage is the weight in tons of water displaced.

Our own latest regulations (*Field Service Pocket-Book*, 1909) tell us that 4 tons per man and 12 per horse should be allowed in the case of ocean voyages, and 2 per man and 8 per horse for short voyages of twenty-four hours and under. The column in the book is headed 'Gross tonnage,' and I suppose that it is only intended as a guide for forming a very rough estimate. For instance, to carry 1000 men and 1000 horses for a short distance, one may presumably say that a vessel of about 10,000 tons gross tonnage would be wanted. This must be a very rough method of calculation, because gross tonnage gives such a very unreliable indication of the carrying capacity of a merchant ship. One vessel may have so much larger a proportion of her space set apart for engines than another, and so on.

As a matter of fact, it is difficult to go by any rule of thumb, because ships vary so much in their build, and so many conditions come in. It is generally assumed that there will be enough hold-space to take the vehicles with the troops, using the above estimate, but this will, of course, depend upon what sort of troops they may be—it might apply to a battalion of infantry, but it could hardly do so to supply columns, which have many vehicles and very few men. Then again, there is no explanation whether the 12 or the 8 tons' allowance per horse includes space for the man with the horse. I have an idea that it does, and if so, the above estimate of 10,000

gross tonnage for 1000 men and 1000 horses for a short voyage may be cut down to 8000.

I hope I am not boring you with all these figures and calculations. I have gone into the details on purpose, in order to draw your attention to them, and I should recommend you to get together all the historical examples you can before you form your own opinion. Remember how much of our own experience in the transport of troops by sea has been obtained under conditions which do not require any crowding, and remember that we always have, both for horses and men, special fittings which take some time to put up.

If we take this experience, gained in ocean voyages only, as a guide, we may be astonished to find what can be done, under war conditions, in crowding troops into transports for short voyages. I understand that on the west coast of Scotland considerable numbers of horses are moved by sea every year on the decks of small steamers, with no special fittings at all; and in Turkey there seems to be hardly any limit to the number of officers and men who can be crowded into small transports.

Take as an instance the Chilian operations which we are now considering. We read that the transports *Aconcagua* and *Amazonas* were allotted to the First Congressionalist Brigade, of which the total strength was 2524. The transports *Maipo*, *Cachapoal*, *Copiapo*, *Isidora*, *Limari*, and corvette

Abtao took the Second and Third Brigades, of which the combined strength was 6750.

I have had the usual difficulty in getting for you the tonnage of the transports, because some of the figures given are gross tonnage, some net tonnage, and some displacement. As far as I can gather, the total net tonnage of the merchant ships employed could not have much exceeded 10,000 tons. This gives only a little over one net ton per man, which is a small proportion, if we consider that they were accompanied by horses, guns, and transport animals. We do not know the exact number of horses and mules. We know that there were 16 guns, and 660 cavalry, and that there were 200 mules over and above those required as gun and ammunition mules. Perhaps the armed vessels escorting the transports helped by carrying part of the expeditionary force. These vessels were the protected cruiser *Esmeralda* and gun vessel *Magellanes* with the First Brigade, and the battleship *Cochrane* and corvette *O'Higgins* with the Second and Third Brigades.

Having selected and distributed the transports, the next operation was the speedy embarkation of the force. Perhaps you would like to have a copy of the actual instructions issued. They ran as follows :—

‘On the day of embarkation of a corps, its commander should arrange—

‘1. That the baggage of the corps should be

placed on the mole or other spot appointed, at least three hours before the time fixed for the embarkation, and an officer with eight men should be sent in charge.

‘ 2. To send on board the vessel in which his corps is to embark, at least an hour before the embarkation, an adjutant with the following instructions—

- ‘ (a) Watch the baggage being stowed on board.
- ‘ (b) Ask the captain of the transport to provide the necessary number of berths for the commanders and officers to the rank of captain inclusive.
- ‘ (c) Also to allot the space necessary for his corps.
- ‘ (d) Place sentries on the kitchen, water, and bread stores, to ensure regularity in their service.
- ‘ (e) Allot the proper space for the subaltern officers.
- ‘ (f) Superintend the stowage of the rank and file, etc.’

Other orders deal with the routine while on board ship, the number of sentries, and other matters with which most of our own army is familiar. The fleet carried for the force 300,000 rations, of which 50,000 were packed ready for carrying in haversacks.

You notice how much care was taken to avoid complications during the embarkation, and to make things work smoothly, and when we study

together some other amphibious wars we shall see what wild confusion ensues if these details are not considered beforehand. For the present, I only want to draw your attention to the question of stowing the transport vehicles and stores which accompany a military force.

The golden rule is to work backwards. Think of the operation of disembarkation first, and take care that what will be wanted last is put into the ship first ; you will notice that on this occasion military officers superintended the stowage, and this should always be the case, but they should study the subject if they are to be of any real assistance. Whoever does the work should be given a list showing the order in which everything will be required on landing.

In the Egyptian War of 1882 we made some bad mistakes through forgetting this point. If you read again the official history of the South African War, you will find this subject specially referred to on page 113 of the first volume, and you will find that after seventeen years we remembered nearly, but not quite, all the lessons we learned in 1882. You should read the whole of the second section of the sixth chapter, which describes the embarkation for South Africa of the largest military force that has ever been moved so far across the ocean in the known history of the world.

The embarkation of the Congressionalists' brigades in 1891 was carried out smoothly and

without a hitch. The Second Brigade commenced to embark at Iquique on the 9th of August, and left that place on the 11th of August, because their transports had also to pick up the Third Brigade at Caldera. They arrived at Caldera on the 14th, and put to sea at 1 P.M. on the 16th of August. The Third Brigade was left at Huasco as long as possible to demonstrate inland against the Balmacedists, and so mislead them as to the real point of attack. This brigade commenced embarkation on the 15th, and left harbour on the evening of the 16th of August.

At midday on the 19th, the whole force assembled at a rendezvous at sea, sixty miles from the coast, in the same latitude as Quintero Bay, and before we follow their fortunes further let us think over together some details about movements by sea to which we have not yet referred.

Although we shall never have to deal with the question ourselves, I think we ought to realise what a difficult task it is for the naval authorities to handle a number of transports. Captains of merchant vessels are not accustomed to steaming about in company, and in formations like those adopted by men-of-war, and the engine-room staff are not trained in constantly making changes in the number of revolutions of the screw. If we think the matter out we shall realise better how difficult it must be to keep the vessels the same distance apart from one another at sea, whether they are in line ahead (one behind the other), or

in line abreast (alongside one another). In both cases the officer on watch must use a sextant or some such appliance to measure his distance, and when he wants to alter it he must constantly be obliged to communicate with the engine-room authorities to get them to increase or decrease the number of revolutions. Any mistake made in communicating his wishes, or in carrying them out, may lead to a collision or to delays, and the means of communication in merchant vessels are by no means as perfect as those in men-of-war. All this must lead to constant loss of time on the voyage, in order to get into order again after the proper formation has been lost, and it is on account of this loss of time that we ought to realise the point. It affects so seriously the time problem which is all-important in strategy. We must not expect the naval authorities to move a fleet of transports at the maximum rate of speed of the slowest vessel. Naval officers I have consulted say that they ought to have at least two knots in hand in order to provide for keeping proper station, and to enable lame ducks to pick up the distance lost.

All this also shows us how unreasonable it would be to expect transports to manœuvre at as close intervals as men-of-war. This does not matter so much at sea, but it does matter very much indeed when we want to anchor them close to the shore to disembark a military expeditionary force. It means longer trips for the boats,

which will entail the expenditure of much more time.

Even if the transports could move about at the closest intervals, other difficulties would be encountered when it came to anchoring them. Have you ever seen a fleet of large war vessels coming to anchor together? It is one of the most wonderful and impressive sights in the world. I remember seeing such a sight at Lagos on the coast of Portugal in 1903, when about seventy big ships came in and dropped all their anchors together. The roar and rattle of the cables running out could be heard for miles inland, and when the operation was completed the whole were in exact lines and apparently exactly the same distance apart as far as the eye could judge. They all appeared to be wonderfully close together and hardly seemed to have room to swing round their anchors; but here again, men-of-war have a great advantage over merchant ships. They are able to what is called 'moor,' which is done by laying out two anchors each, with a 'swivel' between them. They then shackle a short cable to the swivel and swing closely round and round it. You can imagine how much space can be saved by doing this, but it requires the necessary appliances, and a personnel trained to their use; merchant ships have neither, and we have to remember this, so as to avoid making unreasonable demands of them, and this fact must always affect the plans of those

who select bays or harbours in which to land military forces. They must allow plenty of room for the transports to anchor, and safe anchorages with plenty of room are not easy to find.

The next important subject we have to consider is how to make sure that all those concerned are fully acquainted with the orders for landing, so that they shall know exactly what to do directly they get on shore. If orders are issued at the port of embarkation they are quite certain to get out, and you realise what this means. It means the loss of secrecy, upon which the success of amphibious operations entirely depends.

An alternative plan would be for the naval and military authorities to confer before starting, and for them to prepare sealed orders, not to be issued until communication with the shore is impossible. This plan is also open to objections. It is not easy to write orders on any subject which will not be read differently by different people, and for such a delicate operation as a landing upon a hostile coast, possibly in face of opposition, it is almost essential that, besides written orders, there shall be a conference attended by the commanders and staff officers who will have to carry out the plan. Some naval authorities rightly point out that communication between transports at sea will often be impossible; but you have plenty of chances of talking over these problems with them at the Staff College nowadays, as we used to have

in my time, when this was one of the most interesting points we used to discuss.

It will interest you to note that the Congressionalists found no difficulty in 1891. We have seen that all the transports met at a rendezvous at sea at noon on August the 19th, sixty miles from Quintero. During the afternoon a meeting of the commanders of brigades and captains of ships was held on board the *Cochrane*, and the military commander-in-chief and his 'secretary general' explained the arrangements for disembarkation, and the operations which were to be carried out on the 20th of August. Detailed written orders were also given to them at sea; these orders are dated the 19th of August at 4 P.M., and the destination of the expedition—Quintero Bay—was then disclosed for the first time.

Let us for the moment imagine ourselves at sea with the Congressionalists. The weather must have been good because communication between the transports was possible, and we hope that the hastily trained and half-disciplined army was not suffering seriously from sea-sickness. Most of the troops had been on board for about three days, but the Second Brigade, which embarked at Iquique, had been in their transports for ten days, so the men must have been getting their sea legs, although they must have been somewhat out of training, and the horses and mules with them must have lost condition to some extent. This faculty

for getting over sea-sickness has a most important bearing on the success of amphibious operations. When drawing attention to the usefulness of a landsman skilled in trades for service in the fleet in time of war, Sir Edward Grey's Committee on Naval Reserves called it 'acquiring so much physical quality' that he 'may become a useful man.' I am not quite sure whether sea-sickness brings more good or harm to soldiers taking part in an expedition by sea. A seasick man may lose heart or 'moral' while at sea, but when he is landed he is so glad to get on shore that he finds the discomforts before him a welcome substitute for the horrors of the ocean. At all events, troops landed on a hostile coast always seem to acquit themselves well when they meet the enemy, and this may not be entirely due to their being nearly always on the offensive.

It is not only on account of sea-sickness that the weather must be considered. We must remember that communication between ships and the shore is impossible, even in some good harbours, if weather conditions are unfavourable, and, as a rule, the possibility of landing depends entirely upon the weather. This fact has provided a constant source of friction between the naval and military commanders in charge of a conjunct expedition. On the one hand, the soldier is anxious to get ashore as soon as possible, especially if the day is fine; on the other hand, the seaman has to think of the prospects of

fine weather continuing. A heavy responsibility rests upon him if he puts some of the troops ashore with only a few stores, and if he is then prevented by the weather from sending further reinforcements. Imagine his feelings if he has to remain powerless to assist, although he may actually see the detachment on shore being overpowered by the enemy. Examples of this kind of trouble between admirals and generals have occurred on several occasions in our own history.

Quintero Bay appears to have been a comparatively secure and sheltered anchorage during the operations in 1891, so we need not press this point further.

I want you now to turn your attention to a naval difficulty which may arise in finding the exact spot where an army wants to land. We must not make unreasonable demands of the naval authorities, and ask them to perform impossibilities, and they on their part must realise how difficult it is for the first men, probably landed in the dark, to find their way to wherever they want to get to, if they do not know where they are starting from.

In order to preserve secrecy, and to minimise the chances of serious opposition to the landing, it is usual to stipulate that the transports shall not show off the coast by daylight. It may have been impossible for some hours to take satisfactory sights in order to get the exact position of the fleet, there will probably be currents along

the coast of which the exact strength is difficult to determine, soundings may give an insufficient indication, and, finally, there may be neither lights nor conspicuous marks on the coastline to help the navigator to bring the fleet exactly to the spot intended. I once saw a detailed scheme drawn up for landing an expeditionary force at a place which could only be reached by passing up an intricate zigzag channel, running between shoals and sandbanks, on a coastline where the tide runs like a millrace. For the sake of secrecy it was proposed to select foggy weather for the venture. You can picture to yourself the face of a naval officer to whom the proposal was submitted.

Given good navigators, I gather that the difficulties in finding an exact spot on the Chilean coast by night should not have been insurmountable. The moon was full at Valparaíso on the 19th of August 1891, and the mountain ranges along the coastline should have provided features which could be recognised by those familiar with them. Soundings may also have helped, but to what extent I am not competent to judge.

While we are considering the question of a secret approach to the coastline of a hostile country, there are a few more points to be considered. It will, of course, be a great help if the men-of-war and transports can steam with all lights out. For the latter to do so, without running into each other, practice beforehand is

essential, but the danger can be reduced by showing astern of each vessel a light which will not be visible from the shore.

Assuming a secret approach before daylight as far as the actual anchorage, we must remember that the noise caused by the cables running out when the anchors are let go can be heard for miles on a still night. In order to avoid this I have seen proposals to stop the fleet and hoist out the boats at sea some miles from the anchorage, putting the first troops into them to be towed ashore by steam launches. The conditions under which such an operation would be possible would perhaps be exceptional, but the idea is worthy of consideration. In cases where the state of the sea renders such an operation possible, allowance must be made for the tows to proceed very slowly to the shore, especially if there is any side current at all. In our Clacton manœuvres in 1904 there was a current running about a mile an hour along the beach, and I think that the men-of-war's steam launches, which could easily do fifteen knots alone, were unable to tow the loaded boats at a greater average speed than four knots.

When the transports have anchored secrecy is no longer possible. Directly the actual landing begins every nerve must be strained to ensure the utmost speed attainable in the operation, because every minute lost may increase the strength of the opposing force, and the improvement of modern weapons has rendered a landing in the

face of serious opposition almost an impossible task. It is difficult enough to move a force in face of a heavy fire over ground affording some cover, but to move boats crowded with men long distances over water which shows the splash of every shrapnel and rifle bullet, is truly an heroic task. In order to save all possible time, the first thing is to find out what the dominating influence on the time-factor may be. In most cases I think that one has chiefly to consider the distance of the transports from the shore, the nature of the boats in which the men are to be carried, and the number of steam launches available for towing them.

For landing their expeditionary force on the beach the Congressionalists had constructed 16 large flat boats with overhanging ends, like the ends of river punts, and each of these would take from 110 to 150 men. Some of these boats were finished by the ships' carpenters during the voyage, and I believe they were secured flat against the sides of the transports; if so, it was lucky that fine weather was experienced on the voyage, or they would probably have been swept away. Special ladders, one for every 150 men, were prepared, in order to get the men out of the ships as quickly as possible, and arrangements were made for a supply of steam launches, each of which was to take one of the flat boats to the beach every trip. Buoys were prepared, to be anchored near the shore with hauling-lines made

fast to them, to be used for warping the flat boats ashore when the steam launches had to let go owing to the shallowness of the water.

Every mounted man was to land with his saddle and bridle in one package, so as to have no difficulty in sorting them out. The horses were to swim ashore. Each officer and man was to carry a blanket, and two days' rations of preserved meat, bread, sugar, and coffee. The men were to carry 150 rounds of ammunition, and were told to put their cartridge belts round their necks to keep the ammunition dry in the event of their having to wade through the surf.

All this attention to detail shows how much thought was bestowed by the responsible authorities upon organisation, so that nothing should be left to the last minute, and as much time as possible saved in getting the force on shore.

You will of course notice that orders on subjects of this nature can be issued before the troops embark. It is only the destination, and the operation orders for landing at the destination selected, that need be kept secret, and these latter should be as short as possible. There is nothing to be gained by padding them out with detailed instructions which apply to landings anywhere, and can therefore be published before starting.

In my next letter I will send you a précis of the operation orders that were issued on the afternoon of the 19th of August, for the landing at

Quintero Bay early on the following morning, and we will then follow the fortunes of the Congressionalists after they had succeeded in getting on shore.

Having told you where the landing was to take place, I would suggest that, before hearing from me again, you should once more study on the map the distribution of the Balmacedist troops who were stationed within reach of railway lines leading to Valparaiso. I regret that I cannot give you details of rolling stock available, and of the platform and other facilities for getting the troops in and out of the trains at the various places, because rapidity of movement depends so much upon such facilities. You must know by heart the chapter in Hamley's *Operations of War* on the influence of railways on military strategy, so I will not insult you by commending that part of his book to your careful attention.

STRENGTH AT SEA IN THE CHILIAN WAR OF 1891

CLASS.	CONGRESSIONALIST.	BALMACEDIST.
Battleships, .	<i>Blanco Encalada,</i> <i>Amiral Cochrane.</i>	
Monitor, . . .	<i>Huascar.</i>	
Protected cruiser, .	<i>Esmeralda.</i>	
Corvettes (old), .	<i>O'Higgins, Abtao.</i>	
Torpedo gun vessels,		<i>Amiral Condell,</i> <i>Amiral Lynch.</i>
Gun vessels, . .	<i>Magellanes.</i>	<i>Pilcomayo.</i> ¹
Gunboats, . . .	<i>Huemul.</i>	<i>Valparaiso.</i>
Torpedo boats, .		9 in number.
Merchant steamers, (80 to 2600 tons net)	<i>Aconcagua, Cachapoal,</i> <i>Maito, Amazonas,</i> <i>Itata, Magellanes,</i> <i>Biobio, Copiapo,</i> <i>Isidora de Cousino,</i> <i>Carlos Roberto,</i> <i>Limari, Dithmarschen,</i> <i>Maule, Trumao,</i> <i>Longavi, Cachapoaletto,</i> <i>Bismarck, Minero,</i> <i>Pudeto.</i>	<i>Imperial,</i> <i>Mapocho.</i> ²
Paddle storeship, .	<i>Tolten.</i>	
Sailing vessel, .	<i>Miraflores.</i>	
Tugs,	<i>Chala Loa, Chala</i> <i>Huanay.</i>	<i>Condor.</i> ³

¹ Secured in Magellan Straits, and laid up at Montevideo during the war.² Detained in Peru during the war.³ Remained in Magellan Straits.

SECOND LETTER

THE WAR IN CHILE IN 1891—*Continued*

MY DEAR TOM,

I am glad to hear that you found my first letter interesting. You say that you propose in future to make a special study of amphibious operations, because you can think of so many possible wars in which the British army can be used in no other way. But please do not misunderstand the first part of my letter. You seem to think that I intended to cast doubt upon the possibility of our ever taking an active part in a land war on the Continent of Europe, and you ask how, if this is the case, we shall ever want to use a British Cavalry Division as strategic cavalry in advance of an army.

I remember so well that we used to discuss the question of our army policy with all the confidence of the inexperienced when I was a student at the Staff College, and some of us came to the conclusion that we should never see a British force as large as a Division on a war footing. Within ten years we were nearly all of us in the South African War, with far larger forces in the field. History tells us that British armies have in former days been employed on European soil in

order to help to preserve the balance of power when it was endangered, and it is not for us to decide upon such a question. It is for those who are responsible for the foreign policy of the Empire, and for making sure that the instruments for supporting that policy are at hand. We can realise the difficulty of their task by studying our treaty obligations, as far as they have been published to the world, and these obligations afford food for much contemplation.

All that I intended to ask you was, not to confine your reading to the fascinating study of the strategic employment of mammoth armies in purely land warfare, but to turn your attention also to amphibious wars, in which the attacking forces moved by sea. Every military problem to be studied by the British army involves the movement of military forces by sea, either to hostile or to friendly coasts, and we are specially fortunate in having records of four recent wars which afford material useful to us in such studies. When we have finished the Chilian War of 1891, we will study together the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5, the Spanish-American War of 1898, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and draw all the lessons we can from them.

At the close of my first letter we left the Congressionalist force at their rendezvous at sea, sixty miles west of Quintero Bay, which is about twenty miles north of Valparaiso. They had at sea a total force of about 9000 fighting troops, with

auxiliary services and departments in addition. About 7000 of the Balmacedists were at Valparaíso, which was protected by forts bearing on the sea, and about 15,600 more of the enemy's troops were at places east and south of Valparaíso, and close to railway lines leading to that place.

I promised to send you a *précis* of the orders issued by Colonel del Canto, the commander of the Congressionalist force, but I have thought the matter over, and have decided to quote them in full. They are among the few published orders I have as yet been able to find for the disembarkation of an expeditionary force on a hostile coast in recent years.

I enclose a map of the country round Valparaíso so that you can follow the orders, which ran as follows :—

‘ ORDERS FOR THE 20TH AUGUST, DATED 19TH
AT FOUR P.M.

‘ Each man will take in his knapsack preserved rations for two days, which will be distributed after dinner to-day.

‘ At 2 A.M. broth and coffee will be distributed, and a ration of cooked meat, to be carried in the haversack.

‘ At 3 A.M. the whole of the troops will prepare to disembark: the infantry with 150 rounds per rifle.

‘ORDERS FOR DISEMBARKATION

‘The advanced guard will disembark the 300 men of the Pisagua Regiment, who are on board the *Biobio*, and they will occupy, protected by artillery fire, a position which will allow them to command the points of access to the place of disembarkation. The main body will disembark in four divisions—

- ‘1. The Constitution Regiment: Engineers of the 1st Brigade: Chanaral Regiment of the 2nd Brigade from the transports *Aconcagua* and *Cachapoal*.
- ‘2. The squadrons Libertad, Granaderos, Carabineros, Lancers, and Guides: the Hurtado battery of 1st Brigade and the Armstrong battery of 2nd Brigade from the transports, *Aconcagua*, *Amazonas*, *Cachapoal*, *Maipo*, *Limari*, and *Abtao*.
- ‘3. The Regiments Iquique and Antofagasta of the 1st Brigade from the transports *Aconcagua* and *Amazonas*.
 ‘The Regiments Chanaral, Atacama, and the Huasco battalion of the 2nd Brigade from the *Cachapoal* and *Limari*. The ambulances, stores, and a day’s rations for the landed troops.
- ‘4. The 3rd Brigade, according to arrangements made by its commander, from the transports *Maipo*, *Copiapo*, *Isidora*, *Limari*, *O’Higgins*, and *Abtao*.’

‘DISTRIBUTION OF THE FORCES DISEMBARKED

‘The forces of the first division will assemble, immediately on landing, south of the road from the port of Quintero—

- ' A. The Constitution Regiment, the Engineers, the Rifles on the road from Puerto Viejo to Concon Bajo.
- ' The Commander of the Corps of Engineers will cut the telegraph communication from Quintero to Vina del Mar, and will take special care to destroy any mines.
- ' B. The Chanaral Regiment on the road from Quintero to Colmo.

' Commanders of corps will be held responsible that this muster of forces takes place without delay, that no soldier enters any house or leaves the ranks.

' Bodies of the enemy will be attacked at the point of the bayonet, under cover of the fire of artillery and infantry from the fleet, and the complete rout of the enemy will then be confirmed by a well-directed fire.

' The first battalion of each of the two regiments will advance towards the first height as far as the road, where they will await the arrival of the other battalion.

' The two battalions of each regiment will form the advanced guard of their respective brigades, and each advanced guard will be strengthened by a company of Engineers, provided with the necessary tools to facilitate the passage of a river, and with implements for demolition.

' These advanced guards will advance along the roads leading to Concon Bajo and Concon Medio respectively, to prepare the passage of the

river Aconcagua at the two points marked in the map by the word Vado (ford).

‘ Captain Lazo will hand over to the commander of the Engineers, the flat barges brought by the fleet.

‘ The squadron Libertad and the battery Hurtado will follow the advanced guard of the 1st Brigade. The squadron of Guides and the Armstrong battery that of the 2nd Brigade.

‘ Both squadrons of cavalry will push forward. Officers’ patrols to explore the country on both sides of the roads taken by the advanced guards, and to reconnoitre the river Aconcagua with respect to its passage, especially at the fords.

‘ One of the patrols of the squadron Libertad will take the road from Puerto Viejo to Concon Bajo; a patrol from the Guides the road from Quintero to Concon Alto.

‘ The respective commanders of the Engineer companies will push on with these patrols, with the object of determining the points for the passage of the river, before the arrival of the advanced guards.

‘ The main bodies of the two squadrons will advance along the same roads till they reach the advanced guards, with which they will leave their respective batteries, and will at once endeavour to reach, as quickly as possible, the opposite bank of the Aconcagua, in order to occupy the heights south of the river.

‘ They will keep the main bodies on or near the

roads that lead to Vina del Mar, and will push forward officers' patrols towards Vina del Mar, Salto, and Quilpue.

‘ One troop of the squadron of Guides will make for Limache immediately after crossing the river. The commander of this detachment will receive from the commander of Engineers of his advanced guard, as he passes, a detachment provided with demolition tools, and he will endeavour to destroy the railway and telegraph line near Limache, or, if possible, the tunnel of San Pedro.

‘ In case of meeting with bodies of the enemy, the advanced squadrons will avoid conflict, unless they can reckon upon sufficient support on the part of the advanced guards, and will retire before superior forces upon their advanced guards, but not without previously warning the latter, and detaching patrols of observation in front of the enemy.

‘ The main bodies of the two brigades will form in column of march on the roads which their advanced guards have taken, and will follow the latter as soon as their formation is finished.

‘ The wagons will follow the main bodies of their brigades, bringing with them the mess men, stores, and rations for one day.

‘ The squadron of Carbineers, reinforced by four sections of mounted rifles, and four detachments of mounted Engineers, provided with demolition tools, will send one company by Colmo

towards Manzanar and San Pedro, and the other two companies along the road from the mines, and the road from the peak of Chillicauquen as far as Quillota, and along the road from the peak of Pucalan as far as Nogales.

‘Officers’ patrols supported by Rifles and Engineers will endeavour to reach the stations of San Pedro, Quillota, Santa Cruz, and the tunnel of San Pedro, in order to destroy the railway and telegraph lines in as many places as possible. In case they may not be able to reach the places intended, they will do their best to hold the hills on the north bank of the river.

‘The squadron Granaderos will proceed with four sections of mounted Rifles to Puchuncavi, and thence to Nogales, Purutun,¹ and La Ligua.¹

‘All cavalry patrols will endeavour to maintain uninterrupted communication between each other. They will keep up a system of formation between themselves and the main bodies, and will send all wagons and carts which they meet, with their animals, to Quintero; the wagons loaded with wood, and the carts with green stuff. They will make use of the services of the inhabitants as guides and conductors for the carts and wagons.

‘In case bodies of the enemy are encountered, the cavalry will make use of good positions for defence, and will profit by the fire of the Rifles; but will always leave the greater part of their

¹ Off the map.

troopers mounted, in order to follow and reconnoitre the flanks of the enemy's position.

'Any people whom they find disposed to join the ranks of the Constitutional Army will be directed by the patrols to Quintero and Colmo, but they must be warned that they will have to appear mounted and armed with fire-arms.

'The squadron of Lancers will proceed to Quintero (the farm), and there await further orders ; the remainder of the Rifles and Engineers will join the Lancers.

'The Third Brigade will form up north of the road from Puerto Viejo to Quintero (the farm), and west of the latter, and await further orders from the Commander-in-Chief.

'Captain Lazo will provide commanders with experienced guides from the General Staff for the proper guidance of columns.

'The Commander-in-Chief will proceed after disembarkation to Quintero (the farm).

'(Signed) KÖRNER.'

You will notice that the orders begin by fixing definite times when the men are to be given a hot meal, and to be ready to disembark. This procedure is all right in the case of orders for a march on land, but my experience is that the naval authorities cannot guarantee, on the day before, the exact time when vessels will arrive in harbour and anchors will be let go. When men have a heavy day's work before them it is a great mistake

to interfere with their rest too soon, and to keep them standing about fully equipped. This is very likely to occur if the time for parading is fixed too long beforehand.

It would have been better to say : ' One hour before anchoring broth and coffee will be distributed,' and : ' The leading troops will be ready to disembark immediately the anchors are let go, and the remaining troops in succession, in accordance with the following orders, as soon as boats are ready to take them.' The captains of the transports, or the officers of the watch, could easily have warned the military officers when the fleet was approaching the anchorage. The actual disembarkation was not completed until 10.30 P.M., and there could be no reason for ordering ' the whole of the troops ' to prepare to disembark at 3 A.M.

The next point I want you to notice is the landing of a covering force of 300 men to guard the approaches by land, and prevent interference with the disembarkation on the beach. One can hardly exaggerate the importance of paying attention to this matter. History shows us that if the destination of an expeditionary force can be kept secret, opposition to the actual landing is exceptional, but as soon as the enemy hears of the arrival of the transports he may be expected to hurry troops to the spot, if enough are available in the neighbourhood to crush the invaders in detail before the whole force can be landed.

You will note the order to cut the telegraph line from Quintero. This was obviously necessary, and needs no comments. To have cut it just before the fleet appeared would have been more effective, but this was impracticable.

The next order I want you to notice is the order to attack bodies of the enemy at the point of the bayonet, under cover of the fire of artillery and infantry from the fleet. How the covering fire could be developed at such a critical moment is not stated, but, in connection with this subject generally, I should like to consider the question a little further with you. We must not be unreasonable in our demands for covering fire from men-of-war in case of landings on an open beach. You know how much attention is being paid by our field artillery to the importance of supporting an infantry assaulting line by their fire until the last minute, and you know how difficult it is to do so, even if the distance is within eyesight range. You know all about the special appliances which are being tried to indicate to the artillery the progress of the assaulting troops; appliances such as discs which show to the rear but not to the front, telephones for sending messages, and so on; and you know the constant practice in peace time which our field artillery get in firing over different sorts of ground, and in bursting their shrapnel shell at exactly the right point in the air. In war time, you have possibly experienced the sensation of being under the fire of the

artillery of your own side. Really it is impossible to lay down any rigid rules that the guns shall fire until their own troops arrive at any definite distance from the enemy, because this distance must primarily depend upon the nature of the ground. If the enemy posts himself at the top of a steep slope, the attackers can usually be seen climbing up it, and gunfire can be kept up until the last minute without peppering them sufficiently to stop their progress. On level ground the difficulty is far greater.

The seamen and marines who fire the heavy guns in our men-of-war are all magnificent shots, but their object when shooting at other vessels is to obtain direct hits, not to burst shrapnel shell at an exact spot in the air so that the bullets shall strike the right object with sufficient remaining velocity, and, even if they had the necessary skill, shrapnel shell are not provided for the purpose.¹ Then again their practice is obtained over water, where the splash of the shell can be observed and the aim corrected. It is a very different matter to fire over land ranges with false crests and all sorts of misleading features, and with so much less prospect of accurately observing the result. The greater length of the ranges adds an additional difficulty to correct observation, and makes it harder to distinguish friend from foe. Personally I have only seen such supporting fire attempted on one occasion, just before the battle

¹ Since writing this I have heard that they are being supplied.

of El Teb in 1884, and then a war vessel at Trinkitat appeared to throw some heavy shells at the 10th and 19th Hussars, and none, as far as one could judge, at the enemy. The conditions were as difficult as they could be, the country was flat, and objects could not be distinguished properly in the desert mirage.

When war vessels can be so placed as to enfilade an enemy's position, their fire can be of the greatest assistance, and cases like this occurred later in the war which we are considering, but when they have to fire over the heads of an attacking force advancing over low ground from a beach upon which they have been disembarked, then we must not expect too much effect from supporting fire from the sea.

To return to Colonel del Canto's orders for the disembarkation; you notice with what vigour the various units were directed to push forward when once they had landed. Although the ultimate destination of the force, Valparaiso, is not specified, we can understand how important rapidity of movement would be, because the enemy could take advantage of every moment to increase the strength of the army which he could interpose between the invaders and their destination. The Aconcagua river formed an obstacle running right across the Congressionalist line of advance, and it was of the utmost importance to both sides to seize the crossings without delay.

You will notice the order for officers' patrols to

destroy the railway and telegraph lines in as many places as possible. This was one of the most important of the orders. Success in cutting the railway at this juncture would make all the difference to the enemy's reinforcements which might attempt to come up from Santiago and elsewhere.

Finally, I want to draw your attention to the order to collect wagons and carts and send them to Quintero. This question of land transport is perhaps the most difficult of all to arrange for in the case of a landing on a hostile coast. Without transport of some kind a military force loses its power of movement, and the amount required will depend upon the theatre of operations, whether food and water can be obtained locally, and so on. In any case, ammunition must be carried, and a certain amount of baggage and stores. You will realise how difficult it is to carry sufficient transport animals and vehicles in the troopships and to land them on an open beach, and how much time would be spent in the operation. If such a course has to be pursued, it is essential that the vehicles shall be adapted to the purpose, and two-wheeled carts, like those employed by the Japanese in 1904, seem to be the most suitable. Excluding machine guns, field guns, and ammunition wagons, a British Division of about 20,000 men requires about 860 vehicles, and the large majority of them are quite unsuited for landing on an open beach. If ever in the course of your career you should be charged

with the responsibility of landing four-wheeled vehicles under such conditions, remember to make certain that they are lowered from the ships into the horse boats facing the right way to get them out. I remember seeing nearly half an hour's delay per wagon on several occasions on the Clacton beach in 1904, owing to the neglect of this precaution. Remember also to keep the centre of gravity of the loads as low as possible, so as not to upset the boats. If one can rely upon seizing the transport of the country so much the better, the operation of landing will thereby be simplified and much time will be saved; but one of the points which stands out most prominently in all amphibious wars is that landing forces are nearly always paralysed before they have marched very far, on account of want of sufficient transport vehicles to carry their requirements. If you ever have to draw up a plan to defend a country against raiding forces expected by sea, do not forget to arrange that all transport on the coast shall be driven inland, including even the cabs in seaside resorts, which would be most useful to the enemy. But I am afraid we are getting a long way from Chile.

These are the chief points in the disembarkation orders to which I would draw your attention, and we can now pass to the actual operations in order to study the effect which they produced.

Let us consider the naval arrangements first. The proposal was to arrive at 4 A.M.; the lead-

ing ships were to reconnoitre the anchorage for mines, and the fleet to approach in 'divisions in line ahead' at a speed of four knots. They were to drop anchor, swing with their bows to seaward, and lay kedge anchors landwards to keep them with their sterns to the shore.

Unfortunately the wind and tide drifted the squadron to the northward during the night, so that at dawn on the 20th of August they were ten miles north of Quintero Bay, opposite a place called Zapallar. Quintero Bay was reached at 7 A.M., instead of before daybreak. The advanced ships finished their search for mines, and the covering party occupied Lookout Hill¹ and the beach at 8 A.M. Their landing was unopposed, 26 Balmacedist cavalrymen falling back before them and cutting the telegraph line to Valparaíso during the retreat. At 9.30 A.M. the regular disembarkation was commenced, and was not completed until 10.30 P.M. Had there been no delay in arriving, it would have been easily completed during the hours of daylight.

The most serious effect produced by the delay was that the Balmacedists had sufficient time to get a force to positions on the left bank of the Aconcagua river, covering the crossings, which therefore were not seized by the Congressionalists. The railway lines were not destroyed. Balmacedist reinforcements were brought by train to

¹ Not shown on map.

Vina del Mar, and the local land transport was not seized in accordance with the orders.

At 10 A.M., the advanced guard of the First Brigade moved along the coast road leading to Concon Bajo, followed by the remainder of the Brigade at 4 P.M. Opposition was met with on the Aconcagua river, and the Brigade remained on the northern bank where they had all assembled in bivouac, opposite Concon Bajo, by 10 P.M.

The advanced guard of the Second Brigade also moved off at 10 A.M. and took the road leading to Colmo. The remainder of the Brigade marched at 3 P.M., and the whole reached Dumuno where they bivouacked for the night.

The Third Brigade did not finish disembarking until 10.30 P.M., and were not ready to move off until midnight. Their orders, as no doubt you have noticed, were to follow the Second Brigade on the Colmo road, but being in the dark in a strange country, and having no assistance from a trained staff, it is not surprising that 1500 of them lost their way in a dense mist and followed the coast road, along which the First Brigade had advanced. They marched during the remainder of the night, part along the Colmo road, and part along the Concon Bajo road, and here we will leave them for the present.

On the 21st of August the first battle of the war was fought, but before describing it I should like to quote to you a portion of a report by Colonel

del Canto, which will help us to see things from his point of view. He writes :—

‘ It should be observed that neither that day in Quintero, nor during the subsequent march to the banks of the Aconcagua, did we receive any authentic information which might have revealed to us the number or position of the enemy; being kept in ignorance, owing to the enemy’s foresight in cutting the telegraph and railway lines (*sic*), as to whether the concentration of the different divisions of the Dictator’s army against us had been suspended or not.

‘ All that we knew about this was that military forces, more or less considerable, were distinctly discernible on the heights that commanded the Aconcagua from the south—information vaguely communicated in Quintero by ignorant peasants from those parts.

‘ We had, nevertheless, to presume that this concentration would be effected to a large extent, since the telegraph office in Quintero was at work up to the moment when the squadron came in sight, whereby we could conjecture that telegraph and railway lines were busy, and that at any rate the Dictator’s divisions from Valparaiso and Santiago, promptly advised of our disembarkation, would not fail to concentrate without delay, and this turned out to be the case.’

The Aconcagua river runs between two chains of hills from 450 to 600 feet high, separated by an open valley from 600 to 800 yards in width.

The slopes on the southern bank, especially near Colmo, were covered with bush and undergrowth. There were known to be fords at Colmo and Concon Bajo which were passable by infantry on a front of from 15 to 20 yards, but the water was up to men's waists. You will, of course, notice from the map that the Balmacedists had a road following the course of the river on the left bank, and that this road would afford them some facilities for lateral communication; and another point to notice is that the left of the Balmacedist position rested on the sea, and could be enfiladed by gunfire from the Congressionalist war vessels.

The Congressionalist forces were much exhausted by their march, during which there seems to have been some straggling. Much ammunition, baggage, and stores had been left behind at Quintero for want of transport, because only 200 mules had been landed, and the vehicles in the neighbouring country had not been seized. All the animals had been swum ashore, which is a simple operation, but one leading to much confusion on the beach if done on a large scale, and there seems to have been a regular scramble for them, so that only the worst ones were left for the baggage when they were sorted out.

Del Canto's original plan was to force a passage at Colmo, using the Second and Third Brigades, while the First Brigade crossed, if possible, at Concon Bajo.

At 4 A.M. the Second Brigade advanced from Dumuno, followed by the bulk of the Third Brigade at 6.15 A.M. At 7.30 A.M. they reached the northern bank of the river, and at the same moment the guns of the First Brigade opened fire from their position opposite Concon Bajo. At 8.15 A.M. the Second Brigade guns opened fire.

Having formed the opinion that the bulk of the Balmacedists, estimated at 11,000 men, were opposite Colmo, Colonel del Canto decided to change his plan of attack. He was also influenced in this decision by finding that the enemy were occupying the forward slopes of the hills covering the Colmo crossing, and that they had fresh cavalry, and powerful field and mountain artillery which could not be dominated by the weaker ordnance in the hands of the Congressionalists.

He had taken the precaution of attaching a staff officer to the First Brigade headquarters to report personally to him the state of affairs. We have many instances of the usefulness of this procedure, and I believe that it was found most successful by the Japanese in 1904. Such work requires officers with special qualifications, including great tact and judgment. The officer referred to reported at 10 A.M. that the First Brigade was in a concealed position on the north bank, and that they had a good crossing over the river opposite to them. Del Canto must also have known by this time that 1500 of the Third Brigade were behind the First Brigade, instead of

behind the Second Brigade as they should have been, and this mistake fitted in well with the new plan which he adopted.

Having discovered that the Balmacedists were in such great strength at Colmo, he rightly judged that they could not also be very strong at Concon Bajo. He therefore decided to force the crossing at the latter place, but at the same time to attack vigorously the strong force of the enemy at Colmo, in order to prevent their reinforcing their left. The fleet was asked to co-operate by gunfire directed on the heights south of the river in front of the First Brigade, and the cruiser *Esmeralda* kept up semaphore communication with the army. In all conjunct operations, this question of intercommunication between fleet and army is one of extreme importance, and I hope that we pay sufficient attention to it in our own service. On this occasion the co-operation seems to have been admirable.

The First Brigade commenced to cross the river at 11.25 A.M., and suffered little loss, owing to the fire from the ships preventing the Balmacedists from occupying the forward slopes. This fire is also said to have prevented the enemy's reserves from being moved to their left. As soon as the Congressionalists crowned the heights, they showed their position to the ships by flags, and as far as I can gather they did not suffer any loss from the gunfire of their own war vessels.

The Second Brigade attacked at the same time, without waiting for the support of the Third Brigade, and suffered very heavily, but in a good cause because they held the enemy before them while the First Brigade, and the part of the Third Brigade which was with them, developed their attack upon his left and left rear.

This is one of the best examples of a successful 'holding attack,' as it has sometimes been called, that I have ever read about. The local conditions could scarcely have appeared more hopeless. The attacking force had to wade waist-deep across the fords which could only be crossed on a narrow front, and was exposed the whole time to a withering fire from the stronger forces of the enemy, well posted on the opposite bank. It had not even been possible to dominate the hostile guns, which were superior both in numbers and range to those of the attacking force. You will remember the use of the expression 'holding attack' in our old 'Combined Training' book, and you will often have heard arguments about the use of this expression. Continental military critics consider that we were unwise in employing such a term, because it was likely to be misunderstood. A commander ordered to conduct a 'holding attack,' they argued, would not be likely to execute with vigour a task which, locally, looked quite hopeless. It is true that, if he thought beyond the local situation, he would realise that the hopelessness of the task in itself

meant a general success, because he thereby compelled the enemy to employ in front of him a large force which would save the whole hostile army from defeat if it could be moved elsewhere. Such a result can seldom be attained by fire alone, certainly not by artillery fire. You will find a very good example of this in Henderson's *Stonewall Jackson*, vol. ii. pages 49-59, in his description of the battle of Glendale in the 'Seven days' in 1862, where Jackson's guns failed to hold the Federals opposite to him along the White Oak Swamp river, because he did not order the infantry to cross and attack the enemy. Henderson exonerates Jackson, but allows that if he had acted otherwise the result would have been a decisive victory for the Confederates. Most of our continental critics hold that only one sort of attack must be specified in orders to troops, or the result will be no real attack at all, and you will notice that in the new *Field Service Regulations*, Part I., which supersede the old 'Combined Training' book, the expression 'holding attack' is no longer employed.

The result of the vigorous attack on the Colmo position by the Second and part of the Third Brigades was that the enemy's troops in this part of the field were pinned to their position. At 3.45 P.M. the Balmacedist left flank was driven in by the First and remainder of the Third Brigades, which had crossed at Concon Bajo, helped by the gunfire from the war vessels.

Firing ceased at 4.30 P.M. and the victory was decisive. There were 869 casualties on the side of the attack, many of them drowned in the river, and 1648 among the defenders, of whom only 3000 could be collected after the battle; all their artillery, ammunition, baggage, and stores fell into the hands of the enemy, and the Congressionalists would have met little opposition if they had pushed on to Valparaiso. They had run short of ammunition and had only ten rounds per rifle remaining, but it was not solely the want of ammunition that checked the pursuit.

You have noticed how every manual on war impresses the lesson that a defeated enemy must be pursued and routed at any cost, but can you find many examples in history of such vigorous pursuits? You know Charles Kingsley's sound remark in *Westward Ho!* which runs: 'While the literary man is laying down the law at his desk as to how many troops should be moved here, and what rivers should be crossed there, and where the cavalry should have been brought up, and where the flank should have been turned, the wretched man who has to do the work finds the matter settled for him by pestilence, want of shoes, empty stomachs, bad roads, heavy rains, hot sun, and a thousand stern warriors who never show on paper.'

The fact was that the Congressionalist force was in no condition for pursuit. Like many hastily raised levies they were ready to fight

like demons for their cause; but war is not all fighting, it is often a period of deadly monotony to those who take part in it, and it is during the long monotonous marches under adverse conditions that training and discipline are so urgently required. Having been raised and organised a few months beforehand, the Congressionalists could hardly have been expected to be properly disciplined. With little thought for the future, they had thrown their greatcoats and even their rations away when crossing the river, or when coming into action, and they had not acquired the habit of obedience, which might have saved them from such foolishness.

Fortunately for them some food could be obtained; there were plenty of oxen and sheep in the country, and some of the badly needed draught cattle were slaughtered. The troops were therefore in a better plight than Wolfe's heroes after the battle of the Heights of Abraham which led to the capture of Quebec, and decided the fate of Canada. In the orders issued on the 14th of September 1759, the day after the battle, these troops were only promised fresh provisions 'the day after to-morrow.' The greatcoats of the Congressionalists did not reach their owners again in many cases until the 28th of August, and as rain storms were experienced the want of such covering was very serious, especially in bivouac. For the sake of the wounded, it was fortunate that a Balmacedist ambulance and equipment

were captured, much of the medical equipment having been left behind because all spare transport was wanted for ammunition.

By the most strenuous exertions, more ammunition was brought up from Quintero during the night, most of it coming by sea and being landed in Concon Bay. It is curious how often we find that expeditionary forces are obliged to keep to the coastline after landing, because they have to rely upon the fleet to bring their food and other necessities to them; we shall find better examples than this one in other amphibious wars, so we will leave this point for the present.

At 10.20 A.M. on the 22nd of August the Congressionalists were concentrated on the southern bank of the Aconcagua river, and by that time they had 120 rounds of ammunition per rifle, and 64 rounds per gun. Orders were again issued for the destruction of the railway line between Quintero and Limache, but these orders were not carried out. During the day the First Brigade advanced to the Renaca Heights, north of Vina del Mar, the Second and Third Brigades to the Paso de Gallo Heights, commanding Vina del Mar, Salto, and Quilpue. At 10.45 P.M. orders were issued for the force to advance southwards at 4 A.M. on the following morning and attack the Vina del Mar position, which lay across the direct route to Valparaiso. In coming to this decision, Del Canto was influenced by a report which I had

better give in Colonel Körner's words: 'Information was received concerning the unfavourable feeling of the (Balmacedist) troops towards the Dictator, and especially their disinclination to fight for him, a fact which I had observed myself at 10 P.M. when there was some firing amongst the enemy's soldiers, followed by eight fusillades of execution. All this seemed to ensure the success of a surprise assault on the position at Vina del Mar.'

During the nights of the 21st and 22nd of August, many trains could be heard passing towards Valparaiso. As a matter of fact, they were bringing Balmacedist troops from Concepcion and intermediate stations, and the delay in cutting the railway was now to have most serious results.

By the morning of the 23rd of August the Balmacedists had been reinforced, and were entrenched on the Vina del Mar position. In these circumstances, little energy was shown by the Congressionalists in the movement to attack. The ships tried to co-operate by gunfire, but were driven off by the fire of the Valparaiso forts. At 9 A.M. some of the brigadiers reported that the task was impossible, and the troops were ordered back to the bivouacs which they had occupied on the previous night. Colonel Körner writes with some feeling that 'the position of Vina del Mar was slightly fortified, but this was quite enough to impress the commanders of the attacking corps, in spite of the fact that the

troops which occupied this position retired to the heights west of Fort Callao as soon as they caught sight of the Constitutional forces. From the position of the First Brigade the retreat of the enemy's forces towards Valparaiso was observed in perfect safety, and our artillery was only waiting for the moment of advance to open fire upon the most suitable points; but the advance did not take place. A surprise would now have been impossible, because daylight would have made the enemy aware of our intention of attacking them from the beginning of the advance.'

The result of this day's operations was that the idea of an attack on Valparaiso from this side was definitely abandoned.

Let us now for one moment imagine ourselves in Del Canto's predicament. In spite of so many things having gone wrong, the soundness of his original plan, and the fighting qualities of his troops, had enabled him to inflict a decisive defeat upon a far superior force of the enemy, posted in a strong position behind a river line. Owing to the failure to cut the railway, he was now confronted by still stronger forces which had had time to entrench themselves, and the co-operation of the fleet, which had been such an important factor in his success at the battle of Concon, was no longer possible on account of his nearer approach to the forts of Valparaiso.

Of course you know the books by Prince Kraft, from whom I borrowed the idea of writing these

letters to you. In one of his letters on strategy he writes : ‘ Clausewitz, my instructor in staff duties, when criticising a disposition worked out by one of the pupils which began with the words, “There are but three cases possible,” said : “There are always only three cases possible, and when all three have been provided for, the fourth invariably happens.” ’ On the same page Prince Kraft writes that a friend of his used to say that in war it is only a question of being the least little bit less afraid than your opponent.

The ‘ three cases ’ apparently possible to Del Canto were, to pursue his original plan, to embark his force and attack some other place such as Concepcion, from which the garrison had been sent to reinforce Valparaiso, or to throw up the sponge and be content with holding the Northern Provinces until he could get a bigger army. Can you think of any other course ? When I reached this point in my first study of the campaign, those were the three which occurred to my own imagination.

A ‘ fourth case ’ was adopted by Del Canto, who evidently had learned the secret to be the least little bit less afraid than one’s opponent in war time. He decided to march right round the superior Balmacedist army, thereby exposing his communications with the sea, and to force his way into Valparaiso from the other side. His plan involved a twenty-eight mile circuit *via*

Quilpue, Quillayes, Las Palmas, Las Cadenas, and La Placilla, to attack Valparaiso from the south.

Besides its extreme boldness and unexpectedness, the advantages of the plan were, that it would prevent further reinforcements reaching the enemy by train, that it would confuse his somewhat immobile opponents, and that it would manœuvre them out of a strong position into a weaker one. The disadvantages of the plan were obvious. It involved a flank march along a single road in face of an enemy of superior strength. Transport and supply difficulties were apparently almost insurmountable, and co-operation with the fleet must be abandoned.

The practicability of the single road to be traversed depended entirely on the state of the weather; very good in dry weather, it became very boggy and almost impassable after even a little rain. It was estimated that the force would reach Quilpue on the 24th, halt for the day on the 25th to rest and reorganise, move to Las Cadenas on the 26th, and reach the El Puerto Heights, north of Placilla, on the 27th of August.

These estimates do not assume a very high power of marching, but Colonel Körner points out that, although an army well trained in marching could probably cover the whole distance in twelve hours, yet the Congressionalist troops had not been trained to this work. He appears to have thoroughly realised the limitations of his force, as he adds that volunteers, always

ready to fight, submit without difficulty to instruction in fighting, but not so readily to the more arduous training of forced marching, which is the only means by which one can, in time, form a marching army.

The success of the audacious plan would depend to a great extent upon the secrecy which could be observed, and the First Brigade, which was nearest the sea, was ordered to remain in position until they received the loads landed from the fleet up to 10 A.M. on the 24th of August, then, and not till then, to march round the rear of the Third Brigade, which was to hold its position opposite to El Salto until the First Brigade had passed. The Second Brigade was to move direct to Quilpue.

The movement was one of extreme delicacy and difficulty, and the Congressionalists based their prospect of success on the assumption that the enemy's leaders had little or no military capacity, that his troops had received no instruction in campaigning, and that ill-digested orders and counter orders would be issued which, in the circumstances, would inevitably produce confusion.

The movements began on the 24th of August. The Second Brigade carried out their simple march to Quilpue without incident. Their cavalry were sent to Quillota, presumably to see that no further reinforcements arrived, but they failed to cut the railway. The Third Brigade succeeded in cutting it at the bridge near El Salto,

and obtained the important information that thirteen trains, with at least 8700 Balmacedists, had passed through in the preceding twenty-four hours. The First Brigade's movement was delayed until nightfall by slowness in handling the baggage and stores, and by the difficulty of the country. In order to conceal their intention to move, they kept up their camp fires, and lighted additional ones—an old campaigning trick, against which we used to be warned in our training manuals.

At dawn on August the 25th the last portions of the First Brigade were being withdrawn, and the whole force was collected during the day in the neighbourhood of Quilpue. It was fortunate that a day's rest on the 25th was allowed for in the original estimate, as on that day the force was not in a position to move forward. Luckily the important Limache tunnel had at last been blocked by a locomotive being run into it and destroyed, so there was little chance of any further reinforcements reaching Valparaiso. The total strength of the forces in and about that town was now reported to be 20,000 of all arms.

Quilpue was fortunately found to be full of provisions, and, possibly less fortunately, of wines of various descriptions. As we know, free access to liquor is a severe test of the discipline of men who have been enduring considerable hardships. Do you remember when we arrived together at a certain small town in South Africa with our hastily organised column of men, after a

fairly long trek over a thirsty country ? To our surprise we found that most of the inhabitants of the town had left, the proprietor of the hotel among them, accompanied by all his staff. The hotel was open with all the drink unguarded, and, expecting trouble, we took care to post a guard, with a sentry to take charge of the liquor. A short time afterwards we rode round to see how things were going on. No sentry was to be seen, but we soon found him, turning on the tap of a cask while all the men who had heard of the chance were filling bottles of the most potent 'Cape Smoke' to enjoy at their leisure. You will remember our astonishment, but then we had only been accustomed to regular troops, with their long training in the sacredness of 'sentry go.' What advantage was taken by the Congressionalists of the wines of Quilpue I am unable to say. The official report simply mentions that the supply was abundant.

Rain fell on the evening of the 25th of August, and this must have caused serious anxiety to Del Canto, because the single road by which he proposed to advance was expected to become impassable after even a little rain.

Having committed themselves to such a dangerous and critical movement, it was necessary to carry it through with as much speed as possible, and the longer the march could be concealed, the greater would be the prospect of success. In such circumstances, it is always a

question for a commander to decide whether to undertake a night march, or to wait until dawn before moving. Marching by night near the enemy in a hostile country requires a trained staff, and a rigid observance of orders. It requires practice beforehand, and is a difficult operation even for highly disciplined troops; the actual rate of movement by night is far slower than in day time, and I am sure that in your staff rides you must have sometimes fretted at the extent to which the directing staff puts the break on the speed of all night movements. You will find that they are justified by experience gained in war, and not only is the rate of movement slow, but the men become far more exhausted than they do when marching by day. Nothing tires them more than the constant checks, which are quite unavoidable, even when the march is carefully arranged. When men have once got up a good swing by daylight, a few miles more or less have little effect upon them, but you know well that standing about or moving slowly is one of the most tiring of all operations. To test this, one need only compare a ten-mile walk with a visit to a picture gallery taking about the same number of hours.

In order to conceal the movement as long as possible, Del Canto decided to undertake a night march from Quilpue, commencing at 1.30 A.M. on August the 26th. The Second Brigade, which had recently had the easiest time, was

directed to lead, followed by the Third and First Brigades in the order given. Colonel Körner writes feelingly on the subject of the execution of this march. The moon rose at 1.30 A.M., but the Second Brigade, instead of starting at that time in accordance with the orders, was not ready to move until 3 A.M. The leading regiment, about 1000 strong, took a whole hour to clear the town 'because there were some small pools at two places on the road.' This delayed the whole column, the Third Brigade could not start until just before dawn, and the head of the First Brigade could not move until 6.30 A.M. Rain fell during the movement, and, although not an unmixed blessing, it had the effect of concealing the march from the Balmacedists, who kept a very bad look-out. There were of course no clouds of dust, which always give away the movements of troops to the enemy by daylight. The most exciting incident occurred when a squadron of Hussars, which had deserted from the enemy, joined the Congressionalist force on the line of march. The strength of this squadron was a little over 300 sabres.

The rate of movement was even slower than might have been expected from undisciplined troops. The head of the Second Brigade reached Las Palmas at 9 A.M. on the 26th of August, the Third Brigade at 2 P.M., and the First Brigade at 3.30 P.M. The enemy fortunately made no movement. Orders were issued

at 3.30 P.M. on this day for the march to be continued at 5 P.M., the Second Brigade leading as before. The Third Brigade was to follow at 6 P.M., and the First Brigade at 7.30 P.M. The right flank was covered by some of the cavalry. It was estimated that the march to Las Cadenas would take four hours, but it was a very dark night, and the road became abominable owing to the rain and the constant traffic. The Second Brigade straggled badly, and instead of the last Brigade reaching Las Cadenas at midnight, as had been anticipated, sunrise the next morning found a large proportion of them still straggling along the road. Men of all three brigades had fallen out and were lying about all the way along the line of advance.

Del Canto describes this march as the most difficult of the campaign, and his personal influence must have been wonderful, or he would never have got his command to Las Cadenas at all in such adverse circumstances, but at this stage he was obliged to stay his hand. The original intention had been to push on early in the morning of the 27th of August and attack the Balmacedists in their position on the El Puerto Heights, but the Congressionalist force was now incapable of such an effort. By 8 A.M. most of the stragglers had come up, but all the troops were exhausted, and required a day's rest for repose and reorganisation.

Instead of attacking on the 27th of August,

Del Canto accordingly decided to halt at Las Cadenas, and to spend the day in reconnoitring the El Puerto position. Outposts were put out to provide for the safety of the force, and an ample supply of food was brought up and distributed at noon, the resources of the country having been collected by the mounted troops during the previous day's march. At 2.30 P.M. the brigadiers reported that the troops were all ready and anxious to attack, but that it would not be advisable to harass them by night. The enemy made no offensive movements during the day, but from the latest reports received, and estimates of railway traffic, the conclusion was come to that his strength was about 14,000 men. He must by this time have known all about the Congressional movement, and the direction from which to expect attack, and he had had time to prepare the El Puerto position for defence. In the evening a conference of the Congressional commanders was assembled at Las Cadenas, at which a decision was arrived at to attack at day-break on the following morning.

The battle of La Placilla, which took place on the 28th of August, presents so many points of interest that I wish I could describe it to you at length. Unfortunately I have not been able to secure a good map for you, and without one it would be useless to give the orders in full, and to attempt to describe the course of the battle in detail. We must do the best we can with the

map which I enclose, and the following report by Del Canto will be of some assistance. It was written after the reconnaissance on the 27th of August : 'The plain of Penuelas is bounded on the north by a cordon of hills, with sharp crested knife-edged spurs, which trend towards the south, getting lower and lower till they are lost in the plain. At the foot of these ridges lie the houses of La Placilla, and alongside of these, towards the north-west, runs the old high road from Santiago to Alto del Puerto and Valparaiso. On the heights of these hills, facing southward, and occupying a space of about 3 or 4 kilometres, the line of battle of the Dictator's army was extended on both sides of the high road. To the east their positions commanded a series of woody ravines difficult to cross. A little to the west, the enemy's right occupied the upper part of one of the above-mentioned spurs, over the crest and edge of which runs another road, more narrow and less used for traffic than the first-named road.'

You will notice that the ground to the eastward, opposite to the enemy's left, was difficult to cross. This difficulty applied to both sides, and Del Canto pointed out to the brigadiers that on this account the enemy's forces eastward of the main road might be considered useless and lost to him if it were found possible to carry the commanding crest of the hill to the westward of the road. Del Canto thought that this hill was capable of being taken by assault, and he formed

his plans accordingly. He anticipated that the eastward portion of the enemy's force, considering the broken nature of the ground they occupied, would neither be able to advance at the right moment, nor to bring fire to bear upon forces attacking their right flank, the most important part of the defensive position which they had selected.

The Congressionalists had only one hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition available per rifle, and for this reason fire was to be reserved until within 300 to 400 metres. The commanders were enjoined to bear in mind the propensity of the soldier not to estimate distances, but to halt and waste a good deal of ammunition at long ranges, whenever he finds himself protected by any accident of the ground.

In distributing the force, Del Canto stipulated that the main attack should be carried out by two brigades in echelon from the right, at 500 metres distance, the other brigade being kept with the artillery to act as a reserve. The details of the plan he left to Colonel Körner to work out.

The conference of commanders was held between 7 and 8 P.M. on the 27th of August, and at 8 P.M. the orders were issued to the brigadiers. The Third Brigade was to move first, and was to occupy the height east of the main road near Placilla, and form the reserve for the attack; they were also told to watch the right wing of the First Brigade and protect it if

necessary. The artillery of the First and Third Brigades were to be massed on the same heights, to entrench themselves, and to prepare for a duel with the superior artillery of the enemy. They were enjoined to watch the enemy's artillery, not to open fire unless the enemy did so, and to overwhelm his guns with fire as quickly as they could.

The First Brigade was to be drawn up at first in close formation in rear of the left wing of the Third, with their left resting on the main road. The Second Brigade was to be in similar formation in echelon at 500 metres' distance from the left flank of the First Brigade, their object being to gain ground to their left, and ultimately to attack the right of the enemy's position beyond the flank of the First Brigade. The cavalry of the Second Brigade were massed on the left, and that of the First and Third Brigades on the right flank.

After allowing for the losses at Concon on August the 21st, and the number of inhabitants and of deserters from the enemy who had joined on the march, the total strength of the Congressional force engaged in the attack may be estimated at ten thousand.

The orders issued were very clear, and after reading them, one wishes more than ever that one could go to Chile and study the operations on the spot; there is only one point to which I want to draw your attention, the order to the Third

Brigade. Del Canto wished them 'to act as a reserve if required.' Colonel Körner's orders say: 'The Third Brigade will constitute the reserve for the attack, and will watch the right wing of the First, *so as to protect it in case of necessity.*' (The italics are mine.) Of course we do not know whether the wording of this order was submitted to Del Canto for approval, but I want to warn you, as a future staff officer, of the danger of going beyond your instructions in a matter of this nature. The wording of the order, as it was issued, left it to the commander of the Third Brigade to decide whether, in certain circumstances, he should interpose in the fight. He might decide to do so, and commit his force to battle just at the time when the general commanding required its services elsewhere, and, as you know so well from other examples, it is difficult or impossible to keep control of any force when it is once in close contact with the enemy. We certainly have a brilliant example of this course having been pursued by the Japanese in their late war with Russia, but even so, the operation took a considerable time, and we have no guarantee that it could be applied in the case of a small force engaged in a one-day battle. The conflicts in Manchuria were on a much larger scale, and absorbed several days in their development.

As I have said before, we cannot follow the course of the battle in detail for want of a suffi-

ciently good map, and personal knowledge of the ground, so we will content ourselves with a brief summary. Between 4 and 5 A.M. on the 28th of August the Congressionalists left their camps and marched off to form for attack. At 7.30 A.M. the Balmacedist guns opened fire upon them, and shortly afterwards the combat became general. The First Brigade had been given their line of advance on a conspicuous house showing up on the heights, but they lost direction and moved too far to the eastward. The Third Brigade joined in on their right, and so was not available as a reserve when Del Canto wished to send supports to the Second Brigade, to help them to carry the high ground on the right of the enemy's position. The Second Brigade was accordingly unable to carry out the important task which had been allotted to it, and was stopped by the fire of the enemy.

The situation of the Congressionalists now appeared to be somewhat desperate. They had no infantry in reserve and they had abandoned their communications and the co-operation of their fleet. All their movements must have been visible to the defenders who held the commanding ground on the crest-line of the heights, and their left flank lay open to a counterstroke by the stronger army which they had attacked, if the Balmacedist troops had been capable of such a manœuvre.

Del Canto appears to have revelled in devising

desperate measures to deal with desperate situations. He ordered the three squadrons of cavalry which were watching his left flank to advance rapidly in support of the Second Brigade, ascend to the crest line, and attack the enemy. In the words of his official report, 'the three squadrons crossed the plain at a gallop, ascended the crest, and fell on the enemy with a gallantry and intrepidity really extraordinary.'

There is not much doubt that in staff rides and on regimental tours such a manœuvre would have been 'ruled offside,' as one of my friends at the Staff College used to remark. But, whatever may have been the theoretical result of this cavalry charge, the actual result was that the enemy's right flank was driven in, and by 10.30 A.M. the rout had become general along the whole line. The Balmacedist army fled panic-stricken and defeated beyond recovery.

The losses in the battle of Placilla were heavy. There were 1800 casualties, including 485 killed, on the side of the attack, and 3363, including 941 killed, on the side of the defenders. The victors captured 105 guns, 23 machine guns, 23,960 rifles and carbines, 1350 sabres, and 2½ million rounds of ammunition.

The Congressionalist forces were formed up immediately after the battle, and within two hours they marched down the slopes into Valparaiso, and occupied the forts and barracks without further resistance. A little before 1 P.M.

some shots were fired by the torpedo vessel *Lynch*, which was at anchor in the bay, but she was soon boarded and silenced, and this incident closed the campaign. At 5 P.M. the fleet arrived from sea and anchored in the harbour.

The best comment we can make upon the battle of Placilla is to quote that pregnant sentence from our *Field Service Regulations*, referring to the case where one force awaits the attack of another: 'If victory is to be won, the defensive attitude must be assumed only in order to await or create a favourable opportunity for decisive offensive action.'

Santiago, the capital of Chile, was occupied on the 31st of August by the Provisional Government and the Headquarter Staff of the army, and President Balmaceda, who had fled to that place after the battle of Placilla, was obliged to take refuge elsewhere.

Postscript to Second Letter

MY DEAR TOM,

You write that you have read with some interest the account I sent you of the wonderful doings of Del Canto's army in 1891, but you say that you would be very glad if I could add anything more to explain how the Congressionalists so frequently achieved the impossible, in face of the difficulties with which they were confronted. I can only refer you to the last part of Del Canto's official report, in

which he says that the cause was national, and the triumph belonged to the nation. He considers that he had the nation behind him, and that the national feeling, which weakened the courage of the Balmacedists, communicated to his own force the moral energy which carried them over the stream of the Aconcagua, and up the heights of Concon and Placilla.

We know well what a difference it makes to an army to feel the spirit of a nation behind it, and the longer a war lasts, the greater assistance this moral support will give. Do you remember the period, in our long struggle in South Africa, when cricket matches were given larger and blacker type in the newspaper headings than the incidents of the campaign? If you do you will know well what I mean. But it was not with the object of accentuating such points that I began this correspondence with you; it was in order to bring out lessons which apply more especially to amphibious campaigns. Whatever their spirit may have been, it seems doubtful, to say the least of it, whether such a hastily raised and half disciplined little army could have attained their wonderful success, if they had not used the facilities afforded by sea communication for concentrating rapidly, and for striking a sudden and unexpected blow against their powerful opponents.

THIRD LETTER

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR OF 1898

MY DEAR TOM,

My original intention was that we should study together the amphibious wars which have taken place since 1890 in the order in which they occurred, but after thinking the matter over I have decided to take next the Spanish-American war of 1898, although it happened four years after the war between China and Japan. When you have read the account of the Spanish-American war you will realise the reasons; the operations undertaken by the Americans in Cuba were somewhat similar to those carried out by the Congressionalists in Chile, and the general strategy adopted by Japan against China in 1894 is wonderfully similar to that adopted by her against Russia in 1904. This is why I think that it will be better for us to take the four amphibious wars in the order I now suggest.

At the close of my last letter I quoted to you Colonel del Canto's words about the effect produced upon the spirit of fighting forces by the feeling that the cause in which they are fighting is a national one, and that they have the population behind them. After reading about the

Spanish-American war I think that you will hope as I do that with us this spirit will remain within proper bounds, and that the population will not endeavour to interfere with the actual conduct of the operations. When they do this, their one idea seems to be to clamour for forces to protect them, and they seem to be incapable of realising that the very best way to protect everything and everybody is to concentrate all our own forces to destroy the enemy's forces, whether by sea or land. When this has once been done nothing can hurt the population, if it is not done nothing can save them. If every demand for local defence were complied with, then we should soon scatter all our forces and not be able to strike a blow at all, and an opponent not hampered by such harmful clamour could concentrate his strength and deal with our forces in detail. You probably know what Captain Mahan, the author of the Sea Power books, wrote so feelingly after the war : ' Whatever really enlightens public opinion in a country like ours facilitates military operations.' You will find the remark in his *Lessons from the War with Spain*, and I draw your attention to it so that you may realise the value of the various Leagues which have been started in this country, and the numerous journals on naval and military subjects ; they all help to educate popular opinion, and above all things it is important that they should all agree on broad questions of policy. Until recent years, no attempt was made to

educate the public in the principles upon which our policy is based, but there has been a great advance since the establishment of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and important statements on the subject are now made in the House of Commons during the debate on the vote for the maintenance of that Committee. Having the weight of responsible authority behind them, these statements naturally must have great influence upon the electorate, and all these causes should combine to avert the danger of interference by a panic-stricken population with strategic concentration. History shows us that popular opinion must of necessity be taken into consideration in all strategical plans, and the object to be attained is to encourage the study of general strategical principles, so that the populace shall realise how their interests can best be advanced, and shall exert their great influence in the right direction. I think that if we now revert to our study of the operations in 1898 my meaning will become clearer, and later on we can devote to this special subject some further consideration.

This war included naval operations to a greater extent than the war in Chile in 1891. Both sides had fleets, and in order that we may have a general grasp of the strategy adopted it will be necessary for us to follow the distribution and movements of the war vessels throughout the operations. I am sending with this letter a

90 SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR OF 1898

table¹ showing you the names of the ships employed, from which you will see that the combatants had in the Atlantic :—

AMERICA.	SPAIN.
4 first-class Battleships.	<i>At Sea</i> —4 first-class Armoured Cruisers and smaller craft.
1 second-class Battleship.	
2 first - class Armoured Cruisers.	
2 Armoured Coast Defence Vessels.	<i>At Cadiz</i> —1 Battleship,
2 first - class Protected Cruisers.	1 first - class Armoured Cruiser, and various unarmoured vessels.
1 second-class Cruiser, and smaller craft.	

In the far Eastern waters they had :—

AMERICA.	SPAIN.
1 first - class Protected Cruiser.	2 second-class Unprotected Cruisers.
3 second-class Protected Cruisers.	2 third - class Protected Cruisers.
2 third - class Protected Cruisers.	8 third-class Unprotected Cruisers.
and smaller vessels.	and smaller vessels.

As you know, the difference between ‘armoured’ and ‘protected’ vessels is that the former have side armour, the latter armoured decks only.

You will notice that, provided they kept together, the American ships should have been more than a match for the Spaniards.

We need not consider the total strength of the

¹ See page 161.

land armies, because they never came to close grips with one another, and the only military forces to which we need pay attention are those which were employed in the area of active operations. In these amphibious wars we constantly come across examples to prove that it is not the enemy's total land force that must be taken into consideration, but it is rather the force which he can use in the area of active operations before the conclusion of the conflict.

In considering the origin of the war, I would remind you that there had been unrest in Cuba from 1826 onwards. We need not go into the causes of this unrest, because we are chiefly concerned in the actual operations, from which we want to draw lessons for our future guidance; but we ought to note how war resulted from the possession by Spain of oversea territory closer to another powerful country than to the homeland. Popular opinion in the United States had tended for many years towards supporting the independence of Cuba, and if necessary towards forcible interference to attain that object. As far back as 1868 the United States Government had made definite proposals on the subject to the Spanish authorities, but without result, and from 1896 onwards the situation became more critical owing to the policy pursued by General Weyler in suppressing the Cuban insurgents. A private letter written by the Spanish minister at Washington to a friend in Havana, ridiculing the idea

of Cuban self-government, and criticising President M'Kinley, did not tend to improve the situation, and matters were brought to a crisis by the U.S. cruiser *Maine* being blown up in Havana harbour on the night of the 15th of February 1898. On the 20th of April the United States Government publicly recognised the independence of Cuba, and on the 22nd of April declared a blockade of the Cuban coastline.

We have studied the relative strength of the American and Spanish fleets, but, before we follow their movements, I should like first to consider with you some general points which are taken partly from Captain Mahan's book on the lessons to be learned from the war, and partly from other sources. The geographical position of the United States naturally secures them from any probability of invasion by Spanish armies; but they have a long coastline where valuable property is accumulated, and they have an immense coasting trade upon which the industries of the country depend to a very large extent. Natural indifference to naval and military matters appears to have produced most complete ignorance of elementary strategical principles among the people, and to have prevented any proper preparations being made to deal with emergencies such as the one with which they now were confronted. The result was that an extraordinary panic arose on the outbreak of war, amongst the coast population, ending in wild demands for

protection against the depredations of the weak and far distant Spanish war vessels; a marvellous number of Spanish battleships were reported in all sorts of unlikely places, and imaginary firing was heard along the coastline. Soon afterwards Mahan wrote: 'The preposterous and humiliating terrors of the past months, that a hostile fleet would waste coal and ammunition in shelling villages and bathers on a beach, we may hope will not recur.' The government appears to have been compelled to pander to popular clamour, by keeping near the coast a portion of the fleet, under Commodore Schley, and with singular acumen this was entitled a 'Flying Squadron.' The somewhat inappropriate adjective sufficed to produce some moral effect upon the authorities in Spain, who seem to have expected the appearance of Schley's squadron on the other side of the Atlantic, and to have made provision against such an eventuality by detaining a portion of their own sea-going fleet in their own waters, thus reducing their already diminutive chances of gaining successes on the high seas.

Mention of flying squadrons reminds us of the time in the nineties when we ourselves commissioned such a naval force, at a period when there was trouble about Venezuela, about Delagoa Bay, and also about some locality in the Levant. Within a short time the newspapers published telegrams from all these places reporting that our

squadron was expected to arrive there. I quote this to show the tremendous moral effect produced by naval forces in the world, owing to their wonderful mobility.

The Spaniards in any case had a very difficult task in 1898. Their fleet was unready and very badly equipped, some of their vessels were without even their primary armament, and were short of stores and ammunition. Another factor was sadly against them—and it was a factor which could not be altered—their geographical position. Cuba was a long way from Spain; it was 4000 miles from the Spanish naval base at Cadiz and only eighty miles from Key West, and since the Spanish military forces in Cuba depended upon the sea for supplies, their capture was only a matter of time unless a success could be gained over the American fleet. In these days a naval force is severely handicapped if it is obliged to cross an ocean to fight against a hostile fleet which can use its own harbours for shelter, repairs, and replenishment. In order to achieve success under such conditions a fleet of far superior strength is required, and even then it will be in much danger from the enemy's torpedo craft as soon as it approaches his territory. Defended harbours may enable the hostile fleet to choose its own time for action; and submarines, which have been developed since 1898, add still more to the difficulties which confront a naval force when operating close to an enemy's coastline.

The possession of Cuba was the bone of contention, and in spite of all difficulties Spain was obliged to make some effort to gain success at sea. You will notice therefore the disadvantages from which a combatant suffers if he has oversea possessions close to an enemy's territory; these possessions may have an irresistible drawing power, forcing a fleet to fight at a disadvantage a long way from its base, and we have to bear this in mind when we consider our own empire, and the emergencies against which we must make preparation. In the 'two power,' or whatever standard we adopt, we must make allowance for the geographical distribution of possibly hostile forces, and allow the necessary margin.

Reverting to the problem which presented itself to the combatants on this occasion, I am sure that after the time you have spent at the Staff College you know your Clausewitz, or rather you do not really know him, any more than you know Johnson's Dictionary, but you have him by you as a book of reference. You will remember the expression 'war with a limited object' which he employs,¹ and you will have shuddered, as many people have done, at coming across the loose statement in English writings that Clausewitz used to refer to 'limited wars.' There is something very fascinating in the expression 'limited war,' it conveys the idea of

¹ Book VIII., chaps. v., vii., viii.

a limited liability campaign upon which one may embark as lightheartedly as one may invest cash which one does not mind losing in a limited liability company.

In undertaking the conduct of a war it is necessary to remember that, though the object in our minds may be limited, it may require the whole moral and material resources of the country for its attainment. This was a war with a limited object; popular opinion in the United States demanded the independence of Cuba, and unless the Spaniards could obtain successes at sea the limited object must sooner or later be brought about, but, even so, the conflict could not be confined to the area immediately surrounding Cuban territory.

In following the description of the events, it will be convenient for us to take the Atlantic area first, and then to refer to the operations in the Far East. I have prepared a track chart¹ of the Caribbean Sea, which I think you will find useful in following the preliminary naval movements.

On the 23rd of April, Admiral Sampson's fleet undertook the blockade of the Cuban coastline, Commodore Schley's 'Flying Squadron' being kept at Hampton Roads to allay the terrors of the populace. Being very short of ships, Sampson was unable to maintain an effective blockade, and Mahan points out that, had he had the

¹ See Map III. in pocket in cover.

assistance of Schley, he might have done the work more effectively, and prevented supplies reaching the Spanish garrison. Cienfuegos, on the south side of Cuba, was blockaded on the 27th of April, and Matanzas on the north side, to the eastward of Havana, was bombarded at 5000 yards' range on the same day. The only reinforcement expected was the *Oregon*, a new American battle-ship on her way round from the Pacific to join Admiral Sampson's squadron, and she was reported to be at Rio de Janeiro on the 30th of April.

On the 29th of April a small Spanish squadron under Admiral Cervera left St. Vincent, and Sampson was so informed by cable on the same day. Cervera is reported to have left much against his will; the unreadiness of his vessels had lost him many valuable days, so there was no hope of effecting a surprise, and he would have preferred to wait until he could be reinforced by the vessels preparing for sea at Cadiz, and then to have moved across the Atlantic with the full strength available. He was supported in this view by the senior officers under his command, but he appears to have been forced to sea by popular clamour in Spain; and nowadays clamour of this nature is far-reaching in its effects, if governments pay it serious attention, because submarine telegraph cables afford the power of controlling the responsible commanders. We shall find that it was a whole month before

Cervera was located by the United States war vessels, and here again we can imagine how Sampson must have missed the help of Schley's so-called 'Flying Squadron,' of which the wings had been clipped when pandering to popular panic.

On May the 5th, Sampson left the vicinity of Havana on a cruise, and on the 11th of May some of the small American vessels attacked some Spanish gunboats in the harbour of Las Cadenas, east of Matanzas, in Cuba. On the latter date Cervera was off Martinique. On the 12th of May Sampson bombarded San Juan in Porto Rico, and on the 13th Schley's squadron was at last permitted to leave Hampton Roads.

On the 14th of May Cervera was at Curaçoa, where he was doing his best to obtain coal for his ships, but only a little was to be had, and that little of bad quality. On the 15th of May he heard of the bombardment of San Juan by Sampson, and left for sea. Sampson, who was at sea, appears to have heard the same day that Cervera was at Curaçoa. Schley was off Charleston.

One is inclined to wonder whether the bombardment of San Juan by Sampson's fleet had the same drawing power upon the Spaniards that the bombardment of Lissa by the Italians had upon the Austrian fleet from Pola in 1866. On that occasion the Italian Admiral, Persano, had expended so much energy upon his geographical objective, the island of Lissa, that his ships fell

an easy prey to the Austrian fleet which was weaker on paper, but was handled with great skill by Admiral Tegethoff. It is a useful point to bear in mind that there is an off-chance of a bombardment of this nature drawing towards the threatened locality a hostile fleet which has hitherto remained in a defended harbour.

The American naval forces under Sampson and Schley were concentrated at Key West on the 18th of May, and on the same day the battleship *Oregon* reached Barbadoes on her way to join them. On the 19th of May Sampson and Schley put to sea, the former remaining either in the Nicholas Channel or at Key West for the next few days, and the latter off Cienfuegos on the south coast. Cervera, on the 19th of May, arrived at Santiago in the south-east corner of Cuba, very short of coal, and some days were subsequently spent by the Spaniards in discussing sorties; a proposal to make a dash for San Juan to obtain coal was abandoned on the 23rd of May because they heard that Schley had left Key West. But although this commander had, on the 21st of May, been ordered to Santiago, he was still off Cienfuegos, because he wished to make quite certain that the Spanish fleet had not taken refuge in the latter harbour.

Have you ever noticed, when studying some of our Admiralty charts, that very little attention is paid to topographical detail in representing the land, especially on coasts of which no good

maps are available to assist the compiler. The result is that one cannot always ascertain from the chart whether ships in a good natural harbour are visible from seaward or not, and in many cases it is not possible to glean this information from any other source. It is always worth while to notice this point when visiting harbours likely to be used in war.

Schley seems to have experienced considerable difficulties in locating Cervera's fleet. By the 27th of May he was off Santiago and received definite orders to stay there, but it was not until the 29th of May that he discovered that the Spanish ships were in the harbour, and it had therefore taken a whole month to locate them definitely.

At this stage I should like to consider with you the effect of coast fortifications in naval strategy upon what are called 'containing forces.' In military strategy you constantly come across this term, and you know well the strategical trick of employing 'containing forces' to keep hostile armies *stronger than themselves* away from the area of decisive conflict. Writers on naval strategy have sometimes used the term rather loosely, and I have read of a strong naval force 'containing' a force which was inferior to it in strength. I do not know what the writer had in his mind, but if the same term is to convey different meanings in naval and military strategy there will be no end to the confusion that will

result, and when we come to try and mix them in 'amphibious' strategy it will be like trying to mix oil and water. Let us use the term 'containing force' about fleets therefore in the same way that we use it about armies, and note that a fortified harbour gives a small fleet inside it the opportunity of 'containing' a superior number of the enemy's war vessels.

In order to maintain an effective blockade, I think it was estimated by experts, after certain naval manœuvres held some years ago, that a numerical superiority of thirty per cent. at least should be kept within reach of a defended harbour containing a hostile fleet. You must excuse my dwelling upon the naval side of the question for so long; you will see later that my object is to show you the use of a military force to deal with a situation of this nature, and this war gives a good example of such procedure. When speaking of the superior naval force to be kept off the defended harbour I did not mean to convey the impression that it must necessarily be close to the harbour, because the object of the superior naval force is not to shut in the weaker enemy, but get him to sea and deal with him there.

You know Nelson's private correspondence, which explains perhaps better than any official despatches his policy towards the French fleet sheltering behind the fortifications of Toulon, and his ideas of 'blockading' an enemy in a harbour.

The last thing he wanted to do was to shut the hostile fleet in; his one aim and object was to induce it to put to sea.

Whilst it is not a question of shutting the enemy's fleet in, it is necessary to make quite certain that immediate information is received of its coming out, and as soon as it does so it must be met at sea by a superior force. Where this force is to remain in the meanwhile depends upon local conditions, but the point with which we are chiefly concerned is its necessary strength. Taking it as thirty per cent. greater than that of the enemy, we have also to remember that a fleet of such power must be constantly ready for action outside. If the blockade lasts a long time, some ships must always be away coaling or undergoing repairs, so really a much larger margin than thirty per cent. may be required, and this makes the 'containing' power of the fleet in the defended harbour still more effective.

You may raise the question why, in such circumstances, the fleet outside does not attack and destroy the forts, and then steam in and deal with the fleet inside. The answer is that ships are built to fight each other, and not to fight with forts; the ordnance mounted on land is on a steady platform with all sorts of appliances such as autosights, giving the exact range automatically and increasing the accuracy of fire, and these appliances cannot be adapted to ships. Besides, other things have to be dreaded by the ships, such

as mines and torpedoes, which can be made specially dangerous near a defended harbour; ships must be built to float, and therefore only a certain portion of their weight can be devoted to protection, while with forts no such economy in weight need be exercised; a fort can be made almost invisible from long ranges, while a ship at sea is always a conspicuous target. Finally, ships only carry a certain amount of ammunition, and if this is fired away against forts, there will be none available for use against hostile war vessels, which are their proper objective. Admiral Persano felt this sadly at Lissa in 1866 when he had to meet the Austrian fleet, and I wonder how many rounds of ammunition were left in our own Mediterranean fleet in 1882 after the bombardment of Alexandria, but there was no question of having to meet a hostile fleet on that occasion.

History tells us that successes are seldom achieved against forts by ships alone. This point was elaborated in a lecture at Malta in 1894 by Sir George Clarke, who was then a major in the Royal Engineers at that place, and he quoted many historical examples to prove his case. I have a copy of the lecture, which was printed at the time, but I will not send it, because you will find enough on the subject in his book on fortifications and in similar writings by other authors. We learn from studying former cases that fortified places on the coast are seldom or never captured by purely naval action or bombard-

ment from the sea ; if taken at all, they usually fall to forces disembarked to attack them from the land side. In Sir George Clarke's words : ' Attacks on an enemy's fortified ports across the sea are generally undertaken for naval objects, are practicable only on condition of full naval superiority, and to be effective must assume the form of military operations on shore, supported by a covering naval force able to maintain communications. These military operations on shore may be, of course, and often have been, successfully carried out by sailors when their scale was practically small ; but they may be distinguished from the direct naval attack which specialised coast defences are intended to oppose.' The reason why I quote these words is because they have been so wonderfully borne out since the year when they were written. Port Arthur in 1894, Wei-Hai-Wei in 1895, Santiago in 1898, and Port Arthur again in 1904, all fell before attacks directed against the land side of their defences.

We left the Spanish squadron under Cervera still in the harbour of Santiago on the 29th of May. For nearly a week after his arrival there, on the 19th of May, he might have put to sea again without meeting the enemy, but he could not have gone very far for want of coal, and he did not make use of this opportunity to escape to San Juan or any such destination. On the 30th of May Sampson's fleet, which had been reinforced by the *Oregon*, left Key West and joined Schley's

squadron on the 1st of June, after which date Cervera may be said to have been most effectively blockaded in Santiago harbour.

On the 30th of May orders were issued for the embarkation for Cuba of a military force of 25,000 men, under the command of General Shafter, at the harbour of Tampa in Florida, and later on we must follow the fortunes of this force in full detail. We shall find much to learn from the mistakes that were made owing to want of organisation and forethought before the embarkation, and we know that it is easier to learn by mistakes than in any other way. The Americans themselves must have learned many lessons which will doubtless be applied by them upon future occasions of a similar nature.

The forts at the mouth of Santiago harbour were very weak, and many of their guns are described as having been simply and inexpensively mounted on heaps of gravel. There were only four modern guns, all of six inches calibre, but they sufficed to keep off the American fleet and prevent its entering the harbour until the assistance of a military expeditionary force could be obtained. On the 3rd of June, a merchant vessel called the *Merrimac* was sent in by the blockaders and sunk in the entrance to the harbour. This was a measure of doubtful expediency, because the fleet inside was far the weaker one, and therefore presumably the sooner it could be induced to go to sea the better for the strong fleet outside.

Unfortunately for the Spanish fleet, as matters turned out, the *Merrimac* did not completely close the entrance, and it is doubtless a very difficult matter to close a channel in this way ; at all events there are very few examples of such success. The undertaking requires the greatest gallantry and steadiness of nerve from those who carry it out. This of course does not affect the strategical expediency of the exploit, which may possibly have been undertaken to keep the Spanish torpedo craft quiet during the expected landing of Shafter's expeditionary force.

✓ The Santiago forts were bombarded by Sampson's fleet on the 6th of June, and again on the 14th. Weak as they were, their guns do not appear to have been silenced by the far superior ordnance of the American vessels, and very little damage is reported to have been done to the obsolete works themselves. On June the 20th Cervera's fleet was still inside, with Sampson and Schley blockading it, and as this was the day upon which Shafter's convoy appeared in these waters, it will be a convenient date to leave the consideration of the local situation at Santiago, and to go back to the time when Shafter's force was ordered to embark at Tampa.

The orders for this operation were issued, as we have seen, on the 30th of May. General Shafter, the commander designated for charge of the expeditionary force, had been at Tampa for some weeks, and he had received four days'

notice to make all arrangements for the rapid embarkation of 25,000 men as soon as orders were received.

When considering the war in Chile we noticed that, if a military force moving by sea is expected to produce its maximum effect, absolute secrecy must at all costs be maintained, especially with regard to its destination, and we have a good deal to learn about the control of the Press on an occasion of this description from the instance now under consideration. Until about the middle of May, the American Government seems to have made no attempt to exercise any control over the news published by newspaper correspondents, but early in that month a very serious case had occurred. An expedition called, I believe, the Gussie expedition, was fitted out to land stores and arms for the use of the Cuban insurgents close to Havana, and just to the westward of the town. The Spanish authorities learned the destination of the expedition from the newspapers, and for this reason it was repulsed and failed in its object. General Shafter did his best to bring about a better state of affairs, and issued orders holding newspaper correspondents responsible for the news which appeared in their respective journals; the penalty he imposed for a breach of his orders was the revocation of the offender's licence as a correspondent. Copies of the newspapers were filed in the Press Censor's office, but I do not think that any attempt was made to

editor censor the messages before they went to the papers.

Soon after, another minor expedition was organised, and full accounts appeared, as before, in three of the newspapers. Shafter's orders were put in force against the papers, but having furnished what was considered a satisfactory explanation to the War Department, the correspondents were allowed to continue sending news. It is difficult to conceive how any satisfactory explanation can be furnished of what practically amounts to an act of treachery; if a soldier furnishes information to the enemy in time of war, his offence is subject to the death penalty.

Do you remember the time when you and I were at De Aar in Cape Colony at the end of January and during the first days of February in 1900? Preparations were being made for Lord Roberts's great concentration at Enslin and Graspan, to march north-east and cut off Cronje's force, which was between Modder River and Kimberley, and we were the only two people at De Aar who knew the secret. Success depended upon its being most carefully guarded, and you will remember our astonishment at hearing that a press message was going through on the wire to the effect that, from local indications it could be gathered that a big movement from Enslin would shortly take place. We were just in time to stop the message; and the case I quote was a very exceptional one because our press corre-

spondents submitted most reasonably to control in these matters; doubtless the information I refer to would not have got very far, even if we had not taken any action. In the United Kingdom itself this question of press control in war time is of extreme importance. I gathered from the newspapers a few years ago that the best newspaper proprietors were only too anxious for action to be taken, and for legislation to be passed on the subject, and I remember that an interview took place between some of the representatives of the press and the Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence, but I have not heard anything further about the prospect of legislation.

After General Shafter failed to devise, at the last minute, a satisfactory system to deal with the situation at Tampa, I can find no record of any further efforts having been made to exercise efficient control over the correspondents.¹

The war with Spain was popular in the United States, and the forces in arms in the country at this period amounted to 68,000 regular army, 20,000 for the navy, and 200,000 volunteers. The American army depended for its expansion upon auxiliary forces which were not liable for oversea service, and when it became necessary to put the system in force it was not found to work well. The Militia of many of the States did not volun-

¹ A New York paper has recently announced that legislation is shortly to be introduced to deal with the question of control of the Press in war time.

teer; many more would not serve excepting in militia units, and in order to get out of the difficulty the expedient adopted was to enlist militiamen specially into the regular forces, and hurriedly to raise complete units of volunteers.

The men were therefore forthcoming for the expeditionary force, but a trained staff and officers could not be improvised. Nothing could exceed the keenness of everybody to get to Cuba, but more than keenness is required of a military force; a great deal more if they are to be embarked and sent across the sea with all the staff arrangements well thought out, and difficulties properly foreseen and provided against; and the whole operation of embarkation at Tampa is full of lessons for our guidance. You may have fretted while at the Staff College at the time devoted to the Staff duties, and to working out the details connected with an embarkation, but I think you will consider the time well spent when you read of the confusion and discomforts which the want of such foresight is reported to have brought about on this occasion. I have consulted as many authorities as possible, and have tried to arrive at the true facts. If I have not succeeded in doing so, the account may in any case be useful as a record of mistakes which should be avoided in such operations.

To take first the provision of the transports to carry the troops. Considering the extent of the seaboard, and the amount of the American

sea-borne and coasting trade, it is surprising that considerable difficulty should have been experienced over this matter. There seems to have been little or no co-operation between the naval and military authorities, and as a result they competed with each other in the open market for merchant vessels, the owners of which must have reaped a golden harvest. Thirty-two transports were with difficulty collected, with a total register tonnage of about 53,000. It was estimated that 23,000 men could be put into them, but it was found that they could not carry more than about 16,000, and Shafter's proposed force was therefore reduced by about one-third. The transports were ill-found in many ways, and I do not think that a very large proportion of them would have been passed by our own Admiralty authorities as being suitable for the purpose.

The harbour at Tampa, though inconvenient in some ways, was well suited in others for an embarkation. You know in our Staff College work how careful we are to work out the time factor, and find out whether time will be lost in getting the troops to the wharves, or in clearing the wharves, or in getting the transports away to sea and replacing them by others. We do what we can to shorten whichever of these operations takes the longest time. Then you know too how much attention we pay to loading the vessels properly, so that whatever is wanted by the troops when they land shall be easily accessible, and you

know how much time can be saved by forethought and good staff work in these matters. The time must not be counted for the operation of embarking alone, because a hurried embarkation may lead to a very slow disembarkation if, for instance, the second line transport, baggage and so on, is stowed on the top of the first line transport, ammunition and tools, which must be landed at the same time as the troops themselves. Much depends therefore on the troops and transport being brought to the wharves in the right order, and at the right rate, in order to avoid congestion. All excepting those actually at work must of course be kept off the wharves.

As regards facilities for bringing the troops to the place of embarkation, there were two single lines of railway to the small town of Tampa, but only one of them ran on to the port, which was nine miles from the town itself. The line to the port was privately owned ; for a long time no connection was made with the other line, and meanwhile excursion trains were run to the harbour, so that you can imagine the difficulties, and the congestion that ensued.

The wharfage facilities must have been good on the whole because from ten to fourteen of the transports, according to their size, could tie up at the same time alongside. Some of the transports were made fast outside those tied up to the wharves, so that troops had to cross the inner ones to get to the outer ones ; this is a measure of

doubtful expediency, which only seems justifiable in the case of a cramped harbour, where the vessels not being loaded can find no other berths, but even then it seems better to keep them out in the stream, and only bring them in when berths are available. Two lines of rails ran along the whole length of the wharf, but they were fifty yards from the water, so everything had to be man-handled from the railway trucks to the transports, and the stores were sent down in a hurry at the last minute, so that there was no time to sort and arrange them properly. The trucks were not labelled with their contents, and this fact must have added to the confusion which resulted; of stores alone over 4500 tons weight were embarked, and when we consider that in order to put a complete ration on board it must have been necessary to go from one truck or train to another and take something out of each, it is not surprising that the operation took a whole week. Eventually the trucks were run alongside as they arrived, and unloaded into the nearest ship, regardless of their contents; thus we read of a case of a battery having its guns in one ship and its horses in another. Many units were separated from their stores and baggage, and as no check appears to have been kept upon what was put into each ship, you can imagine how difficult it must have been to sort things out again on arrival at the destination in Cuba. The original intention had been to send supplies for six months,

but it was found that this would cause too much delay, so supplies for two months were taken.

Some of the men were not completely equipped and were at first without uniform, or even rifles ; many units were not given any instructions on arrival at Tampa, and appear to have detrained and encamped where they could, and to have bought their own rations until they could succeed in drawing supplies. In order to bring the scene before us more closely, I will quote the reported experiences of one of the regiments. Instructions were received that this corps was to entrain at midnight to move about nine miles by the railway to the port, and they were warned that they must be on board their transport by 9 A.M. on the following day, or they would not get to Cuba. Finding nothing to take them at the hour stated, the commander held up a goods train which was going in the opposite direction, and forced the driver to back down to the harbour, where everything was found to be in a state of confusion, and a crowd of about 10,000 of all ranks, from generals downwards, was swaying to and fro on the wharves, trying to find their way to destinations of which they were ignorant.

Apparently the transports had not been allotted to different units beforehand, and considerable difficulty was experienced in finding any staff officer who possessed a list of the ships and authority to give the necessary instructions to units which had been ordered to embark. After

some time an officer of the corps we are considering obtained the name of a ship which his regiment might have, but on his way back he gathered from conversations he overheard that the same ship had been given to two other regiments, and accordingly he hurried his own corps to the ship and held her against all comers. As the men came on board they deposited their baggage and stores in a heap in the hold in no particular order, and as some of the rations for the voyage were at the bottom of the pile, you can imagine the subsequent difficulties.

The transports are reported to have been ill-found in many respects; the cooking arrangements must have been inadequate, because extra galleys had not been provided, and the sanitary arrangements were deficient. Few of the vessels had condensers, and the water supply of the others was very short; many had not enough fresh water on board when the convoy was ready, and it was therefore necessary to wait for the tanks to be filled before starting. The capacity of the boats which were carried was not very large, the total number of them was 153, and they could take altogether about 3400 men. Not a single steam launch for towing purposes seems to have been taken, and this was a serious deficiency, because the time of disembarkation upon a beach depends chiefly upon the number of such boats available.

This is an important point to consider when

selecting transports, because in these days merchant ships can usually go alongside quays, where cranes on land pick the heavy weights out of them, and consequently few of them carry appliances to hoist out anything of great weight ; even if steam-launches are put into them at the port of embarkation, they cannot for this reason be hoisted out again in an open anchorage. I believe that the Japanese subsidise their merchant ships for carrying the necessary appliances, in order to have suitable transports available in wartime, but I have not heard that the same is done by any other Power. The point is worth considering by any country proposing to disembark expeditionary forces on an enemy's coastline, and unless some such arrangements are made beforehand the only thing to be done in an emergency is to place a man-of-war alongside each transport to hoist out her steamboats, which is not an easy thing to do unless the sea is perfectly calm during the operation.

The strength of the force embarked at Tampa was 16,375 officers and men ; 2295 horses and mules ; 26 guns ; 114 wagons (6 mules) ; 81 wagons (4 mules) ; 7 ambulance wagons. Rations for two months were taken with the force.

The time for embarkation may be taken at from ten to twelve days, and we must remember that as the troops were daily expected off Santiago, the delay might have been very serious. I

think it is worth our while to note that where a fleet has been located in a defended harbour and a military expedition is called for to put it out, speed may be a most necessary consideration, and the whole operation may fail if prompt action is not taken. Either the fleet may get out without being brought to action, or it may be necessary to raise the blockade owing to the fleet outside being urgently required elsewhere, or possibly another fleet may be expected to come to the help of the one blockaded. Delay also gives the defenders an opportunity to strengthen their works of defence, and if given sufficient time, they may make them almost impregnable.

I wish I had enough details of other embarkations of a similar nature to give you, but I have not been able as yet to get a satisfactory parallel for purposes of comparison. The Japanese Twelfth Division,¹ the first to embark in 1904, took about seven days. The first group of transports left Nagasaki in twenty-four hours. In 1904 we tried an experiment ourselves under peace conditions, when we embarked a force at Southampton, which of course has far greater facilities than Tampa. The strength was: 11,700 men; 2700 horses; 61 field guns; 315 vehicles, besides motors, bicycles, etc. Ten transports were used having a total gross tonnage of about 70,500 tons. The average time taken to load a transport was six and a half hours, and the whole operation

¹ For the strength of a Japanese Division, see pp. 224 and 345.

took twelve hours, but we must remember that the subsequent voyage only lasted about two days and that two months' supplies were not embarked. The force was then put on shore on the beach at Clacton, where it was found that the rapidity of working depended upon the number of steam launches available for towing; we can compare the actual times when we come to the disembarkation of General Shafter's force in Cuba. Keep in mind that speed in embarkation is not of much avail if the transports are not carefully loaded, so that the operation of landing shall also be rapid. The time must be counted from the commencement of the embarkation to the completion of the disembarkation.

On the 8th of June Shafter's convoy was reported to be ready to leave Tampa, but it was not allowed to put to sea, on account of a report from a United States war vessel that a Spanish battleship, two gunboats, and a destroyer had been seen in daylight in local waters. I believe that the vessels seen were afterwards proved to be two United States transports and a collier, but the start from Tampa was delayed until the 14th of June on account of the report. This allowed time to rectify some of the mistakes, and to embark some important material which had been left behind.

The average speed of the convoy on the voyage was only six knots, but nevertheless there appears to have been a good deal of straggling, and at

times the transports are said to have extended over a distance of nearly forty miles. Owing to the delays, fresh water ran short, and some ships had to stop at Great Inagua Island to fill up again on their way to Santiago.

Having learned as much as we can from the embarkation and from the voyage, I think that this will be a convenient period to select for the close of this letter. General Shafter's force of 16,000 men on board the ships was a picked body, consisting partly of regulars, and partly of volunteers, who seem to have varied considerably in efficiency. They must have lacked the opportunity of sufficient preliminary training with their units before starting, and in this they differed from the Chilian Congressionalists in 1891, who had had three or more months together for special training in the work upon which they were to be employed. Part of the force consisted of dismounted regular cavalry, from which it would appear that the intention was to avoid taking too large a proportion of volunteers, and accommodation in the transports being very limited, only one cavalry regiment was accompanied by its horses.

We must imagine the men suffering considerable discomforts during the voyage; the rations are reported to have been bad, the fresh water indifferent, and for want of sufficient galley space few hot meals could have been provided.

Before hearing from me again I think you will

find some interest in studying the map of Cuba, and comparing it with that of Chile. Both countries were difficult and mountainous, and deficient in lateral communications. There were no railways from Havana, the headquarters of the garrison, to the eastern end of the island, the roads were extremely bad, and land transport very deficient. About 190,000 Spanish troops were distributed about the island, and of this number about 10,000 were at Santiago and 18,000 in the neighbouring districts, but the movement of Spanish detachments about the country was rendered unsafe by the attitude of the insurgents.

The Spanish army in Cuba had one great advantage over the Balmacedists in Chile, because most of the troops were in telegraphic communication by submarine cable with each other and with headquarters, but this question of cable communications is of such importance in amphibious wars that we must devote more time to it on a future occasion.

In the next letter I propose to give an account of the disembarkation of Shafter's force, and of other operations at Cuba and Porto Rico; we will then study briefly the events which happened in other localities until the war was brought to a conclusion.

FOURTH LETTER

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR OF 1898—*Continued*

MY DEAR TOM,

On June the 20th, Shafter's expeditionary force arrived in its transports off Daiquiri, a small harbour about sixteen miles eastward of Santiago, which had been selected as the landing place. The voyage of 848 miles had been covered at an average speed of about six knots.

In my last letter we touched upon the subject of general naval strategy, and noticed the 'containing' power of a small fleet sheltering in a defended harbour against a superior fleet outside, and we studied the importance of prompt action in such cases, both in order to set free the outside fleet for employment elsewhere, and to avoid giving the defenders time to strengthen their works. I have purposely avoided using the term 'fleet in being' which one comes across so frequently in writings on naval strategy, because I do not know what it means. If 'in being' means 'in existence' the words seem to be redundant and unnecessary, because when one hears of a fleet one assumes that it is in existence without further explanation. I have tried to trace the

expression to its origin, and have found it first in Torrington's despatches in the Dutch wars of the seventeenth century, and even here it would seem that the word 'fleet' alone would convey the impression equally well. Most people whom I have asked, who do not happen to be students of naval strategy, attribute the invention of the expression to Mr. Rudyard Kipling, at which no doubt he would be much amused.

Sampson and Schley, as we have seen, were unable to destroy Cervera's inferior fleet because of its sheltered position behind the guns of the Santiago forts, and the assistance of Shafter's force was called for to bring matters to a crisis. A fleet therefore became, as fleets have upon many other occasions, the objective for a field army. I ask you to pay attention to this point, because it seems worth our while to consider whether occasions might not occur in the future for the use of our own land forces in similar operations. It is a curious fact that, in the last four wars involving naval operations, the assistance of armies was called for to help in the destruction of three out of the four fleets which have been defeated. The four fleets were, the Chinese squadron at Wei-Hai-Wei in 1895, after being defeated at sea in 1894 by the Japanese fleet and put out of Port Hamilton by the Japanese army, the main Spanish squadron at Santiago in 1898, the Russian Port Arthur fleet in 1904, and their Second (Baltic) Fleet in 1905. The last was the

only case out of the four in which the winners entirely destroyed the hostile fleet without the assistance of a military force.

You will probably say that our principal prospective enemies in future wars will not allow their fleets to take refuge in any defended harbours not in their own home territory ; and, in such circumstances, we could not employ our small oversea army to take them, because of the overwhelming strength of the land forces which could be brought against us. This is sound enough, provided that those overwhelmingly strong land forces are not otherwise employed ; but have you considered how important it would be to destroy the war vessels and commerce destroyers sheltering in an enemy's defended harbours beyond the seas ? Until we had done this it might be difficult to remove our own war vessels to concentrate them all for decisive action elsewhere, because we have such important trade and local interests to guard against the enemy's depredations. As long as an enemy can use such small 'containing' forces to force us to form larger detachments, he is obtaining a great strategic advantage over us. In our study of the two recent Japanese wars in the Far East we shall have better opportunities of considering the use of armies for the destruction of war vessels, so I propose now to continue the narrative at the point where Sampson's and Schley's fleets, and Shafter's army, combined

to destroy the Spanish fleet under Cervera at Santiago.

When undertaking a serious landing in amphibious operations, it is a common practice to make feints at other places on the coastline, in order to prevent the enemy from concentrating his strength on land to overwhelm the expeditionary force. It is claimed for such feints that they may induce the defenders to march their troops in the wrong direction, or, at all events, reinforcements will not be brought to the decisive point from the places which are apparently in danger from the false attack. In accordance with this principle, Admiral Sampson had landed some Marines at Guantanamo, thirty-seven miles east of Santiago, before the arrival of Shafter's force. At about the same time as the actual landing, which took place at Daiquiri,¹ feints, consisting of bombardments and attempts to construct landing stages, were carried out at various points west of the harbour mouth.

On the 22nd of June the disembarkation of General Shafter's army was commenced. There is a sandy beach at Daiquiri about 300 yards in length, and a small jetty about 25 feet by 40, with sufficient water alongside to take vessels of 10-feet draught at all times of the tide. In the original plan it had been arranged that 1000 Cuban insurgents should cover the landing against interruption by the Spanish troops from

¹ See Map III. for places mentioned in this part of the narrative.

Santiago. As a matter of fact, there was no opposition by the Spanish garrison, and although the number of insurgents who were on the spot did not apparently come near the number anticipated, the absentees may have been better and more securely employed elsewhere. The neighbouring hills were heavily bombarded before the landing took place, and I believe that three of the insurgents who had come to help were hit during the bombardment.

✓ There were no steam launches to tow the loaded boats to the shore, and this want was felt immediately. You will remember that the number available was the governing factor in the time taken in our own experiment on the Clacton beach in 1904. One such launch was fortunately placed at the disposal of General Shafter by the naval authorities, and without it he would have been obliged to rely upon rowing boats, manned by soldiers, to send his orders round to the scattered portions of his command. You will recollect that we touched upon this question of the issue of operation orders to a force before it is landed when we were considering Del Canto's arrangements in Chile in 1891, and we came to the conclusion that the most satisfactory arrangement is for a meeting to be held between the different commanders, to discuss the orders, and to provide against the possibility of misunderstandings. The delay at Tampa before starting afforded facilities for such meetings, but I do not know

whether advantage was taken of the opportunity so offered. You wrote the other day to ask why, if the naval authorities consider that such meetings can rarely be arranged on the voyage, do not the responsible commanders convey their orders by signal while the convoy is at sea. When asking this question, I do not think that you can have realised how much signalling goes on between the naval authorities and the transports in connection with maintaining the fleet formation and other matters, and I wonder if you have grasped the practical difficulty of sending a Morse or semaphore signal to all the units of a convoy. If they are formed in line ahead, in fact whatever their formation may be, the signal has to pass through so many hands that it is not likely to arrive at its destination unaltered. We noticed that even written orders are frequently misconstrued, and we decided that a meeting of officers was desirable for that reason; signalled orders would be even more liable to misconstruction. Of course, there may be special occasions when alterations of plan, or similar matter, may have to be signalled, and it is necessary to bear this in mind, and make proper provision for having enough signalmen on board the transports for the purpose. With Shafter's convoy, strung out as they were while on the voyage, Morse and semaphore signalling must have been impossible.

Although no steam launches were available for

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the actual landing, the difficulty had been partly foreseen, and a large steam lighter had been brought with the convoy; this lighter could carry nearly a thousand men each trip, and put them on the jetty at Daiquiri. Another similar one had been towed from Tampa, but it had been cut adrift during the voyage, and the loss must have been felt severely.

The transports were anchored at distances varying between two and five cables (about 400 to 1000 yards) from the beach, and the horses and mules were put overboard to swim ashore. Many did so, but a few swam out to sea and were drowned. After losing about thirty in this way, the remainder were towed on shore by boats, a method which took a longer time, but prevented the loss of valuable animals.

Landing operations were carried out at Daiquiri until the 23rd of June, on which day a force, under General Lawton, was pushed on at dawn to Siboney, a place on the coastline nine miles from Santiago; and from this date Siboney became the place of disembarkation. This movement saved seven miles of bad road, an important consideration, if one bears in mind the difficulties from which such expeditionary forces usually suffer, on account of their shortage in land transport. Fortunately for the invaders, the Spaniards had not destroyed the railway at Siboney, and had left plenty of rolling stock and about one hundred trucks of coal, thus helping to some

extent the inadequate pack transport which had been landed.

By midnight on the 25th of June the disembarkation is reported to have been 'practically completed.' By this is meant that the men, guns, and horses were on shore, and also the pack transport, but that few transport vehicles, if any, had been landed. As there was a shortage of provisions, the force on land would have been in a serious predicament had there been any change in the weather. Fortunately for them the sea was calm, and remained so throughout.

The actual landing of the force, without the wheeled transport, took about three days. Comparing this time with our own peace experience at Clacton in 1904, we find that the operation took thirty-one hours on that occasion, and all the transport vehicles were got on shore in the time, and caused most of the delay. In my last letter¹ I gave you the number of men, animals, and vehicles for purposes of comparison. I think that in our case the supply officers had gone into Essex beforehand, and supplies were collected for the use of the invading force, but I am not certain on this point. The American supply officers in Cuba do not seem to have been able to obtain anything in the country, in spite of the friendliness of the inhabitants, probably because the area had been denuded of supplies during the rebellion.

¹ See p. 117.

On June the 24th, about nine hundred of the American force engaged about four hundred Spaniards at La Guasinas, and drove them back towards Santiago. The Americans had sixty-eight casualties on this occasion. No further forward movement could be made by the invaders for want of transport. All men leaving Daiquiri and Siboney carried with them three days' rations, and the result was that there were many cases of throwing away blankets, as there were in the Congressionalist forces in Chile. The nights were cold, and this caused a bad outbreak of disease, which was a very serious consideration, because the season of the year was unsuitable for operations in the low-lying parts of the island.

Although so close to the sea bases, where transports were lying full of stores, supply difficulties made movement impossible for six days, owing to want of land transport. During this period the Spaniards, had they acted with vigour, had a good chance of administering a check by attacking the invaders' advanced troops, but they did not take any advantage of their opportunities.

The American pack trains of mules were not ready until the 25th of June, and the transport vehicles had not then been landed. On the 26th of June two more pack trains and ten ambulances arrived in transports, and on this day it was found impossible to keep the force supplied by pack trains without further assistance, although the number of mules to each of the six trains

landed appears to have been sixty-five, and the troops were still close to the harbours. Accordingly, sixty wagons were ordered on shore before anything else was disembarked. The land transport at first was organised on the 'regimental' system, that is to say, it was distributed among the different units of the force. Even with a line of communication only fourteen miles in length this arrangement entirely broke down, and the 'general' system was adopted. Two pack trains were allotted to each Division, and all the remainder of the transport was kept under an officer of the Headquarters Staff. In spite of all the care that could be taken, the forces never had more than half a day's rations in hand, and were often a day or more to the bad; they never received throughout the campaign any baggage that they did not carry ashore on their own persons, and tents, cooking utensils, and extra clothing were not taken off the transports until after the object of the campaign had been attained. No officers appear to have been detailed to control the convoy traffic; pack trains and wagon trains seem to have struggled for precedence, and to have halted when they wished, and much confusion and delay must have resulted. Want of foresight and staff training therefore produced upon this, as it does on all occasions, the most serious hardships for the unfortunate troops, who were thus deprived of bare necessities in a very bad climate.

By the morning of the 30th of June, Shafter had about 15,000 of his own force available, besides 4000 Cuban insurgents. These latter had done formidable work as guerillas, but were not of much use in large bodies ; they were armed with all sorts of weapons, they were badly organised and clothed, and they had no transport. In the circumstances they seem to have lived upon their allies, and had the Cuban authorities been able to furnish transport instead of troops a better result would have been produced.

When an invading army has selected a fleet in a defended harbour as its objective, there are usually two alternatives ; either to capture the defended place outright, whether by a surprise, an assault, a regular siege, or whatever method may be selected, or to destroy the ships by bombardment without capturing the defence works. The latter method probably entails far less loss of life, but in order that it may be effective there are two requirements. Heavy howitzers must be available, and the result of their fire must be observed ; if this observation can be done in no other way, it is necessary to capture a position from which a view of the harbour can be obtained. Shafter had only field guns of three-inch calibre with him, so the bombardment method was not adopted.

This point is worth noting by any government contemplating the use of military expeditionary forces against fleets which may shelter in defended harbours. The effective bombardment of war

vessels in such circumstances depends upon several factors, among which we may note, the heaviest shell it is possible to employ, a steep angle of descent so as to strike the decks, absolute accuracy in elevation, and, above all, facilities for observation of the fall of each projectile. You may suggest that such bombardments could be carried out from ships, but I think that, if you consider further, you will realise that the conditions under which this could be done are very exceptional. Ships may have heavy shell, but heavy howitzers which give a steep angle of descent they have not. For absolute accuracy of elevation the use of clinometers with spirit levels is required, and these are difficult to apply at sea, because a perfectly steady platform is required for their employment. Where the harbour is sheltered by high ground, observation of the fall of each projectile cannot be obtained from the sea, and furthermore the bombarding ships do not, as a rule, wish to come within range of the coast forts, which have the great advantages over them which we considered on a former occasion. Any country contemplating the possibility of having to conduct such bombardments of harbours from the land side should be provided with very heavy howitzers. The calibre of those employed by the Japanese in 1904 was eleven inches; they required bulky and carefully laid platforms, with concrete foundations, and the ammunition was brought to them along tram

lines. In that case the heavy material was landed at Dalny, a good harbour with every facility for handling such heavy weights; but if no such harbour is available it is important to bear in mind that the weights should be so divided up that they can be landed on an open beach.

Bombardment of the Spanish fleet from the land side being out of the question for want of necessary material, General Shafter had to make other arrangements. His plan was to direct his attack against the town of Santiago. It is not certain whether the amphibious nature of the operations was thoroughly grasped in forming this plan, because, even if he occupied the town, his force could have been shelled out of it again by the Spanish ships in the harbour, and he had nothing more formidable than field guns with which to return their fire. To have captured the ships by boarding them may perhaps have been contemplated, but this would have been a costly operation of which the issue would have been very doubtful. The American ships could not co-operate until the forts at the entrance to the harbour had been seized, and if these had been made the primary objective of Shafter's army the fleet could have then entered the harbour, cleared away any mines there might be in the channel, and captured the Spanish vessels. This having been done, the Spanish garrison and town would have been under the fire of the American ships' guns on the one side and of the American army

on the other. I believe that some such plan as this had been actually agreed upon between Sampson and Shafter, but it was not the one which was adopted in the actual emergency.

Shafter's plan was to attack El Caney, the source of the Santiago water supply, with one Division, while the remainder attacked the Spaniards who were in position at San Juan, covering the direct route to Santiago. One regiment was to advance against Aguadores, supported by the guns of the fleet. The small force of cavalry which was mounted was given a very subsidiary rôle; the horses had to carry three days' forage, and the men were ordered to dismount and lead them in rear of the infantry, taking care not to interfere with the baggage.

Instead of being able to carry the El Caney position in two hours, as they had anticipated, the Americans did not take it until the evening, and then with a loss of four hundred, although it was held by only five hundred Spaniards. The division engaged on that flank was therefore not in time to co-operate in the main attack on the San Juan position, in accordance with Shafter's instructions. At San Juan, 6600 Americans were engaged, and this force drove back the Spaniards on the 1st of July, but lost 1100 in the action.

On July the 2nd, Sampson's fleet bombarded the coast forts, and on this day General Shafter was holding a position on the ridge about a mile from Santiago and completely commanding

the town, but was unable to make any further advance in face of the gunfire from the Spanish fleet. The general situation at this period presents several features of interest. We must remember the saying of Prince Kraft's friend, that in war it is only a question of being the least little bit less afraid than the enemy, and had the Spaniards known it, they had an excellent opportunity for a counterstroke against Shafter's force. The American army was in a state of exhaustion, and it is reported that many senior officers were in favour of a retirement. A relieving force of 8000 Spaniards was on its way from Manzanillo, and actually arrived during the course of the following day, but it was then too late. Shafter had decided to hold on for another twenty-four hours and try the effect of a little 'bluff,' and he sent a flag of truce into the town during the morning of the 3rd of July to demand surrender. While this flag of truce was on its way Cervera's fleet steamed out of the harbour.

This was, of course, the crisis which had been desired, and we must investigate the reasons which led Cervera to his destruction, in order to see how far Shafter's force brought about the result. I have seen it stated that Cervera left by desire of the Captain-General in Cuba, and it has also been said that he was ordered out by the Spanish Government; it is difficult to reconcile these two statements, but they are perhaps

explained by the following information which has been obtained from a Spanish military officer who was in Cuba during the campaign. On arrival at Santiago on the 19th of May, Cervera received orders from the Spanish Captain-General in Cuba, Blanco, to come to Havana at once ; we can see the Captain-General's point, because Havana was the Spanish military headquarters, and a large proportion of the garrison of Cuba was stationed there ; but whether Cervera would have reached his destination is doubtful, in view of the distribution of the American fleets at that time. You will remember that Sampson was at Key West, or off Havana, from the 19th to the 29th of May, and Schley went to Cienfuegos on the south side of the island on the former date. Cervera replied to the Captain-General that he took his orders only from the Navy Department at home, and proposed to stay where he was ; Blanco thereupon cabled to Spain, and a council of ministers was held, which invested him with full powers. In the meantime telegraph communication between Santiago and Havana had been cut, but the decision of the Spanish Cabinet was somehow communicated to Cervera, who felt himself bound to carry out Blanco's original order, in spite of the changed circumstances, and make a dash for Havana. I do not know whether this is the correct story ; the date of the communication of the Government's decision to Cervera is especially important, and this I cannot give you. Reports

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about the American cable-cutting operations are so contradictory that I have not been able to obtain satisfactory information on the subject, but I believe that Santiago was still in communication with Jamaica, and therefore with Spain, on the 2nd of July, even if the communications with Havana had been cut. It is reported that Cervera was 'ordered out' on this date, and I think it therefore fairly safe to assume that decision either of the home government or of the Captain-General was conveyed to him on this day either by cable, or by other means. Mahan says that it was popular clamour in Spain that sent Cervera to his destruction.¹

✕ Much as we should like to do so, in order to prove the value of a military force when employed to ferret a fleet out of a defended harbour, I am afraid that we cannot assume that Cervera came out entirely on account of the pressure exerted by Shafter's force on the land side. The American army does not seem to have been capable of further offensive action, and 3000 Spanish reinforcements reached Santiago from Manzanillo on the 3rd of July. The reason could not have been due to want of provisions in Santiago: ships usually carry provisions for at least three months. The Spaniards had expelled 20,000 Cubans from the town to economise food, and there were plenty of horses to eat when other supplies failed. While therefore we cannot help thinking that the

¹ *Lessons from the War with Spain*, p. 92.

defeat of the Spanish garrison outside Santiago must have had some influence on the situation, we cannot tell how much, unless we can ascertain for certain the date upon which the decision of the Spanish Government in favour of the Captain-General's supremacy was communicated to Cervera.¹

The action which resulted between the Spanish and American ships presents no particular points of interest; Cervera's fleet came out in broad daylight, and his ill-equipped vessels were run ashore and sunk by their own crews. The Americans fired nearly 10,000 shells of various calibres at ranges varying from 6000 to 1500 yards and obtained only a proportion of about one per cent. of hits. One American was killed in the action. You will find that the names of the ships engaged on both sides have been marked

¹ Since writing these lines I have found for you in Captain H. H. Sargent's book, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, complete information on this subject. The Minister of Marine in Spain informed Cervera on the 24th of June of the Government's decision. From the following extracts from official telegrams we may gather that Shafter's expeditionary force succeeded in forcing Cervera's squadron to its destruction.

The Captain-General on the 28th of June telegraphed to Admiral Cervera: 'In case the situation should become aggravated, so that the fall of Santiago is believed near, the squadron will go out immediately as best it can.' On the 2nd of July, at 5.10 A.M., the Captain-General telegraphed: 'In view of exhausted and serious condition of Santiago, as stated by General Toral, your Excellency will re-embark troops of squadron as fast as possible, and go out immediately.'

These telegrams also establish the fact that Santiago was in telegraphic communication with Havana up to this period—a subject which is referred to again below.

on the list I enclosed for your information in my last letter.¹

Shafter's force now invested Santiago, but rightly did not attempt any further attacks, since the object in view, the destruction of the fleet, had been attained. On the 11th of July 1500 reinforcements from America, under General Miles, arrived off Siboney; and on the 17th of July the Spanish garrison of Santiago itself, and 23,000 troops in the district, laid down their arms and surrendered.

The Americans began to re-embark as soon as possible after Santiago fell; nearly seventy-five per cent. of them were down with severe malaria, while yellow fever, dysentery, and typhoid fever played havoc among them, and it is reported that the volunteers suffered more severely than the regular troops, because they disregarded, as untrained officers and men always will, the most elementary sanitary precautions.

Whatever part Shafter's expeditionary force may have played in the destruction of the Spanish fleet, we have here a striking instance of the effect of amphibious operations, because when Cuba was surrendered to the Americans there must have been 180,000 good Spanish troops in the island, and only one American regiment, but we must remember of course that the inhabitants were hostile to the Spanish occupation.

Before we refer to the events which were taking

¹ See p. 161.

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place in other parts of the world we must notice that, after the capture of Cuba, the Americans turned their attention to Porto Rico; up to August the 18th General Miles had landed 18,000 men on that island, and these men had come partly from Cuba, and partly from America.

In considering the objectives for amphibious operations I think we can divide them into two classes. Those which are directed against an enemy's mobile force, whether his fleets or his field armies, and therefore have a direct influence upon the issue of the war, we can put in the first class. Those which are undertaken in order to influence the terms of peace, when the ultimate issue of the war is no longer in doubt, we can put in the second class. I think that the occupation of Porto Rico by the Americans was an operation of the latter class, and that it was undertaken because they wanted the place afterwards, rather than because they thought that they could thereby influence the issue of the conflict. We get similar examples in the occupation of the Pescadores islands and Saghalien by the Japanese in 1895 and 1905 respectively, and when we come to the Chino-Japan and the Russo-Japanese wars we shall see how far the parallel was complete on each of these occasions.

The lessons we have to learn from the operations in the Caribbean Sea in 1898 are so numerous that I think that it would be as well for us now to make a short summary of what we have so far

gathered from our study of the campaign. With the assistance of Mahan, we learn the great effect of popular opinion, however ignorant, upon the action of a government elected by popular vote, and consequently we deduce the importance of instilling into the electorate some idea of elementary naval and military strategy. Popular opinion cannot be ignored, and you will find that Prince Kraft, in his letters on strategy, discourses at length on the subject of the relative advantages of offensive and defensive strategy in war, and then says that it is all very well for us to examine these questions from a purely military point of view, but when it comes to the point, the decision is governed by political, rather than by purely military, considerations. Clausewitz writes, as you probably remember, that 'the leading outlines of war are always determined by the Cabinet, that is, if we would use technical language, by a political and not a military organ';¹ but he adds that 'a certain knowledge of the nature of war is essential to the management of political intercourse'; what we want ourselves to ensure is that strategy should not be controlled by the clamour of a populace without such knowledge.

In defence of the detention of Schley's squadron at Hampton Roads, I have heard it advanced that this detention covered the concentration of the American fleet. How it did so I do not know. Also that the risk of coast raids was greater for

¹ Book VIII. chap. vi.

America than for Spain, because a Spanish move against the American coast was more in the direction of the theatre of war than an American move against the Spanish coast. I confess I do not understand this. Raiding forces are strategical detachments which can only be justified if they can induce the enemy to detach forces of greater strength, and so be without their aid in the area where the main bodies engage in the decisive conflict. I believe that, in the original Spanish plan, the vessels in reserve at Cadiz had been ordered to the Canaries, and that some of the Spanish ships were to have been employed to raid the American coast north of Charleston. The fact that Schley's force was dubbed a 'Flying Squadron' seems to have decided the Spaniards to keep the Cadiz ships off their own coast, but this effect was produced by the name given to the squadron, rather than by its detention on the American coast to allay popular fears, and I prefer to accept the opinion of Mahan, who was in a good position to know the motives actuating the combatants. His opinion is that the proper place for Schley's squadron should have been off Cienfuegos. You will probably point out that, if coast raids were included in the original Spanish plan, the fears of the American populace were partly justified, but what damage could Spanish ships have done on the heavily fortified east coast of America? Serious invasion of American territory by the Spanish army was out

of the question unless a decisive victory could first be gained at sea, and shells thrown at undefended coast towns or bathing resorts could produce little or no effect upon the issue of the war. Every detachment from their naval strength would reduce the chances of the Spanish fleet gaining a success, and, with their main fleet beaten, what chance would the detached Spanish raiding ships have against the victorious American fleet which would soon be free to deal with them ?

Knowing as we do that no war-plan is likely to be effective if the strength of popular opinion is not taken into consideration, I hope that, after considering these points, you will deduce as Mahan did in America, that ' whatever really enlightens public opinion in a country like ours, facilitates military operations.'

The next lesson we have to learn from this campaign is the want of a central body, well acquainted with the principles of amphibious strategy, to control fleets and armies which may be working together for a combined object. How such a system can be brought to perfection we can learn best from the two recent wars conducted by Japan, so I propose to postpone further comment on this subject for the present.

We also learn how important it is for the naval and military authorities on the spot to co-operate most loyally in the actual execution of the plan for which they are responsible. Von Schellen-

dorff, in his book on the duties of the general staff, advocates making either the admiral or the general supreme, according to whether the sea or land part of the operations is likely to be the most important. Our own usual custom has been to make them independent of each other's command and to trust them to work together for the common object. Where cases of friction occur, I think it is in a great measure due to the seamen not realising the difficulties with which the soldier is confronted, and *vice versa*. It is not easy for seamen to grasp how much the movement of an army depends upon a sufficiency of land transport, upon which the men and horses depend for food and forage, because fleets are always able to move, as long as they can get occasional supplies of coal and lubricants. Supplies of necessities for several months can be stored on board men-of-war, while with armies a daily supply of food has somehow to be transported and distributed, even if it is obtained locally in the country. On the other hand many soldiers have little knowledge of naval subjects, and do not always realise the difficulties with which seamen have to contend in handling their ships under adverse conditions on a difficult coastline. Even the technical terms used in the two services are different, and I remember on several occasions seeing the result of this myself. To give you an example: the word 'handsomely' is used in the navy for hauling very gently on a

rope, but it sounds as if it meant being exceedingly vigorous, and I have seen soldiers putting their full strength into the work when asked to haul 'handsomely'; you can imagine the result when moving a heavy weight the last few inches, with a palpable chance of its toppling over if too much power is put into the work. I think that in our case we may anticipate the very best results from the new system of sending army officers to the Naval War College, and naval officers to the Staff College at Camberley. Even if they do nothing else, they will learn each other's language, and form friendships, and it is far easier to work well with a friend than with a total stranger.

From General Shafter's experiences we may also learn that serious administrative difficulties are likely to arise on the outbreak of war, when a nation relies on voluntary service for the expansion of its regular forces. Instead of a smaller proportion of staff officers, a larger number, and those of the best sort, is required for forces which have been hastily raised and incompletely trained. We also noted the naval difficulty of landing sufficient transport animals and vehicles for expeditionary armies landing on foreign territories, and the limitations which, as a result, must be placed upon the radius of action of such forces. Finally we learn how entirely dependent Shafter's force was upon the weather; had there been any change, and a bad sea had arisen upon the coast before the stores could be landed, his

men would indeed have been in a perilous situation.

Before closing this letter I will keep my promise and send you all the information I have been able to gather about the American cable-cutting operations, but before doing so, I think you would like me to describe briefly the events which took place in other parts of the world during the course of the war ; and we will first consider the ships which the Spaniards had kept in reserve at Cadiz under the command of Admiral Camara, although these vessels were not thrown into the balance in time, and so took no part in the war. We have seen that, instead of Cervera having been ordered to wait for them at the Canaries, and so have a better chance of meeting the American fleet upon more equal terms, he was ordered to cross the Atlantic weak as he was, and we have noted the result. After Camara had been detained off the coast of Spain for several months, the authorities ultimately decided to send him to the Far East, but here again the action was taken too late to be of any avail, as he did not pass the Suez Canal until the 2nd of July.

I would ask you now to look at the track chart which I enclose in this letter,¹ and at the list of American ships² under Admiral Dewey, and of Spanish ships under Montojo, which were stationed in Eastern waters at the time of the outbreak of hostilities. You will notice that Dewey

¹ Map IV.

² See p. 161.

had at his disposal one first-class, three second-class, and two third-class protected cruisers, while Montojo had two second-class unprotected cruisers, one of these being of wood, two third-class protected cruisers, three unprotected and three gun-boats.

On April the 27th, two days before Cervera left St. Vincent, Admiral Dewey left Mirs Bay¹ for Manila, in the Philippine Islands. Montojo, who was at Port Subic at the time with his ships, heard on the following day that Dewey's squadron had put to sea, and on the 28th of April he moved to Manila and anchored in the harbour. On the 30th of April Dewey entered Manila Bay by night, and on May the 1st he proceeded to deal with the Spanish ships, which all remained at anchor to receive his attack. Montojo's weak vessels were in full view of the gunlayers in the American fleet, which steamed round and round and bombarded them until the majority were sunk where they lay. Here again we do not get a naval action of any special interest, for it is just as suicidal for war-vessels to remain at anchor to meet an attack, as it is for cavalry to halt and sit on their horses to receive a charge of hostile mounted troops; and any one adopting such procedure would find it difficult to support his action by reference to historical examples.

As in our own case after the bombardment of Alexandria in 1882, there was no military ex-

¹ East of Hong-Kong (beyond boundary of map).

peditionary force ready on the spot to be landed in order to force home the blow struck by the war-vessels. Had we had one ready in 1882, it is doubtful whether the Egyptian war would have taken place ; but had the Americans had one in the Philippines, I doubt whether its effect could have been very decisive. Landing parties from the fleet destroyed the Manila batteries and arsenal on the 23rd of May, and on the 25th the first of many American expeditionary forces left San Francisco for the Philippines ; a second such force left on the 15th of June, and a third on June the 27th. It was found that they had not only the Spaniards to deal with, but also the population, and it is open to question whether the operations in these islands were of much service to the Americans, either as influencing the issue of the war, or as providing a desirable acquisition under the terms of peace.

The war came to a close on August the 13th ; the winners, in addition to experience, gained their ' limited object,' the freedom of Cuba from Spanish rule, and they obtained the good and well-placed harbour of San Juan in Porto Rico. The Philippines were also handed over to America, and with them the responsibility for maintaining order in those islands, a task which subsequently proved to be one of considerable magnitude.

I think that it will now be worth our while to go into the question of telegraph cables, and their influence upon the conduct of this campaign,

because of the possibility that we ourselves may some day be engaged upon a world-wide conflict. The operations in this war covered so large a proportion of the surface of the globe that they afford us especially useful data for such studies.

When you went up for the Staff College entrance examination, I remember that you wrote and told me of the difficulty you had experienced in obtaining satisfactory information about the telegraph cables of the world, which was a subject in which you had to qualify, under the heading of military geography; you pointed out that though good atlases do indicate the most important cable communications, yet few of them are sufficiently new, and what you wanted was an up-to-date map of the world on Mercator's projection, showing all the latest cables in existence. I remember writing to tell you that the Admiralty Coal and Telegraph Chart, which is constantly kept up to date, would give you all the information you required, but I should like to add now that this chart shows only the connections between different places, and not the routes followed by the cables which join them together.

Telegraph cables are safe-guarded in peace time by an international agreement which resulted from the convention which sat in 1884, but in war time belligerents would probably have no hesitation in cutting those they wished to cut, unless they were afraid of incurring the hostility of neutral powers. It is therefore interesting to

note the general policy approved by the United States Government in 1898. In order to explain it, I shall have to consider the various cables in classes, according to the nationality of the countries in which they were landed. Firstly, the cables between the enemy's possessions. All these were to be cut regardless of ownership. Secondly, the cables from the enemy's country to neutral countries. All these were to be destroyed near the enemy's country, unless messages could be censored at the neutral end. Thirdly, the cables between the territories of the two belligerent countries. These were to be left intact, but messages were to be carefully censored at the home end. Fourthly, the cables from American territory to a neutral country in cable communication with the enemy's country or possessions. These also were to be left intact, but messages were to be censored at the American end. Fifthly the cables from American territory to a neutral country not in cable communication with the enemy. In this case no messages were to be allowed to go if addressed to destinations in the enemy's territory, and arrangements were to be made with the cable companies to give up all doubtful messages. There remains a sixth case, that of the cables joining neutral countries, and this is a somewhat delicate one to handle. I do not think that the Americans published any regulations on this subject in 1898, so that we have here no precedent of which to take note, but

there is little doubt that the rules of 'might is right' and expediency will settle this, as they do so many doubtful questions of International Law in times of emergency. If such arbitrary action were taken by any belligerent, he would doubtless be called upon to prove that the cables so destroyed were being used for belligerent purposes.

You will note that the cutting of certain cables has been freely discussed, but this is an operation which is easier to talk about than to carry out successfully. I think it is very generally believed that any man-of-war can be sent off with instructions to cut any cable at any point at sea, but this is very far beyond their powers. In order to find a cable it is necessary to have the track chart and log of the vessel that laid it, so as to know exactly where the search should be conducted, and even when the exact position is known, special appliances are required to pick up the cable in deep water. I once heard some one who ought to have known better say that all that was necessary was to lower a grapnel to the bottom, drag it along until the cable was caught, and then steam ahead until the communication was broken; this procedure is of course open to the objection that there are other things besides cables at the bottom of the sea, and that few ships carry material for searching the bottom with grapnels in deep water. The regular cable-laying ships carry all sorts of special material, such as instruments for measuring the strain, to

prove whether a cable or something else has been caught, and their crews are trained and practised as specialists.

In 1898 the United Kingdom had almost a monopoly of cable-laying ships and appliances, and of specially trained personnel; one, and I think the only, such vessel owned in the United States was sold by her proprietors on the outbreak of war, and was not available for the use of the Government. Strenuous efforts were made to fit special merchant cruisers and other vessels for cable-cutting operations, but we know of only one case in which these extemporised vessels succeeded in cutting a cable in deep water, and that was when the large merchant cruiser *St. Louis* cut one in about five hundred fathoms. From the experience round Cuba, it would perhaps be safe to assume that it is only near the landing places and in shallow water, not more than about ten fathoms in depth, that we can expect unskilled operators with extemporised appliances to grapple cables quickly and successfully; and if spare bits of old cable are laid alongside the 'live' cables, the chances of such success are very considerably reduced.

A chart of the cable communications of Cuba and Porto Rico shows how many coast loops there were in Cuba, and you will probably wonder why cheaper land lines would not have been equally efficacious; the reason for having cables instead of land lines was I think attributable to the long

duration of the rebellion in the island, and to the fact that the insurgents would have been able to cut land wires, but not submarine communications. It is interesting to study the actual results attained by the American extemporised vessels in their attempts to destroy these submarine cables. Up to about the end of May, I believe that many unsuccessful attempts were made to cut the cable from Santiago to Cienfuegos, the Santiago-Jamaica cables, the French cable from Guantanamo to Hayti, the Cienfuegos-Havana cable, and the cables from Porto Rico. Cable-cutting operations are most delusive, and it is not easy to find out what the actual results were from the published accounts. The following successes were reported in May: Two of the cables from Cienfuegos westward were reported cut. The Porto Rico-St. Thomas cable was weighed, but the grapnel straightened out and dropped it. One of the Santiago-Jamaica cables and the Hayti end of the Guantanamo-Hayti cable were reported cut in May. Reports are contradictory about the subsequent operations; the *St. Louis* is said to have cut the last cable from Santiago to Jamaica on the 18th of June, but, on the other hand, Santiago is reported to have been still in cable communication with Jamaica at the time of surrender on the 17th of July. On the 10th of July the loop of the Santiago-Cienfuegos cable was cut near Manzanillo, and the Santa Cruz loop of the same cable on the 14th of July.

I think that the chief lesson we have to learn is the importance of having a hold upon the cable ships in war time, so that their services, with those of their skilled crews, shall be at the disposal of the government; and of course it is necessary to decide upon policy beforehand, and know exactly what amount of cutting, and how much cable laying, must be undertaken in any probable war in which we may be engaged. If you want to investigate further the question of cable strategy applied to amphibious wars, you will find very interesting articles on the subject in the *Marine Rundschau* for July 1903, and in the *Militär Wochenblatt* for 1st to 5th December of the same year. The articles in the last-mentioned magazine go into the question of cutting cables of which both ends are landed in neutral territory, and they contemplate the possibility of such cables being cut for the purpose of interposing special war stations. The British Blue Book Report of the Committee on Cable Communications, dated 1902, Cd. 1056, also contains some interesting matter, and there is a chapter on the subject in the *Empire and the Century*.

The network of the British cables has been developed chiefly to meet the requirements of our vast sea-borne trade, but we are usually given credit abroad for great strategical foresight in connection with its establishment; and although the possession of the strongest fleet should facilitate the development and protection of our

cable communications in time of war, yet we must remember that the consideration of trade interests in this connection will throw a responsibility upon our fleet which already has so much to protect.

Perhaps the transmission of information is the most important use to which telegraph cables can be put in war time, but they may also be used for arranging strategical combinations, for forwarding demands for stores, and for other purposes. Whether their use for issuing orders to commanders during operations will be an unmixed blessing is open to question, it will depend upon the extent to which popular clamour influences those responsible for the issue of the orders. I have heard it stated that an indignation meeting clamouring for the recall of Nelson as an incompetent commander was held in the City of London at about the time when the battle of the Nile was being fought, and it may have been fortunate that there were no telegraph cables in those days. Cervera, in 1898, would probably have preferred to receive reinforcements from Spain rather than cable messages.

When the Spanish squadron left St. Vincent on the 29th of April, its departure was immediately reported by cable to America, but the destination was not known. Here we note how very important it would have been to the Americans to have a reliable report about the Spaniards being subsequently seen at sea. We have a great advan-

tage ourselves in this respect ; owning, as we do, nearly half the sea-going mercantile tonnage in the world, there is every chance of our getting information from our merchant ships about what has been seen at sea in all parts of the globe, and you will remember a correspondence in the Press a few years ago about the importance of having our merchant seamen trained in signalling, so as to be able to communicate with men-of-war. Judging by one's own experience in mail steamers, when meeting German merchant ships on the high seas, a speciality is made of the study of Morse signalling by the merchant seamen of that country, as they usually send friendly messages in that code to passing ships of other nationalities.

The arrival of Cervera's squadron off Martinique on May the 11th was immediately reported by cable to America, but there was a delay of thirty-six hours before the message reached the Navy Department. The news was sent, I believe, from an American auxiliary cruiser that happened to be at St. Pierre; three such cruisers having been employed to search for the Spaniards at sea, but without result. An agent in Martinique would of course have been as useful as a cruiser to forward the information when Cervera turned up in sight of that place, and this shows us how great an economy can be effected in cruisers by the proper use of skilled observers, who can send information by cable from neutral localities. You will remember how Nelson, when ignorant

of his enemy's movements, wrote that 'More frigates' would be found written on his heart at his death, and we can imagine the Nelson of the future substituting the words 'More cable messages.'

Sampson's squadron, if you remember, was off San Juan in Porto Rico on May the 12th, and he moved westward without having heard that the Spanish squadron had been sighted on that day. Cervera also was ignorant of his opponent's movements at this period.

On May the 14th, Cervera, at Curacao, heard that Sampson had been off Porto Rico on the 12th. Cable messages were received by the American authorities on the same day to report Cervera's arrival at Curacao and that he proposed to coal from colliers which had been ordered to meet him in the Gulf of Venezuela. All available American cruisers were at once ordered there, but the next day news was received by cable that the colliers had been misdirected, and that Cervera had been warned by his government to make for Havana, or for a southern Cuban port connected with that place by railway. This information was received just in time for the orders to the American cruisers to be countermanded, and instructions were sent to Sampson's squadron to concentrate at Key West.

The arrival of Cervera at Santiago is said to have been reported by cable to Washington on the 19th of May, and Schley's squadron, with

some auxiliary cruisers attached, was ordered to Santiago to investigate the truth of the report. We have seen that Schley remained off Cienfuegos until the 24th of May ; on that day he left for Santiago, but reported by cable that he was short of coal and could not keep up a blockade. On May the 27th, the auxiliary cruiser *Harvard* took a cable message to Schley to the effect that he must at any cost remain and obtain the information required, and at 10 A.M. on the 29th of May he obtained and reported the news that the Spanish squadron was in Santiago harbour. Sampson accordingly left Key West for Santiago at 11 P.M. on May the 29th.

Cervera had left St. Vincent on the 29th of April, so it was just a month before any American ship got into touch with him, but nevertheless all his movements had been correctly reported to Washington by cable whenever his squadron came in sight of telegraph stations from which the news could be forwarded.

After reading this account you will, I think, agree that the introduction of submarine cables revolutionised the conduct of naval warfare, and gave far more power to central authorities to control strategical movements. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the most careful study of this subject by all who are entrusted with the conduct of naval or amphibious operations, and even in purely land warfare the cables to neutral countries may exercise a dominating

influence. A good example of this occurred in 1866, and was personally vouched for by the late Sir H. M. Hozier, who described it as follows : ' At about 10 A.M. on the morning of the battle of Königgratz, a telegram reached Prince Frederick Charles from London, announcing that on that morning an official intimation had appeared in a Vienna newspaper, stating that the whole Austrian army was concentrated, under Marshal Benedek, on the Bistritz. This gave Prince Frederick Charles a free hand. He was certain that the whole Austrian force was in front of him, and he attacked all along the line.' I quote this at length as I do not think it is a very well-known example. Sir H. M. Hozier added : ' We may be sure that if we had war with any country there would be means found for telegraphing all intelligence from Great Britain to some point in a neutral country, whence agents of the enemy would telegraph it to their headquarters.' Forewarned is forearmed, and all this accentuates the necessity for preventing the publication of all news of importance in the press, and of taking precautions so that no information which may leak out shall be allowed to leave the country.

It may be that the only solution will be to keep an establishment of paid prevaricators, whose duties in war time will be to flood neutral countries with misleading communications obtained ' upon the highest authority,' so that it shall

be difficult for the enemy's agents to sift the true from the false intelligence. Whatever expedient may be adopted, I think you will agree with me that something must be done in war time, and that preparations must be made beforehand for doing it; there seems to be no reason why we should not succeed almost as well as the Japanese did in 1904, in spite of the fact that many more cables leave Great Britain than Japan, and press publications are far more numerous.

With this suggestion I will close this letter, but we must remember that since 1898 a new means of communication, of even greater importance than cables, has been perfected in all important countries. Wireless telegraphy may produce in the future an even greater effect upon amphibious warfare than the submarine cables did in the Spanish-American War which we have been considering.

STRENGTH AT SEA IN THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR, 1898

ATLANTIC OPERATIONS

CLASS.	UNITED STATES.	SPAIN.
Battleships—		
First-class, . . .	<i>Iowa</i> * (a), <i>Indiana</i> * (a), <i>Oregon</i> * (a), <i>Massachu-</i> <i>setts</i> (b)	
Second-class, . . .	<i>Texas</i> * (b)	
Coast defence vessels, .	<i>Amphitrite</i> (a), <i>Katahdin</i> (b)	
Armoured cruisers, .	<i>New York</i> * (a), <i>Brooklyn</i> * (b)	<i>Maria Theresa</i> *, <i>Cristobal Colon</i> *, <i>Vizcaya</i> *, <i>Almir-</i> <i>ante Oquendo</i> *.
Cruisers—		
First-class, protected, .	<i>Minneapolis</i> (b), <i>Columbia</i> (b)	
Second-class, . . .	<i>Cincinnati</i> (a)	
Destroyers, . . .		3 in number.
Sloops, . . .	5 in number (a)	
Torpedo boats, . . .	4 in number (a)	
Other vessels, . . .	Converted merchantships	

PACIFIC OPERATIONS

Cruisers—		
First-class, protected, .	<i>Olympia</i>	
Second-class, protected, .	<i>Baltimore, Raleigh, Boston</i>	
Do., unprotected, . . .		<i>Reina Cristina</i> , <i>Castilla</i> .
Third-class, protected, .	<i>Concord, Petrel</i>	<i>Isla de Luzon, Isla</i> <i>de Cuba</i> .
Do., unprotected, . . .		<i>Don Juan d' Aus-</i> <i>tria, Don Antonio</i> <i>de Ulloa, Velasco</i> .
Gunboats, . . .		3 in number.
Transports, colliers, etc.,	2 in number	2 in number.

(a) Sampson's squadron; (b) Schley's squadron. * In battle of Santiago on 3rd July.

N.B.—The Spaniards had at Cadiz the battleship *Pelayo*, the armoured cruiser *Carlos V.*, and various unarmoured vessels.

FIFTH LETTER

THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1894-5

MY DEAR TOM,

In the account of the recent Russo-Japanese war, brought out by the German General Staff, you will find a statement that that conflict was one of the few that have been conducted beyond the proper dominions of both belligerent powers. This statement needs much qualification with respect to the wars in which the British Empire has been engaged in modern times, in fact I should be inclined to write just the opposite, and to say that the majority of wars on a large scale in which we have been, or are likely to be, engaged come under the same heading. In wars of this nature, the German account points out that the dominions themselves can only be considered in a general sense as the bases of operations, merely as the sources of power of the armies and navies engaged; and this remark is applicable to all wars in which the invasion of the home territory of neither belligerent is undertaken.

The reason why the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-5 is of such special interest to ourselves is because it was a war between an island and a

continental power. In such circumstances, the continental power, however strong on land, is unable to invade the home territory of the island power without the assistance of a fleet of predominating strength. This sounds rather dogmatic I am afraid, so perhaps I had better say what I understand by the expression 'invasion,' because there has been so much controversy on the subject of late years. I mean it to apply to the landing upon the island of an army of such strength that it cannot be put on shore quickly, and, when disembarked, cannot attain its object without receiving supplies and stores from overseas. Such an operation as invasion, defined in this way, is not feasible against the home territory of an island power possessing a fleet which, on account of its numerical or moral superiority, is able to defeat the fleet of its adversary.

In answer to this statement, you will probably write at once, to say that you never come across an assertion that any operation is impossible in war without at once setting to work to find out how to do it, and I quite agree with you, because one usually finds that wars are won by the achievement of what is apparently impossible. I am afraid that we cannot treat this invasion question exhaustively in these letters, because it is rather beyond their proper scope; we are only considering amphibious wars which have taken place since 1890, and in none of these was the home territory of an island adversary invaded.

If an island power without interests in continental countries should decide to rely almost entirely upon a fleet to guard its territory from invasion, that fleet must be overwhelmingly strong, because a force must always be kept within reach of the home coastline, in order to keep away invading armies ; a fleet must be ready to meet the fleets of all prospective enemies, and enough war vessels must then be left over to secure free transit for merchandise in distant seas which may be infested by hostile commerce destroyers. Please forgive me for referring to such a hypothetical case ; there are only two island powers in the world, Japan and ourselves, and we both have interests to guard on continental territory. The essential requirements for such powers are, in the first place, a strong enough fleet to ensure free communication by sea for military forces and for merchandise ; secondly, an oversea army of sufficient strength for offensive action in the area of decisive conflict ; and thirdly, a home army to ensure strategic freedom of movement for the fleet, so that it shall not be tied to the shores of the home island to keep off invading armies. This home army also provides the reserves of trained men for the oversea army referred to under the second heading.

This would, I think, be a favourable opportunity for us to consider various ways in which wars are usually brought to a conclusion. The most direct way is rapidly to invade the enemy's home

territory, defeat his main field army, seize the centre of organisation and government, and destroy all means of resistance. As regards the comparative cheapness of this method, the late Sir R. Giffen calculated that when the Germans employed it against France in 1870, they made a net profit out of the war, represented by a capital sum of £174,000,000, while the corresponding French loss in capital amounted to £603,000,000. Apart from finance, we understand well the effectiveness of this way of ending a war, and we probably agree that under present conditions it can only be applied by continental countries against their immediate neighbours; wars of this nature are beyond the scope of the subject of these letters, which refer more especially to amphibious operations.

The next way of ending a war is by interference with the external communications of the hostile country, and with such interference will be combined the isolation of the enemy's over-sea possessions, and sometimes their occupation by military expeditionary forces. The Spanish-American war which we have been considering gives us a good example of a conflict which was brought to a conclusion in this way by the Americans, and I think we ought to note that the effectiveness of this method increases as countries become more dependent upon industries than upon agriculture for the support of their populations. The more dependent the population may

be upon external communications for a livelihood, the more rapid will be the effect of the loss of such communications, but in any case the method must operate slowly ; it will be a serious test of the financial stability of the country employing it, and will be a severe trial of the endurance of popular sentiment and patriotism.

The third way of finishing a war is the one to which I want to draw your special attention, because it applies to two out of the four amphibious wars which have occurred since 1890. I refer to wars in which the scene of the decisive conflict which finishes them is in a country which is not the home territory of either belligerent, and possibly does not even belong to either. Such wars are of great interest to ourselves ; they are specially likely to occur in cases where the oversea possessions of one power, or oversea territory in which it has interests at stake, are on the borders of territory in direct communication by land with the home country of a rival power, and you will find little difficulty in finding examples where such conditions obtain in the British Empire. Perhaps Afghanistan is the territory of this nature which is the best known by the British public, but there are several similar examples on our borders.

Japan in 1894 had vital interests at stake in Korea, which is in communication by land with Chinese territory, and in order to guard those interests she required a sufficiently strong army

to defeat the land forces which China could bring into that country, and a sufficiently strong fleet to ensure sea communication for herself, while denying it as far as possible to her enemy. You will probably point out that it would have been better for Japan to have had a still larger army, capable of invading China, defeating the Chinese field armies, seizing the centre of government and all means of resistance, and then dictating her own terms about Korea, but I think that after consideration you will agree with me that this is pushing theory too far. There are limits to the resources in men and money of all countries, and strategical theorists cannot expect governments to do more than provide sufficient forces to maintain order at home, and to support their foreign policy, whatever that may be. Japan's 'limited object' on this occasion was to obtain the independence of Korea from all Chinese interference, and this object could be attained by defeating whatever Chinese armies could be brought into the theatre of operations.

In reply to what I wrote to you about the expression 'wars with a limited object,' used by Clausewitz, and its application to the Spanish-American war about Cuba, you pointed out that Cuba is an island, and had there been a question of attaining a limited object in territory joined by land to Spain, the question would have been a very different one for the Americans. The Chino-Japanese war of 1894-5 gives us a good

example of a war of this nature, and especially brings out the importance of combined action between fleets and armies in an amphibious campaign.

In our study of former wars we noticed the great advantages accruing to the side which is able to move troops by sea, over the side which has only inferior communications by land, and we also noticed that these advantages can only be obtained if the country in which the operations take place has a long and an accessible coastline. If you refer to the map,¹ which I enclose, you will notice that the coasts of Korea and Manchuria are long, and that there are certain sheltered bays and inlets distributed along them. The disembarkation of troops at such places proved to be practicable, although sometimes difficult, and the difficulty was chiefly due to the shallowness of the water, and to the rise and fall of tide. Large ships had to anchor a long way from the shore in most places, and even small boats could not get near the beach excepting at high tide, on account of the extensive mudflats which were laid bare at low water. The local practice in Korea is to lay stones or rocks on the mud at low tide, and to bridge them over with planks brought for the purpose, and so form piers to facilitate landing operations at all times of the tide. All this must have tended to delay, but neither side could afford to ignore the advantage which could

¹ See Map V.

nevertheless be gained by the rapidity of movement by sea of their military forces.

For attainment of the limited object in view, the question at issue was which side could pour field troops into Korea more rapidly. Here we notice that, although Korea was connected by land with China, yet the route was so long, and the means of communication so difficult,¹ that China was compelled to move her troops there by sea if they were to be in time to be of any use in the theatre of active operations. This brings us to an important principle in connection with the amphibious strategy adopted by island powers which have interests to guard on continental territory. They need not consider the total armies of their prospective adversaries, but only the armies which can be put in the field at the decisive point. If the enemy is weaker at sea, he cannot rely upon the sea route for his military movements, and the maximum strength of his field army at the front will depend upon the means of communication with the home land, upon the supplies and water in the country in which the operations take place, and upon the attitude of the population and their military spirit and resources. Without the help of railways, the size of an army which can be employed in the field is comparatively insignificant, unless the resources of the country can supply most of its requirements; with only animal transport

¹ Note that the railways shown on the map did not exist in 1894.

to rely upon for carrying its supplies, the limit of strength of a force is soon reached, and the difficulties increase rapidly as its radius of action is extended.

To realise this it is only necessary to remember the fact that transport animals must eat, and food must be carried for them, if it is not obtainable in the country. Take as an example a pack animal that can carry 160 lbs. weight on its back, and assume that 8 lbs. weight per day must be carried for the animal itself to consume ; then if the animal carries its own forage it can only carry enough for twenty days, so if sent out to an army ten marches away it can carry nothing at all for that army, if it is necessary to march back again to the supply depot from which it started, because its own forage weighs 160 lbs., the full load which it can carry. Or imagine that, instead of sending the same animals all the way to the front, the staging system is adopted, in which animals are employed to pass the loads on for one stage only, and others take it over the next stage, and so on. With ten stages as before, the food for the animals on the tenth stage must be passed to the front by those on the ninth stage, and, working backwards, we find that enough animals must be employed on the stage nearest the supply depot to pass forward the food for all those employed on the second to the tenth stages, so that we soon come to a situation when nothing but food for the animals on the front stages can be sent along the

first stage, and no stores for the field army can be sent forward at all. But I must apologise to you for enlarging upon this subject, because it is so familiar to nearly all British officers, and after your time at the Staff College you will have thoroughly mastered the question of the supply of armies in the field in different countries, using every description of land transport.

Our study of the Chilian and of the Spanish-American wars showed us the great results that can be attained by the movement of military expeditionary forces by sea against others which can only move by land. In the former case a small army of about 9000 men invaded a country containing over 32,000 hostile troops, defeated the hostile field army, and seized the capital, where they dictated their own terms. In the latter case an army of about 16,000 men secured the freedom of an island containing originally an army of over 190,000 of their opponents.

The Chino-Japanese war gives us an example of an island power attaining her 'limited object' on continental territory, in spite of the possession by her enemy of huge and invertebrate military forces, and the result was attained by the skilful direction of naval and military force to a common object, in accordance with the principles of amphibious strategy.

Before passing to a description of the operations it will be advisable for us to consider the relative strength both by land and sea of the two com-

batants. Taking Japan first, we note that conscription had been in force in that country since the year 1873. The Japanese army in 1894 was organised in seven regular divisions, behind which there were depot troops, like our own Special Reserve, to provide drafts for the units in the field ; and behind them again there were Landwehr troops, whose duty it was to defend fortresses, and to hold the lines of communication. These Landwehr troops cannot be compared with our Territorial army, because they could be used to reinforce the field forces, and were not tied by their terms of service to the defence of the home land. Each division comprised all branches of the service, and the necessary departments, and its total strength was about 18,500. Most of the regular infantry were armed with the Murata rifle, pattern 1880, but one division had the Murata repeating rifle, issued during the year of the war. The Landwehr troops were armed with Snider rifles. The artillery was armed both with field and mountain guns, the respective batteries being in the proportion of about two to one, but for service in Korea mountain guns were chiefly employed, and many batteries exchanged field for mountain equipment and pack transport.

From some points of view, it seems a pity that the term 'mountain gun' is so universally employed by us for a gun which is transported on pack-saddles, because there are other uses besides mountain warfare for guns of this nature, and

they are specially applicable to employment with forces which are landed upon an open beach. They are comparatively easy to land, and when on shore are easy to transport over country which would be impossible for field guns, and this is an important consideration, because it is so difficult to find everything that one wants when choosing a place for disembarkation ; even if a good beach or harbour can be found, the communications inland are seldom as good as one would wish them to be. The Japanese, in deciding to use chiefly guns with pack transport, were doubtless influenced in their decision by the facility with which such guns could be landed, as well as by the nature of the country in which they proposed to operate.

Including the trained reserves, the Japanese forces amounted to a total strength of about 273,000.

The First Army for oversea service, under the command of Marshal Yamagata, was mobilised in July 1894. It included the Third Division (Lieut.-General Katsura), and the Fifth Division (Lieut.-General Nodzu). The Second Army, under the command of Marshal Oyama, was in two portions. The first portion, mobilised in August and September, consisted of the 1st Division (Lieut.-General Yamaji), and part of the Sixth Division (Lieut.-General Kuroki). The second portion, mobilised in December, included the Second Division (Lieut.-General Sakuma), and

the remainder of the Sixth Division. The Japanese officers were efficient and well trained, and some of the names quoted above have now earned a world-wide reputation.

The Chinese armies were vast on paper, but quite unfitted to take the field for a campaign fought under modern conditions. They appear to have been a most heterogeneous crowd including 'Bannermen,' the descendants of the Manchu conquerors of the seventeenth century, 'Green standard troops,' the descendants of the Chinese army which was conquered by the Manchus, 'Braves,' who enlisted voluntarily, and specially trained Green standard men, who were intended to supersede the 'Braves.' In the provinces of Manchuria, Chihli, and Shan-Tung were stationed about 356,000 of these nondescript troops, but they were not organised in units larger than 'camps' or battalions of a strength of about 350, and only about 60,000 altogether were fit to take the field. The military organisation was chaotic, and no attempt appears to have been made before the war to establish the necessary administrative services. Only about three-fifths of the men had rifles; the infantry was armed with various descriptions of varying dates, and different weapons were sometimes to be found in the equipment of the same battalion. The field artillery had small 7 cm. (2.7 inch) Krupp field guns.

As regards the officers, it was the practice in

China to place inexperienced civilians in command of armies in time of war ; the chief power over the army in peace time was equally divided between the civilian and military authorities, the former decided strategical questions, and the latter were responsible for the tactical training. All this of course must be borne in mind when we study the operations, and try to draw lessons from them, and I fear that the value of the lessons is much reduced by this consideration. The fact was that the Chinese as a race were without any military spirit, and only the lowest classes enlisted in their armies. The commander of the Chinese military forces in the field was General Yeh.

The strength employed at sea by the two powers is shown on the enclosed list of ships¹ of which the following is a summary :—

JAPAN.	CHINA.
1 old third-class Battleship.	2 second-class Battleships.
2 Armoured Cruisers.	8 Armoured Cruisers.
7 second-class Protected Cruisers.	8 third - class Protected Cruisers.
1 Gun-vessel.	8 third-class Unprotected Cruisers.
	1 Torpedo Gunboat.

Besides Torpedo boats on both sides.

The superiority of the Japanese fleet does not appear in this summary, but the average size of their vessels was considerably larger than that of

¹ See p. 209.

the Chinese ships, and their speed was far superior. The Japanese naval personnel was the more efficient and the better trained of the two, and their fleet was under an efficient commander, Admiral Ito ; the Chinese fleet was commanded by Admiral Ting, who had spent most of his service as an officer of cavalry. The Chinese had made the additional mistake of having several small localised navies, instead of one homogeneous force, kept concentrated and trained together, and so available for decisive action at the outbreak of war wherever the dictates of sound strategy should require immediate and decisive action. They had altogether eighty-two war vessels and twenty-five torpedo boats, but these were divided into four localised squadrons called the Peiyang, Nanyang, Foochow and Kwantung, respectively ; only the Peiyang and three small vessels from the Kwantung squadron, took part in the war, so the remainder of the Chinese fleet has been omitted from the lists which I have given you above.

After these preliminary considerations, we can pass to the events of the war. You will remember that when referring to wars like this one, which have been fought out on territory which did not belong to either combatant, I asked you to bear in mind several factors which affect the strength of the army which each combatant could employ in the field and bring into action against the field forces of the enemy. One of the factors we

referred to was the attitude of the population of the country, and their military spirit and resources. If operating in a country with a warlike and hostile population, large forces must be employed to guard the bases and lines of communications of the field army, so the available field force for decisive action will be correspondingly reduced, owing to the deductions which must be made from its strength for this reason. In most of the territories on the borders of the British Empire this consideration is one of dominating importance, but in Korea the attitude of the population of the country could be ignored by both of the combatants, because the inhabitants had no military spirit, nor had they either arms or organisation which could render their attitude in any way formidable.

The Chinese in 1894 still regarded Korea as her vassal, while the Japanese for a long time had wished to recognise her as an independent state. After many years of trouble, Japan and China had agreed in 1882 to recognise Korean independence, and, after more trouble in the following years, they further agreed in 1885 that neither Power should send troops into the country without informing the other. In 1894 an insurrection broke out, both powers sent troops to deal with the situation, and matters were brought to a climax when Japan refused to withdraw at the request of the Chinese Government. The real question at issue was the recognition of the

suzerainty of China over Korea, and as no agreement could be come to on this point, both countries prepared for war. War, as you know, is defined by Clausewitz and others as a continuation of policy, and it is necessary for all Powers to maintain sufficient armed forces to support their policy if it is challenged. The Chinese learned the lesson that it is unsafe for any country to allow her foreign policy to be in advance of her naval and military preparations.

By the beginning of July 1894 the Japanese had sent 8000 men to Chemulpo;¹ the Chinese had sent only 1500, and while the negotiations were still proceeding they sent reinforcements into Korea in order to endeavour to put matters more on an equality. Eight thousand Chinese troops were sent by sea from Taku to Ping Yang, in order to form a strong army there to move southwards, and drive the Japanese out of Korea, and 3000 were sent from Port Arthur to Asan, in order to hold the Japanese at that place. This distribution of the Chinese forces seems open to the criticism that it gave to the Japanese forces, at and about Chemulpo and Seoul, the advantage of 'interior lines,' so that they could move southward to attack the Chinese force at Asan in superior strength, while detaching a small containing force, if required, to delay the hostile army to the north of them.

The despatch of the 3000 Chinese reinforce-

¹ See Map V. for these operations.

ments to Asan gives us a very good example of an attempt to send troops by sea before the question of naval predominance had been settled, and in this case we note that negotiations were still proceeding, and war had not been declared. On the 24th of July, 1800 out of the 3000 arrived safely at Asan, but the remaining 1200 were not so fortunate. They were on their way to their destination in a British merchant ship called the *Kowshing*, and on the 25th of July two Chinese third-class cruisers put to sea from Asan to escort them into the harbour. These vessels were defeated near Phungtao Island by three Japanese second-class cruisers which had been sent to cut off the Chinese reinforcements, and the Japanese then proceeded to deal with the *Kowshing*. The Chinese military officers on board refused to surrender, or to allow the captain of the ship to do so, and it was left to the captain of a Japanese cruiser to decide the delicate question whether a man-of-war is justified, in time of peace, in sinking a neutral merchant ship, carrying troops belonging to a country with which war may possibly break out in the immediate future. The Japanese sank the *Kowshing*, and the name of the officer responsible for this action was Togo, now so well known to fame. All on board the transport were drowned, with the exception of about 150 Chinese and three of the ship's officers. I wrote above that the occurrence took place in time of peace, but you as a student of international law

will be able to tell me whether I was correct. I confess that I do not know at what precise period a state of war between two countries begins. The Japanese had already committed an act of war, in engaging the two Chinese cruisers, and few wars nowadays seem to begin by formal declarations ; they usually commence by action taken by the best prepared side in order to secure the initiative.

What strikes one so very much in this early naval action is the co-operation between the naval and military authorities on the Japanese side. Before the 24th of July, there were about 1200 Chinese at Asan ; on that day their strength was raised to 3000 men and 8 guns by the reinforcements arriving from oversea, and on the following day, the 25th of July, a Japanese mixed brigade of about 3500 men and 8 guns under General Oshima left Seoul for the southward. Togo no doubt knew this, and understood therefore that it was of great importance to Oshima that the Chinese in his front should not receive so large a reinforcement. The result of the first land battle, which occurred on the 28th of July, was that the Japanese under Oshima attacked the Chinese under General Yeh and drove them out of a position which they had occupied at Songhwan, about ten miles north-east of Asan. The rout of the Chinese troops was complete. They fled in all directions, the majority somehow making their way to Ping Yang. The Japanese

force returned to Seoul on the 5th of August, on which day war was declared between China and Japan.

I think it would interest us chiefly to follow their operations from the point of view of the island power, and I would suggest that you should now spread out the map and consider the naval situation ; because on that depended the chances which both sides would have of moving their troops by the most expeditious route to Korea, in order to fight out the question of Korean independence.

The Japanese fleet remained at sea during most of the month of August ; they demonstrated off Wei-Hai-Wei on the 10th of the month, and subsequently off Port Arthur. It seems that they expected the Chinese to take more active measures at sea than they did, because, with the exception of a detachment of about 300, which landed at Gensan, the troops of the Fifth Japanese Division were landed at Fusan, so had a long march to reach the area in which they were to be employed. The march through Korea may, however, have been intended to influence the inhabitants, because on the 25th of August, an offensive and defensive alliance was concluded between Japan and Korea, under the terms of which Korea gave every facility for the conduct of the war to Japan, who on her part engaged to fight against China, in order to obtain the independence of her ally from Chinese suzerainty. During the month of

August the Chinese fleet remained at Wei-Hai-Wei excepting between the 17th and 19th when they cruised to Taku and back again.

The Japanese force at Gensan was strengthened by four battalions, a battery, and a troop of cavalry belonging to the Third Division, and by the 12th of September they had decided to run the risk of using the sea route to Chemulpo for their troops, although the Chinese fleet was still at Wei-Hai-Wei, and had not yet been brought to battle. The remainder of the Third Division was accordingly despatched to Korea by this route, covered by the Japanese fleet. On the same day (September the 12th), the Chinese fleet moved from Wei-Hai-Wei towards Port Arthur, to escort transports to Takushan, and it arrived at Ta-lien-wan on the 14th of September. Fourteen thousand Chinese troops had by this time been collected at Ping Yang, and that place, and the crossings over the river Taitong, were defended by fortifications. The Japanese fleet, having completed their escort duty, put to sea in order to cut off any further military reinforcements which the Chinese might attempt to despatch.

The naval situation in the early part of September is of special interest. Had the Japanese 'blockaded' Wei-Hai-Wei, or kept a cruiser off the place to watch the Chinese fleet, and a fleet ready to attack them if they put to sea, a naval action would have been fought somewhere between Wei-Hai-Wei and Ta-lien-wan between the

12th and 14th of September, and the result of this action would have settled once for all the question of the safety of the sea route for the transports of one of the belligerents. Presumably the Japanese did not adopt this course because they thought they were not strong enough to 'blockade' the Chinese fleet at Wei-Hai-Wei, and at the same time to sink the Chinese transports sent from Port Arthur, or possibly they feared to leave their own transports unguarded. At all events they waited until their own army had been landed before they undertook offensive movements. When we come to the war with Russia, we shall see how different the Japanese naval strategy was in 1904; on that occasion immediate offensive action was undertaken against all accessible portions of the Russian fleet, and by such means the movement of Japanese troops by sea was rendered reasonably secure during the whole period covered by the war.

On the 15th of September the advanced portion of the Japanese Third Division under Oshima, which had moved north from Seoul, combined with the force under Tachimi which had marched across country from Gensan, and attacked the Chinese who were in superior strength at Ping Yang, their number being estimated at 14,000. Nodzu with the main body of the Third Division had been delayed in crossing the Taitong River, and had intended to postpone the action until the

following day, because he had received no news of the Gensan column, with which co-operation was essential. The attack appears to have been precipitated by Oshima, whose troops were repulsed with loss, but fortunately Tachimi was within hearing of the guns and attacked the Chinese left with more success, and at 4 P.M. the Chinese offered to surrender. The main body under Nodzu arrived too late to take part in the engagement.

These operations on exterior lines seem to have been much favoured by Japanese strategists. To obtain an advantage by such strategy it is of course necessary to be certain that the separated forces shall combine on the field of battle, otherwise the enemy may destroy one of them before the other can come to its assistance, but the Japanese probably considered that their opponent was incapable of offensive movements, and so he proved to be on this occasion.

The account of the Chinese diplomacy after their surrender, in asking the Japanese envoys to go away from the fortified town of Ping Yang on various pretexts, is most humorous ; you will find an account of it in *The China-Japan War* by Vladimir, and I am sorry that I cannot give it in full. When the Japanese representatives tried to enter the North gate they found it chained and they were asked to go away and come again in the morning, because it was raining and night was approaching ; during the following night the

Chinese troops ran the gauntlet through the Japanese, who had surrounded the town, and escaped, with some loss, to the northward.

On the 17th of September the Japanese fleet, which had left Chemulpo on the 14th, found the Chinese at anchor not far from the mouth of the Yalu River; the Chinese fleet had left Ta-lien-wan on the previous day, escorting five transports carrying 4000 troops. The original intention of the Chinese Admiral is said to have been to proceed to sea ahead of his convoy to find the Japanese fleet and bring about an action, in which he hoped to defeat the Japanese, and so clear the seas for the safe passage of his transports. The situation at Ping Yang, however, necessitated the immediate despatch of reinforcements, so that Admiral Ting was obliged to accompany the transports, instead of being ahead of them; they all arrived safely near the mouth of the Yalu on the 16th of September, and the troops were disembarked. When, at about 11.30 A.M. on the 17th, the Japanese fleet appeared over the horizon, the Chinese immediately weighed anchor and put to sea, and the naval battle of the Yalu was fought on the 17th of September.

In this battle the Japanese ships were handled with skill, and had the advantage of speed over their opponents, but were the weaker in heavy ordnance. They commenced the action in two squadrons, steaming in line ahead, and by the

end of the day these two squadrons were steaming round the Chinese in opposite directions, pouring concentrated fire into their unfortunate opponents. The Chinese ships manœuvred badly, faulty signals were made, and such evolutions as were attempted were badly carried out. Five of the Chinese ships were sunk, five more required considerable repairs, and their total casualties amounted to 1500 killed, wounded and drowned. The engagement lasted until nightfall, and the remainder of the Chinese ships escaped to Port Arthur, where they arrived on the 18th of September. The Japanese had no vessels sunk, but three had to return to Japan for repairs; their losses in killed and wounded amounted to 294. One of the chief lessons learned from this action was the great danger of the occurrence of fires in a naval battle, and the importance of doing away with all unnecessary woodwork in men-of-war. There were numerous fires on both sides but, probably on account of their better organisation and discipline, the Japanese were more successful in extinguishing them than their opponents.

If you study the list of ships on both sides, you will see that I have marked the vessels which took part in the engagement. The Chinese after the battle still possessed a fleet which was capable of giving considerable trouble; they might have interfered with the movements of Japanese transports, and with the disembarkation of troops on the coastline, and we shall see later the

measures which the Japanese took to dispose finally of this fleet. We must note how the Japanese concentrated their attention on their two objectives, the fleet and field army of their opponents, and the special lesson to be learned is the manner in which the naval and military forces worked together for a common object ; sometimes the fleet helped the army by preventing the movement of hostile troops, and sometimes the army helped the fleet by hunting the enemy's war-vessels out of defended harbours.

The Japanese fleet moved to a place on the coast near Ping Yang after the naval battle of the Yalu, and arrived there on the 18th of September. Their army now followed up the Chinese troops which had retired from Ping Yang after the battle on the 15th of September, and by the 23rd of October the whole of the first Japanese army, under Yamagata, including the Third Division which had been landed at Chemulpo and Gensan, and the Fifth Division, which had marched from Fusan, had reached the neighbourhood of Wiju. They found the Chinese army, which had been collected on the Yalu to oppose the Japanese advance, adopting their usual tactics of ' occupying a position,' and drove them back on the 25th of October by turning their left flank. The Japanese then passed the river, their advance being covered by batteries on the left bank, and the Chinese retired to the north and north-east on the following days. The

task of driving the enemy out of Korea had now been accomplished, the Japanese First Army occupied Feng Huang Cheng without further opposition, and halted, covered by an advanced line of outposts, to await events in other theatres of operations.

Japan, having cleared the Chinese out of Korea, had obtained her 'limited object,' but the Chinese fleet had not been destroyed, and further operations had to be undertaken to force home the lesson, in order to induce her opponent to agree to conclude the war and to grant favourable terms of peace, as a recompense for all the expenditure of life and treasure which had been incurred.

You will remember that the Chinese war vessels retired to Port Arthur on the 18th of September. They were left there unmolested for a time, but on the 16th of October the Second Japanese Army, under Marshal Oyama, consisting of the First, and part of the Sixth Divisions, and a siege train, commenced to embark to attack Port Arthur and the fleet in the harbour. This force was accommodated in thirty-three transports. It arrived off the mouth of the Huayuan River,¹ near Pitzuwo, on the 5th of November, but on the 7th the Chinese fleet put to sea and escaped to Wei-Hai-Wei without meeting the Japanese fleet. We must assume that, with so many transports at sea, the Japanese authorities thought that the

¹ See inset map on Map V.

best plan was to use their fleet defensively, instead of keeping it off Port Arthur, and so running the risk of the Chinese avoiding it and then attacking the transports. This, as I said before, was very different from the strategy which they adopted ten years afterwards in their war with Russia.

On the 6th of November the Japanese Second Army commenced their disembarkation at the place on the coast they had selected for it, north of Pitzuwo. We note that they were accompanied by a siege train, and that the shallowness of the water and mudflats would have made it almost impossible to land heavy material under such adverse conditions. Ta-lien-wan is a good harbour, well suited for the purpose, but it was too close to Port Arthur, and the landing there would have been strongly opposed; as it was, they effected the landing of sufficient troops without opposition, and then marched to Ta-lien-wan and seized the harbour. The Chinese had about 10,800 men in Port Arthur, and 6000 more distributed between Chin-chou and Ta-lien-wan, both of which places were taken by the Japanese, the Chinese retiring to Port Arthur. The siege train and heavy material were landed at Ta-lien-wan by the 17th of November, and by the evening of the 20th of November the Second Japanese Army, under Oyama, was ready to move southwards against the defences of Port Arthur, having repulsed without difficulty an attack on

their right, which was developed on that day by about 5000 of the Chinese troops from the garrison.

You will notice that we have here another example of a fortress on the sea coast being attacked by a military force on the land side. No attempt was made by the Japanese war vessels to force a passage into the harbour, and, as usual in naval strategy, their energies were reserved for carrying out their proper rôle, the destruction of the hostile fleet.

At this period the land defences of Port Arthur on this side were distributed along the heights from Itzu-shan by Sung-shu-shan and Erh-lung-shan to Fan-tao on the coast.¹ There were thirteen forts on this line, one on Golden Hill, and eight on the Tiger Peninsula on the other side of the harbour. You will find these places on the rough map which I enclose. All sorts and descriptions of ordnance were mounted in the works, from Krupp and Armstrong guns to the most ancient of weapons. The Chinese garrison may be estimated at 13,500, and like the remainder of the army, they are reported to have been in a disorganised condition.

The Japanese force under Oyama numbered about 26,000 in the fighting line, and 13,000 auxiliary services and departments. The task for the supply and transport department had been greatly simplified by the capture of the good

¹ See Map VII. for these places.

harbour of Ta-lien-wan, so close to the theatre of operations ; had they been unable to capture this harbour the force which had been landed would have been in a perilous state, because sufficient transport to ensure the continuity of their movements had not been put on shore at the original landing place. At 7 A.M. on the 21st of November the attack on the Port Arthur defences was commenced by an artillery bombardment which lasted for about an hour ; the Japanese followed it up by a rapid advance, and by 11.30 A.M. the line of forts north of the harbour on the land side had been captured with a loss of only 400 on the attacking side ; the victors entered the town in the afternoon and massacred most of the inhabitants, probably by way of reprisal for the previous murder of Japanese prisoners by the Chinese. You will find an account of the massacre in a book called *Under the Dragon Flag*, by an Englishman who was in Port Arthur at the time and saved his own life with some difficulty.

From the naval point of view, the capture of Port Arthur by the Japanese increased their prospects of destroying the remainder of the Chinese fleet, which was now deprived of one of the defended harbours where it might have taken shelter. From a military point of view a good base was obtained for further operations against the Chinese armies.

Twenty-two thousand Chinese had collected near

Feng Huang Cheng, Hsi Mu Cheng,¹ and Mo-tien-ling,² by the beginning of December, and the next task for the Japanese armies was to defeat these forces. They operated as usual on exterior lines, probably on account of the difficulty of supplying large enough forces in any other way. The first army, now commanded by Nodzu, whose headquarters were at Antung in the beginning of December, had pushed back the enemy and advanced to Haicheng by the end of the month. During January, this army repulsed several attacks by the Chinese with whom they were in contact, but on New Year's Day, the Second Army, which had taken Port Arthur, marched northwards from Chin-chou, reached Kaiping on the 11th, and was in touch with the First Army by the 31st of January. For transport of supplies, Chinese wagons were employed on the five stages north of Ta-lien-wan, and Japanese carts and coolies further north. We leave the Japanese forces in this area in winter quarters on the line Haicheng-Kaiping at the end of January.

The Japanese by the end of the year had taken no further steps to destroy the Chinese fleet in the harbour of Wei-Hai-Wei,³ which was defended by formidable fortifications, and booms to keep out hostile ships and torpedo craft; preparations had, however, been made to deal with the situation here, and a second portion of the Second

¹ Shown on Map VIII.

² *Ibid.*

³ See list of ships on p. 200.

Army, comprising the Second and another Brigade of the Sixth Division, was mobilised in Japan during the month of December. As usual the destination of this force was kept secret, and one finds here another example of the great advantage possessed by a power which can skilfully conduct amphibious operations. We can imagine the feelings of the Chinese on hearing of this mobilisation; they could probably be best described in the words of the old eighteenth-century writer in the book on *Conjunct Wars*, which I quoted in my first letter to you, where he compares the attitude of a Power expecting an amphibious attack to that of 'a man in the dark moving to and fro distracted and at a loss which way to go to guard against the stroke of an invisible hand.' If there is one thing more than another which affects success in strategy, it is rapidity of movement; and the speed with which armies can be moved by sea gives a wonderful advantage to the side which can hold the sea routes, and can collect the best naval and military talent in the council chamber, to direct the combined movements of fleets and armies.

The object of the Japanese was to destroy the Chinese war vessels still remaining at Wei-Hai-Wei, and so once for all to secure for her transports the route to the Gulf of Pei-Chih-Li, or to any other destination to which she might wish them to be despatched. The exact strength of the Chinese garrison of Wei-Hai-Wei has not been

reported; it was between 9000 and 12,000. The defences were formidable; the forts may be divided into three groups, and all those on the coast contained modern heavy guns.

The Eastern group¹ on the mainland consisted of six forts, and their arc of fire commanded the water from Three Peak Bay to Wei-Hai-Wei harbour; they were defended against an attack on the land side by a continuous line of parapet running from Yang Tung Ling westward to Fort Mo-tien-ling, and thence westward to the sea; the last-mentioned fort was on the most commanding ground, and contained field guns; the garrison of this group amounted to about 3000 men. The North-Western group on the mainland covered the northern entrance to the harbour, and contained about 8500 troops. The island group was situated on Liu-Kung-Tao and I-tao Islands and covered all the mouths of the harbour; these forts contained about 1500 of the garrison, and there were about 4000 men belonging to the ships, which were anchored off the naval yard.

The booms across all the entrances are marked on the map which I enclose, and I believe that submarine mines had also been laid in the channels. You will realise from this that the Japanese were confronted with no easy task before they could expect to destroy the remaining Chinese war vessels. Besides the garrison of the fortress itself, they had to reckon with the

¹ See Map VI. opposite p. 208.

Chinese so-called army which was distributed about the province of Shan-Tung; but the prize for a successful attack against this strong coast fortress was considered worth trying for, because there were no less than two battleships, four cruisers, a torpedo vessel, six gunboats, and twelve torpedo boats sheltering in the harbour; these, and not the harbour itself, formed their true objective.

In studying former examples of this nature, we noted that there are two ways in which war vessels in a defended harbour can be destroyed by an army: either they may be bombarded from the land side, in which case an observation station commanding a view of the harbour must be captured, or else the fortress protecting them must be attacked and taken by assault, or investment, or a regular siege. The co-operation of a fleet is required in order to deal with the enemy's war vessels if they put to sea, and also to protect the army during its disembarkation; but, as a rule, the co-operating fleet does not do much damage by bombardment towards the destruction of vessels remaining in a well-defended harbour, because it is usually kept out of the range of the guns of the coast fortifications. Of recent years the introduction of fast torpedo vessels has given to the attacking fleet the chance of striking blows at an enemy so situated, without risking the large war vessels which are intended primarily for action against their opponents on the high seas.

The military problem which presented itself to the Japanese was, in the first place, to ensure that the army of the Shan-Tung province should not be collected in the neighbourhood of Wei-Hai-Wei, and, secondly, to capture the defences of the fortress and either destroy them, or turn them to their own use, so that the guns might be directed upon the Chinese war vessels. If successful in attaining these objects the army would assist the fleet to enter the harbour and capture the fleet of their opponents.

The task of the Japanese navy was first of all to ensure safe conduct for the transports, and to cover the disembarkation of their army ; their second task was to bring the hostile ships to action if they put to sea, or to destroy them in harbour, with the assistance of the army, if they remained at anchor. The operations were undertaken in mid-winter, so we can imagine the hardships which must have been endured by the men of both services, the army without shelter in their bivouacs, and the crews of the torpedo craft running their vessels in gales of wind and snow-storms.

To Marshal Oyama, who had captured Port Arthur with the first portion of the Second Army and siege train, was entrusted the task of attacking Wei-Hai-Wei on the land side with the second portion of the Second Army, which had been mobilised in Japan during the month of December. The first operation undertaken was a feint, on

the 18th and 19th of January, by three Japanese cruisers against Teng-chou-fu,¹ a place on the coastline of the Shan-Tung province, about seventy miles to the westward of the true objective. Their object was to draw to that spot as many as possible of the troops allotted to the defences of the Shan-Tung province, and in this object they were successful. A force of about 2000 men was landed, which I believe was provided by the personnel of the fleet, as I have been unable to trace any record of troops having been employed. We note here the importance of selecting the locality for a feint at a sufficient distance from the true landing place to ensure that the maximum effect is produced. If too close, then the troops drawn away to repel the false attack will have time to move to the decisive point against the force which is landed, even if they are not in time to oppose the actual disembarkation.

The greater portion of Marshal Oyama's force for the capture of Wei-Hai-Wei was embarked at Ujina, and sailed from that place for Ta-lien-wan on the 10th of January, thus mystifying the Chinese as to their true destination, which was kept quite secret. The troops from Ujina—the Second Division, and a brigade of the Sixth Division—were carried in thirty-five transports. At Ta-lien-wan some artillery and engineers from the Second Army were embarked, besides the Headquarters Staff of the force, and some details. The

¹ See Map V.

whole expeditionary force then proceeded in fifty transports from Ta-lien-wan to Yung-Cheng Bay,¹ east of Wei-Hai-Wei.

The total gross tonnage of the vessels carrying the troops I have not been able to get for you exactly, but I have ascertained that it somewhat exceeded 112,000 tons, and the gross tonnage of individual transports varied between 1100 and 4700 tons. Fourteen transports, of about 37,000 total gross tonnage, took a second trip, and two transports, of about 4500 total gross tonnage, took a third trip. Altogether about 37,000 men and 6250 horses were transported to Yung-Cheng Bay by the fifty transports.

The convoy left Ta-lien-wan in several portions between the 19th and 22nd of January. The transports were handled at sea in line ahead, two cables² apart, and the largest number in one convoy was nineteen. Twenty war vessels escorted the nineteen transports which left Ta-lien-wan on the 19th of January.

The field force numbered about 19,500 fighting troops, 3000 departmental troops, and about 10,000 coolies, total 32,500. I have been unable to ascertain for you details of the land transport employed, but coolies for transport service are constantly referred to, and there is no mention of the disembarkation of carts or wagons in any account to which I have had access. The heaviest siege ordnance landed appears to have

¹ See Map V.

² About 400 yards.

consisted of howitzers of 9 cm. (about $3\frac{1}{2}$ inch) calibre, of which there were twelve. As usual, in forces landed by the Japanese on hostile coasts, nearly all the other guns accompanying the troops were pack (mountain) guns.

About 300 sampans or native boats, specially protected against ice and heavy seas, were taken to land the troops, and many steam launches. Some of the sampans were 35 feet long, and could carry up to forty men or ten horses, according to the weather, and some were 15 feet long, and would carry up to ten men or one horse. It is interesting to compare these arrangements with those made by the Congressionalists in Chile in 1891, and by the Americans in Cuba in 1898, described in former letters.¹

On the 20th of January the Japanese fleet and first transports arrived unexpectedly at Yung-Cheng Bay. The whole of Oyama's force, with six weeks' supplies, was put on shore without opposition by the morning of the 25th, and on the morning of the 26th of January they commenced their advance. Part of the Japanese fleet was kept near the transports to guard them during the process of disembarkation; the remainder at first cruised off Wei-Hai-Wei to watch the entrances to the harbour, but afterwards, finding that the Chinese were quite inactive, only one cruiser watched Wei-Hai-Wei by day, while by

¹ See p. 116 as regards carrying steam launches in merchant vessels.

night about a third of the Japanese squadron, assisted by their torpedo boats, was kept off the harbour. For the march of the army to Wei-Hai-Wei two roads were used, the troops of the Second Division using the one nearest the coast, and those of the Sixth Division the parallel road about four miles inland. On the 28th of January both columns reached the line Paochia-Chung Chia Kou. On the following day they advanced to the line of the river, which was frozen over, and therefore no longer a serious obstacle to their advance, though we realise from this fact that lying out in bivouac at night in such weather must have been a severe test of the *moral* of the Japanese troops.

On the 30th of January the serious fighting commenced. Six Japanese war vessels steamed into Three Peak Bay to co-operate with the army, and directed their fire upon the most easterly fortifications. Oyama's force advanced in two columns; the left column attacked the ridges covering the harbour on the south side, and seized the high ground with little difficulty. The attack of the right column was directed upon Mo-tien-ling, which was captured by 9.30 A.M. These successes enabled them to pour a heavy fire into the forts of the Eastern group, which were soon abandoned by their Chinese garrisons; attempts were made to blow up some of the forts before they were evacuated, but with only partial success; the guns were little damaged and the

Japanese succeeded in repairing them during the following day. The intention had been to send the torpedo boats in during the night of the 31st of January, but the weather was so bad that this was found to be out of the question. The majority of the Japanese fleet outside were unable to keep the sea, and returned to Yung-Cheng Bay for shelter.

You may think that the lessons which we can gather from this war are much reduced in value by the inferior fighting power and organisation of the Chinese, but it is very unusual to find two opponents of exactly equal value in this and all other respects. When you studied the war of 1866 between Prussia and Austria, for example, you must have noticed the great value of the strategical lessons which can be learned, and the great risks which were run by the separated Prussian forces until they established touch with each other, and obtained their decisive success in battle ; but then you must bear in mind that the Austrians were armed with muzzle-loading rifles, while the Prussians had breech-loaders. There is nearly always some factor like this which makes it impossible to generalise or to draw from one campaign lessons which are applicable to all wars under all conditions. 'A military maxim is a warning, never a rule,' as a friend of mine at the Staff College used to say in his lectures, and if we study only wars in which both sides had equal commanders, equally efficient troops, and equal

armament, we can produce the most convincing academic theories as a result of our study, but we must seek another world in which to apply our knowledge.

What strikes one most in the operations about Wei-Hai-Wei is the grit shown by the Japanese and the persistence in carrying out their plan without delay under the most adverse conditions. The weather on the 1st of February could hardly have been worse; a blinding snowstorm was falling, and the roads were in a terribly bad condition. Nevertheless the situation called for immediate action. The saying 'ask me for anything but time' in military operations was well applied by the Japanese; any delay would have given the Chinese the opportunity to strengthen Wei-Hai-Wei and the North-western group of forts on the side threatened, and there was always the prospect of Chinese troops from the province of Shan-Tung attempting to come to the assistance of the garrison.

The two Japanese columns advanced westward on the 1st of February in spite of their difficulties. The left column met with serious opposition, but succeeded in pushing back the enemy, and on the following day Wei-Hai-Wei and the North-western group of forts were occupied without opposition. The Chinese garrisons, on account of the determined advance of the invaders, had taken to flight, but before doing so they had effectively destroyed all the ordnance in the

fortifications. The Japanese army now found itself under fire from the Chinese ships in the harbour, and their next task was to undertake combined naval and military operations to capture the ships, and the forts upon the islands. The army had facilitated the task of the fleet by capturing all the forts on the mainland, and the guns of the Eastern group were available to bring fire to bear against either the Chinese ships or the island fortifications.

Weather conditions, especially near a coast-line, have even a more dominating effect upon naval operations than they have upon the movements and actions of armies, and on this occasion we are told that the cold was so intense that the ships were covered with ice, and blocks from three to five inches thick were frozen into the muzzles of the guns.

On the 2nd of February Admiral Ito's fleet left Yung-Cheng Bay ; and on the 3rd, which was a fine day, the ships and forts on both sides bombarded each other ; by night the Japanese torpedo boats made an unsuccessful attempt to cut the Eastern boom, but succeeded in discovering a difficult and rocky channel between the southern end of the boom and the shore.

They took advantage of this knowledge on the night of the 4th of February, when seven boats entered the harbour and advanced singly against the Chinese ships anchored off Liu-Kung-Tao Island. The fire opened upon the leading boat

by the Chinese fleet helped those following to distinguish their targets, and one of the two Chinese battleships was disabled by a torpedo discharged at a range of about eighty yards; nearly all the torpedo boats were struck by rifle bullets, one, which was struck by a projectile from a light quick-firing gun, had to be abandoned, and one of the other boats was lost on the way out by running ashore. A similar attack was carried out at 4 A.M. on the 6th of February, when two Japanese torpedo boats jumped the Eastern boom south of the I-tao Islands, and three passed through the channel to the southward. On this occasion the Chinese ships were found to be moored close to the shore, and they were protected by guard boats which gave the alarm; the ships at once switched on their electric search-lights, which showed up their position, and that of the guard boats, to the attackers. Two of the Japanese torpedo craft went for the guard boats, and the other three ran in to a range of from fifty to a hundred yards and discharged seven torpedoes at three of the Chinese ships, all of which were sunk at their moorings. In spite of a heavy fire from quick-firing guns and rifles having been directed upon the torpedo boats, which could be clearly distinguished in the electric light beams, they suffered no serious damage in this attack.

Meanwhile the Japanese fleet, and the artillery in the Eastern group of mainland forts, had not been idle. The Chinese ships and island

forts were bombarded daily, the fleet steaming outside at ranges of from 4000 to 6000 yards, helping the gunners on shore by distracting the attention of the Chinese and causing them to expend ammunition, which could not be replaced. On the 7th of February the fort on I-tao Island was rendered untenable by this combined bombardment, and was abandoned by its garrison. During the same day, twelve Chinese torpedo boats came out on the pretext of attacking the Japanese fleet, but steamed away to the westward directly they got outside. They were chased by Japanese cruisers, and they all ran on shore after proceeding about fifty miles. They were very little damaged, and seven of them were subsequently got off and taken possession of by the Japanese.

The abandonment of the fort on I-tao Island enabled the Japanese on the night of the 9th of February to remove about seventy yards of the Eastern boom between I-tao Island and the shore, in spite of long range fire from the Chinese ships. This left a passage clear for a subsequent attack upon the remaining Chinese war vessels, and as during the previous day the Western fort on Liu-Kung-Tao Island had been silenced, and a Chinese cruiser sunk by bombardment, the ultimate issue could no longer be doubtful.

The Chinese, or those of them who had not committed suicide in the meanwhile, surrendered on the 12th of February, twenty-three days after the arrival of the combined Japanese force at

Yung-Cheng Bay, and only thirteen days after Oyama had commenced his actual attack. The Japanese army had lost 238 killed and wounded ; their navy had lost two torpedo boats, and had had sixty-one casualties among the personnel. The Chinese had lost the remainder of their available fleet, and a costly fortress which they had considered to be impregnable.

The Japanese were now in a position to move their military forces freely by sea, without any prospect of interference by the enemy's war vessels ; they thus held ' command of the sea,' in accordance with the definition of that much-debated expression by Sir George Clarke, and by the late Admiral Sir Geoffrey Hornby. So far, there had been no overtures for peace, and attention was now turned to the operations of the Japanese First and portion of the Second Armies which we left in winter quarters on the line Haicheng-Kaiping on the 31st of January. The advance of these forces was resumed on the 21st of February. A two-days' battle, in which the Chinese were again defeated, was fought at Liao Yang on the 28th of February and 1st of March. Newchuang was captured by the Japanese on the 4th of March, and Tien-Chuang-tai¹ on the 9th.

This was enough for the Chinese Government ; they sent an envoy to sue for peace, and as the issue was no longer in doubt, the Japanese carried out an effective occupation of the Pescadores

¹ West of Yingkou. Not shown on sketch map.

Islands.¹ This course was obviously pursued in order to influence the terms of peace, rather than to produce a definite effect upon the issue of the war. For the latter purpose, we have seen how attention was directed alternately to the hostile mobile forces by sea and land, and how the two Japanese strategical weapons, their fleet and army, worked together for a common object in all the operations which were successively undertaken.

The Japanese had employed altogether 353,000 men. According to her war establishments for field service there would not appear to have been more than 100,000 fighting troops in the field at one time, and it is interesting to compare the figures with the numbers which we sent into South Africa in the Boer War, and with the maximum numbers we had in the field at any one time on that occasion. Four thousand Japanese were killed or wounded, and they are said to have lost no less than 57,000 men disabled by disease, of whom 3000 died. No statistics of Chinese casualties are available.

On the 17th of April 1895 the Peace of Simono-seki was signed, and Japan thereby gained her original 'limited object,' the independence of Korea, in addition to the Liao-tung Peninsula, the Pescadores Islands, Formosa, and the temporary possession of Wei-Hai-Wei until the payment of a war indemnity of about £25,000,000.


¹ Between Formosa and mainland. Beyond boundary of map.

The intervention of Russia, France and Germany, which obliged Japan to give up the Liaotung Peninsula, the most important of the acquisitions for which she had fought so hard, is a matter of history. It did not dishearten Japan, but only incited her to further efforts, which culminated in the war with Russia which we shall consider in the next of these letters.

The lessons in amphibious strategy which may be gathered from the war of 1894-5 have been referred to incidentally in the course of the narrative, but perhaps the most important lesson of all is that an island Empire, when acquiring possessions or interests on continental territory, gives hostages to fortune, and must maintain land forces of sufficient strength to protect those interests, in addition to a fleet strong enough to ensure their secure movement to their oversea destinations. The necessary strength of such land forces will depend upon the attitude of the population of the continental territory, upon its resources, and upon the means of communication at the disposal of possibly hostile armies in countries adjoining its border. In cases where the territory referred to has a long and accessible coastline, the comparative rapidity of movement by sea adds greatly to the effectiveness with which the military forces of the island Power can be employed.

MAP N^o VI.

JAPANESE ADVANCE ON WEI-HAI-WEI, 1895.



STRENGTH AT SEA IN THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR
1894-5.

CLASS.	JAPAN.	CHINA.
Battleships—		
Second-class, . . .		<i>Ting Yuen</i> (a)(b) <i>Chen Yuen</i> (a)(b)
Third-class, . . .	<i>Fuso</i> (a) (b)	
Armoured cruisers, ¹ .	<i>Hi-Yei</i> (a) (b) <i>Chiyoda</i> (a) (b)	<i>Lai Yuen</i> (a) (b) <i>King Yuen</i> (a) <i>Ping Yuen</i> (b)
Cruisers—		
Second-class, pro- tected, . . .	<i>Takachiko</i> (a) (b) <i>Narrima</i> (a) (b) <i>Itsukushima</i> (a) (b) <i>Matsushima</i> (a) (b) <i>Hakidate</i> (a) (b) <i>Yoshino</i> (a) (b) <i>Akitsushima</i> (a) (b)	
Third-class, pro- tected, . . .		<i>Tsi Yuen</i> (a) (b) <i>Chih Yuen</i> (a) <i>Ching Yuen</i> (a)(b)
Do., unprotected,		<i>Chao Yung</i> (a) <i>Kuang Wei</i> (a) <i>Kuang Chia</i> (a)
Torpedo vessel, . . .		<i>Kuang Ping</i> (b)
Gun vessel, . . .	<i>Akagi</i> (a) (b)	
Corvettes, . . .	9 in number (b)	
Gunboats, . . .	5 in number (b)	6 in number (b)
Torpedo boats, . . .	15 in number (b)	12 in number (b)

(a) Took part in the Yalu battle; (b) in the operations at Wei-Hai-Wei.

¹ Small vessels, 2000 to 3000 tons displacement.

N.B.—The ships are classified as they were at the time, so no comparison is possible with the classes employed in the Russo-Japanese War.

SIXTH LETTER

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1904-5

MY DEAR TOM,

In undertaking to include the recent Russo-Japanese war among those from which we should draw lessons together, I find that I have undertaken a formidable task. The struggle was fought out such a short time ago, and the mass of printed matter on the subject is so overwhelming, and so contradictory, that it is difficult for any one to focus properly the important principles which were exemplified, and to extract the true facts from the many contradictory reports. It has been announced that the task of producing a combined naval and military history has been entrusted by our Government to the Committee of Imperial Defence, and the result of their labours will be awaited with interest by all who wish to study amphibious operations. Meanwhile there are several publications at our disposal which take a comprehensive view of the war, and among them we have the portion of our own official history, written from the military point of view, of which the first volume was published by the General Staff at the War Office, and the second, third, and fourth by the Com-

mittee of Imperial Defence. Then there are the important chapters in the new edition of Hamley's *Operations of War*, in which Colonel L. E. Kiggell (now Brigadier-General, and Director of Staff Duties at the War Office) discusses the strategical and tactical lessons from the facts as they were known in 1907. We also have the official account of the war brought out by the German General Staff. Of course there are numberless other publications in many languages, including several excellent French accounts, which one must read and use as books of reference; those I have quoted are in English, and suffice perhaps to begin with, but we are sadly in want of an account written from the naval point of view, and this want we hope will shortly be supplied. It is not difficult to realise the effect produced upon the armies by the naval situation, but we also want to grasp the effect produced upon the naval operations by the military situation on land. You have of course read *Rasplata*¹ and its climax, *The Battle of Tsushima*,¹ written by a Russian naval officer, and giving the human side of a naval struggle under modern conditions as no other book has done, at least no other to which I have had access.

The great interest of the war to ourselves is that it was fought between an island Power possessing interests on continental territory, and a land Power, with a vast army in communication

¹ Translations published by John Murray.

by land with that territory. The lessons from the point of view of amphibious strategy are invaluable. The time factor, and the relative facility of movement of armies by land and sea, are constantly brought into prominence, and the co-ordination of the work of fleets and armies by Japan to attain a common object provides the most wonderful example of such work in history. From the financial, economic, political, and naval and military point of view, the strategical situation can only be described as kaleidoscopic, and it will always be a wonder to me how any brain could have grasped the problem, and how any executive machinery could have been devised to transfer the solution into effective action.

There seems to be so much to write that one hardly knows where to begin, and from what standpoint to review the events, but the agreement we came to to consider these wars from the amphibious point of view will afford us an aspect of the war to which we can pay particular attention, and I propose that we shall therefore consider chiefly the co-ordination of the naval and military operations to gain the object of the war, and that we shall only refer to the purely naval, purely military, and to the financial, economic, and political aspects as far as they definitely affect this question, and so must of necessity be taken into consideration.

In the first case, it is necessary to understand what the war was fought about, and I will take

up the story of Japanese interests on continental territory at the point where we left this question at the end of my last letter about the China War. In this case, as in the former, I hope you will agree with me that for ourselves, as serving an island Power, it will be of greater interest to study the operations chiefly from the Japanese standpoint.

In pursuance of this policy, let us try and look at the causes of the war from the Japanese point of view. We have seen how hard the Japanese fought in the China War, and we can realise how not only the Government, but the people behind them, must have been disappointed at the intervention of Russia, Germany, and France, which took from them Port Arthur, the most valuable acquisition which they had gained under the terms of peace. The subsequent policy pursued by Russia led them to anticipate that before long that great military Power would be permanently in possession of Port Arthur, and that Manchuria would become Russian territory. There was every reason to anticipate that Korea would ultimately undergo the same fate, and in the future, with these territories in the hands of Russia, with the harbours fortified as naval bases, and with improved railway communications for the movement of Russian troops, there would be no security for the expansion of Japanese trade, upon which the population depended for a livelihood, nor would there be the same opportuni-

ties for disposal of the surplus population of the islands. Should Russia ultimately maintain sufficient naval forces in the Far East to dominate those of Japan, the Japanese teeming population would not even be secure in their own homes from Russian aggressive action.

If the impending struggle between the two empires was to be fought out on the mainland, then the participation of practically the whole male population of Japan might be necessary, in order to ensure any prospect of a successful issue. We read of the unanimous enthusiasm of the Japanese nation for the war with Russia, and we must realise that this condition is absolutely essential to success when an island Power undertakes to meet a strong land Power on continental soil. Every country has its defence (or offence) policy to consider, and it is far easier for the population of a continental country to realise its dangers from the armed hordes of its immediate neighbours than it is for an island people to grasp the necessity for action on continental territory, in order to safeguard its own means of livelihood, and ultimately its own security. If what has been called the 'strategic sense' of the population tells them that, as long as they can be strong enough at sea, their homes will be reasonably secure, they find it difficult to grasp the necessity for expansion in order to provide for the surplus population, and still more difficult to understand the necessity for fighting for oversea markets

without which they cannot continue to exist. Even supposing that their present needs are provided for in these respects, and that their economic position enables them to maintain an overwhelmingly strong fleet, it is still necessary to look ahead, and to consider how soon, and by whom, this sea supremacy may be challenged.

You will find this question studied in detail, from the Japanese point of view, in a book called *The Russo-Japanese Conflict* by K. Asakawa. In this case, the economic problem was not the only side of the question to be considered. Nations, like individuals, have their personality and their honour to guard ; the Japanese people had been deeply shamed by losing the fruits of their war with China, and the national sense of honour and fighting spirit stood high, owing to the great influence of the chivalrous class of Samurai, and to the doctrine of chivalrous conduct in action which went by the name of Bushido. This doctrine was based on self-sacrifice, and not upon self-advancement, and so differed from the principles in which so large a proportion of the population of Western countries is educated. The cult of personal comfort and prosperity, apart from that of the nation, which sometimes goes by the name of high civilisation, had not had a baneful influence upon the national fighting spirit, and the population, especially that of the country districts, was prepared for an amount of personal sacrifice in the pursuit of

ideals which is not perhaps to be found to the same extent in the Western peoples of very highly 'civilised' nationalities. We can assume then that the great driving power of national sentiment was behind the armed forces of Japan, and to this fact, above all, must we attribute the results which they achieved.

In order to realise better the strength of this national sentiment it will be useful to go briefly over the events which led up to the situation at the outbreak of war; we can then consider the naval and military forces at the disposal of the two combatants, and more especially the organisation of the executive which enabled Japan to control her amphibious strategy, and direct the general plan of operations so that the greatest assistance should be obtained from the fleet and army, whether the work to be done was naval, or military, or 'conjunct' upon each occasion.

The Peace of Simonoseki was signed, as you will remember, in the year 1895, and we can imagine the Japanese watching for further moves on the part of the Western Powers. In 1896 Japan and Russia agreed upon their joint policy in Korea, and both Powers contracted to maintain small forces in that country. In 1897 Germany occupied Kiao-Chao,¹ and acquired a zone of influence in China, and some railway and mining rights. In March 1898 Russia acquired

¹ See Map V. for this and other places mentioned in this letter.

a twenty-five year lease of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, together with a neutral zone, and the right to erect fortifications; during the following month she came to an agreement with Japan to respect the independence of Korea; in 1899 Russia began to construct a railway from Port Arthur to Harbin, on the line from Europe to Vladivostok. During 1898 France obtained a lease of Kuang-chou-Wan,¹ and Great Britain acquired extra territory on the mainland opposite to Hong-Kong,¹ and the right to occupy Wei-Hai-Wei as long as Russia held Port Arthur. Wei-Hai-Wei at the time was still held by Japan as security for the payment of the Chinese War indemnity, and she gave the place up to Great Britain.

You will remember the internal trouble which occurred in China in 1899 and 1900, as a result of these concessions to the hated foreigner. The Legations at Peking, which had been besieged, were relieved in August 1900 by a combined force of British, French, German, Japanese, Russian, and United States troops, which occupied the province of Chihli until 1902, when they were all withdrawn, with the exception of the Legation guards. In the meantime Russia had actively pushed on her policy of railway construction in Manchuria, in spite of some delay, due to the necessity for employing considerable forces for the suppression of risings among the population ;

¹ Beyond limits of Map V. to the southward.

this led to a military occupation of the country by September in 1900, after operations in which about 1500 Russians were killed and wounded.

Japan now took the first conspicuous step in her policy of preparing for war with Russia. She had suffered so seriously from the intervention of the Western Powers in 1895 that she evidently wished to avoid the chance of its recurrence, and early in 1902 she concluded a treaty with Great Britain. Under the terms of this treaty, each Power was bound to come to the assistance of the other under certain conditions, and the effect of it was to ensure that the impending struggle with Russia would be fought out without any other Powers being able to intervene, unless they were prepared for war with Great Britain as well as with Japan.

In April 1902 a treaty was concluded between Russia and China, under which treaty the former Power undertook to withdraw her troops from Chinese territory. This withdrawal was delayed, in spite of protests from China, and further concessions in Manchuria demanded by Russia were refused by the Chinese Government in April 1903, after Great Britain, the United States, and Japan had protested against the terms of the demands. Japan was at this time given cause for alarm about Russian influence in Korea. A Russian subject had secured a monopoly to cut timber on the Yalu and Tumen rivers, and in April 1903 work was actively commenced under the terms of this

concession ; Yongampo, near the mouth of the former river, was occupied by Russian troops, and from this and other acts on the part of their prospective adversary, it appeared to the Japanese Government that Russia did not propose to adhere to the agreement come to in 1898. Accordingly negotiations were commenced in August 1903, which led to no solution of the difference between the two Powers, and on the 5th of February 1904 the Japanese minister was recalled from St. Petersburg.

Here again we find Japan embarking upon a war with a 'limited object,' which was to prevent Russia extending her territory and influence in the Far East to an extent which would menace the development of Japan, and we find here a case of a limited object which required the employment of the whole force of the country for its achievement. I want to ask you again to refer to your Clausewitz on this subject. I hope that I am not doing so too often, and I wish that a similar book had been written with the words 'fleet and army' substituted for the word 'army' in every case, and 'naval and military force' substituted for 'military force,' because of the utility of such a book to students of the only strategy which can be applied by island Powers. You will find, in his definition of the ends of war,¹ that the aim must always be the overthrow of the enemy, but that this overthrow

¹ Book VIII. chap. iv.

does not always imply as necessary the conquest of the enemy's country. It is generally brought about by (1) dispersion of his army, if it forms in some degree a potential force ; (2) capture of his capital city, if it is both the centre of power of the state and the seat of political assemblies and factions ; or (3) an effectual blow against the enemy's principal ally, if more powerful than himself. We need not consider the third method in this particular case, and we note that he says later on that one's forces must suffice (1) to gain a decisive victory over those of the enemy ; and (2) to follow up the victory to a point at which it will be no longer possible for him to regain his balance. Clausewitz also draws attention to the importance of making sure that the resulting political situation will not raise up new enemies, who will compel the victor to set free the first opponent.

These remarks are applied by Clausewitz to wars in general, and he goes on to examine the case of wars with a limited object, in which the aim is limited to the conquest of a small or moderate portion of the enemy's country, or to the defence of one's own until better times. Although the Russo-Japanese War was carried on outside the dominions of both Powers, yet the fact that the territory in dispute was occupied by Russian forces justifies us in classifying it as a war of this nature. Neither side had anything serious to fear from the inhabitants of the country, although

Russia had to take precautions to guard her line of communications against the depredations of the bands of robbers called Chunchuses. Japan's aim was the occupation of Korea and Manchuria in face of the opposition of Russia, and in order to attain this object Japan was obliged to attack. To quote Clausewitz for the last time, for the present at all events:¹ 'Let us suppose a small state which is involved in a contest with a very superior power, and foresees that each year its position will become worse; should it not, if war is inevitable, make use of the time when its situation is farthest from the worst? Then it must attack, not because the attack in itself ensures any advantage—it will rather increase the disparity of forces—but because this state is under the necessity of either bringing the matter completely to an issue before the worst time arrives, or of gaining at least in the meantime some advantages which it may hereafter turn to account.' He goes on: 'If again we suppose a small state engaged in war with a greater, and that the future has no influence on their decisions, still, if the small state is politically the assailant, we demand of it also that it should go forward with its object.'

Japan's situation in 1904 could hardly be better defined, and I think that you will agree that the only method by which she could attain

¹ Book viii. chap. v. Colonel Maude's translation: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co.

her object would be to attack without delay the forces, both naval and military, which Russia could bring into the area in which the issue was to be decided.

If you will now refer to the sketch-map which I enclose,¹ you will notice that Korea and Southern Manchuria fulfil the conditions required for the advantageous use of amphibious powers, by a country able to move her military forces by sea. The coastline is long, and it is also accessible in many places, although difficult. The most difficult portion is the east coast of Korea, south of Gensan, because there are only a few shallow inlets with no protection against a rough sea, and movement inland is obstructed by mountain ranges close to the coastline. Winter in these regions lasts from about the middle of November to about the end of March, and we have here to consider a condition which we had no occasion to notice either in the Chilian or in the Spanish-American wars—the influence of ice upon the possibility of disembarking military forces. Vladivostok, and the coastline of Russian territory in the Maritime province, is icebound in winter, and ice at times impedes landing operations on portions of the Korean and Manchurian coastline. The southern parts are always free from this difficulty. You will notice the railway line from Fusan to Seoul, which was in course of construction in January 1904, and also the rail-

¹ See Map V.

ways from Harbin to Port Arthur and from Peking to Newchuang; with these exceptions, the means of communication by land were no better than they were at the time of the war with China ten years before, so that the Power able to move troops by sea would have a great advantage over the Power able only to move by land in the theatre of war.

Provided that the Japanese navy could gain sufficient successes at sea to ensure security for the transports, we notice that the configuration of the territory in which Japan proposed to operate afforded very considerable advantages. The total gross tonnage of Japan's mercantile marine in 1904 was 626,745 tons. We read in the German General Staff account that she had at her disposal 135 ships of 315,000 tons,¹ which could take five divisions of troops simultaneously. This was only half of the total tonnage of her mercantile marine, but allowing for small vessels, and those used by the navy and for commerce I do not think that the Japanese could transport even three complete divisions simultaneously.² I believe that the allowance in Japan for a twenty-four-hour voyage is $1\frac{1}{2}$ tons (gross) per man and 2 tons per horse. For a week's voyage double the accommodation is allowed. The em-

¹ Nature of 'ton' not specified.

² According to Kuropatkin, the Russians wrongly estimated the Japanese facilities for sea transport. They estimated that six divisions could be embarked simultaneously for a voyage of forty-eight hours, and nine for a shorter period.

barkation of a division took about three days, and the time for disembarkation depended of course upon the nature of the harbour or the coastline where it was put on shore ; it is not of much value to attempt to work out an average, and we shall notice the time required in each case when we come to the account of the operations ; in the early stages of the war I believe it took about eighteen days to disembark divisions complete in all details upon the Korean coast. The strength of a Japanese division amounted to 11,400 rifles, 430 sabres, 36 guns, 830 engineers, and 5500 auxiliary services. I do not know the number of wagons or carts, which must have seriously affected the time problem. The two-wheeled carts of the country were applied as much as possible, and much of the transport work was done by coolies. The time spent on the voyage depended of course upon the destination, but at first it was to be counted in hours rather than in days. With several places of embarkation¹ and disembarkation available, we see that the application of sea transport could enable the Japanese to transfer their troops to the mainland with considerable rapidity, always supposing they could get enough transports, and that there was no interference from Russian war vessels.

Let us now compare the means of communication available on the Russian side for transferring

¹ Ujina was the usual trooping port. It is well equipped for the purpose.

field troops into the theatre of operations. Before doing so we can note that at the beginning of February there were about 126,000¹ field, fortress, and railway troops in the districts threatened. The means of communication available for despatching reinforcements from European Russia consisted of a single line of railway, with a break at Lake Baikal; this lake was frozen over, and the ice-breaking vessels were unable to work after the 27th of January. The section of line eastward of Lake Baikal was short of rolling stock, and the distance apart of the places where trains could pass each other, the governing factor² in calculating the maximum number of trains which can pass along a single line, was as much as twenty-one to twenty-five miles, which was reduced to seven and a half miles before the end of the war. At first only three trains could be run each way every twenty-four hours, and only two of these could be military trains, on account of the number required for railway material and so forth. Each train, according to the German General Staff, would take about 500 men, and a rest day was required every three or four days. Other estimates give from 250 to 1000 men, and I think that if you take 500 as an average you will not be far from the mark; but no average is very satisfactory, as the number of

¹ Combatants. See *Official History*, vol. i. second edition, p. 82.

² The shortest interval between arrival of trains at their destination on a single line must depend upon the longest time taken between two crossing-places, so as to allow for empty trains to be sent back.

men carried depended upon the nature of the unit which was being transported. With infantry units the proportion of men carried was high, and with drafts sent to replace casualties the number was still higher. The average speed on the through journey was about six miles an hour, including halts, so that the journey from Warsaw to Mukden took about forty days. In considering this problem I hope that you will note that the country in which the forces were employed was full of supplies, and at first groceries only had to be sent up to the front by railway ; had it been necessary to send bulky supplies up, the rate of sending up reinforcements would have been much reduced. I ask you to note this especially, because I have seen this example used in support of an argument to prove that armies of similar size could be placed in the field at the end of single railway lines in other parts of the world, where the amount of local supplies is scanty, and scarcely suffices for the population.

In working out the problem of strategic concentration, or 'strategic deployment,' it is necessary to ascertain where the chief delays will occur, and to devote one's attention to such points, with a view to accelerating the movement. It is a question of racing for the initiative, in order to carry out one's own plan, because if the enemy gets a start the initiative will lie with him, and we shall be obliged to conform to his movements, and so be subjected to all the inconvenience and

confusion attendant upon a change of plan at the last moment. A miscalculation of the time problem on the outbreak of war will in all probability affect the whole campaign, and may lead to complete failure in the attainment of one's object.

The first operation will be the mobilisation of the forces. War vessels in commission with complete crews are not subject to this delay, but if the crews have to be filled up, or stores have to be embarked, time must be required for this to be done. The units of armies in their own home territory are kept on a peace footing in all countries for the sake of economy, and they have to be brought up to war strength by the assembly of reservists. Thus we find that perhaps the chief factor which lost to the French the initiative in the 1870 war was the fact that the reservists for each unit had to be collected from all parts of the country, while the German reservists lived mostly in the districts where their respective units were mobilised; the Germans thus got the initiative, and so prevented the French from carrying out their plan of invasion of German territory, and the initiative remained with the German side for the remainder of the campaign.

But supposing the rapidity of mobilisation to be about equal on the two sides, the next question affecting the time factor, and therefore the initiative, will be the relative rapidity of movement to the points of concentration. When we

are considering the question of saving time in the embarkation of military forces, we noted the importance of studying whether the troops could be put on the quays more rapidly than they could be embarked and taken away from them, and we realised the necessity for accelerating whichever of these operations caused the greatest delay. Rapidity of movement by railway depends upon the rate of entrainment, upon the rolling stock available, upon the number of trains which can pass along the line in a given time, upon the fuel and watering places available for the engines, and upon the speed at which the trains can move. When the forces arrive at their destination, the time required for detrainment, and for getting the empty trains away, must be considered, but this is seldom the governing factor, because delay can easily be obviated by the construction of extra sidings and platforms.

In 1904 the factors which would most delay the Russian strategic concentration were the difficulty of passing troops across the break in the railway at Lake Baikal, the shortage of rolling stock on the line to the eastward of that point, and the want of extra passing places and water towers.¹ It is therefore important to study the great efforts made by the Russians to overcome

¹ According to Alexieff's reports, quoted by Kuropatkin, coal for the engines was also a difficulty. One thousand tons were sent up daily from Dalny at first, of which five hundred tons went to the reserve. The Yen-tai mines, north of Liao Yang (Map VIII.), afforded a supply until captured by the Japanese.

these difficulties, and so accelerate the arrival of their field armies in the theatre of operations. We must note that the Russian General Staff had studied the time problem, and its relative effect upon the forces, and had determined that the initiative would necessarily lie with Japan. Accordingly they proposed to assemble field forces, of about 115,000 men in all, about Vladivostok, south of Mukden, and in the Kuan-tung province, while the main force of about 185,000 was to be collected at Harbin, in a position to move by railway in either direction on 'interior lines.' We must attribute the proposed dispersion of Russian force to the effect of Japan's amphibious power giving her the choice of so many widely separated points of disembarkation, and prospective lines of advance.

To return to the efforts made by the Russians to accelerate movement over the break at Lake Baikal, and to provide more rolling stock for the eastern section of their railway. The only method at first for transferring stores and baggage across the frozen lake was by means of sledges, and these commenced to run from one terminus to the other on the 25th of January. The distance over the ice which the troops had to march was about twenty-five miles, and this had to be covered in a single day, no mean performance for units recently mobilised, and for men cramped by a long railway journey. The guns were drawn across by extra strong teams, and the artillery-

men were supplied with horses to ride, but the infantrymen had to walk across, and a horse-sledge accompanied every four or five men to carry their baggage and stores ; there were special sledges in addition for ammunition, and to pick up men who might fall out of the ranks from exhaustion. A post well equipped with shelters, heating and lighting arrangements, was established half-way across, and the most valuable use was made of travelling field kitchens for cooking on the line of march. Special warm clothing was supplied to all who arrived at the first terminus without it, and the result was that the arrangements worked smoothly, and without any serious casualties,¹ in spite of the severity of the weather.

However quickly they might get the train loads over the ice to the eastern side of the lake, we must remember that the shortage of rolling stock on the eastern section of the line would prevent an increase of traffic to the ultimate destination unless more trucks and engines could be placed upon this section. This was the greatest difficulty which had to be overcome ; the ice was rough, and there were many deep fissures to be bridged over before a line of rails could be laid across, but in spite of all difficulties this work was accomplished between the 10th and 29th of February. It was not a very secure track and no locomotives could be sent across it at first, but by the 19th of March no less than

¹ A few bad chilblain cases only.

1800 railway carriages or trucks had been drawn over by horses, and on that date it was found possible to commence passing locomotives over in portions weighing about thirty tons each, which were fitted together again on the eastern side. By the 28th of March from sixty to sixty-five complete troop trains had been placed on the far side by this method; and unless these measures had been taken, the heavy troop traffic could not have been competed with before about the end of May, so a saving of over two months in the strategic concentration was effected by the great efforts made by the Russians. The traffic was blocked from the 15th of April to the 7th of May when the ice was melting; ice-breakers recommenced their work as ferries on the lake on the 5th of May, and could deal with the contents of six military trains in twenty-four hours; passenger steamers began to run again by the end of the month. By the 25th of September a line round Lake Baikal had been completed, but the traffic along this section of the long Russian line of communication still continued to be the governing factor in the rate of movement of troops to the theatre of war. The loop round the lake was 160 miles in length, and had many tunnels, and similar engineering difficulties.

We must remember how necessary it also was to forward extra rails and sleepers eastward, because the distance between passing places had to be reduced or it would have been impos-

sible to increase beyond a certain point the number of trains which could move along the single line in a day. Kuropatkin estimates that over eighty miles of extra sidings had to be made requiring nearly 10,000 tons of rails, sleepers, etc. It was also necessary to construct extra water towers for the engines, and to provide heating apparatus to prevent the water from freezing. When the emergency arose, only two troop trains, and one for railway material, could be forwarded daily, and later on two were required for railway material, but by the end of the year ten trains could be worked in each direction, and by the end of the war fourteen¹ could be sent as far as Harbin, and eighteen to the southward of that place. The name of the man responsible for this wonderful piece of work was Prince Khilkoff.

The weather is inclement throughout this inhospitable part of the country for long periods of the year, and we know well that in considering strategic movements, troops cannot be treated like counters are in a war game; they have to arrive both alive and fit for work at the end of the movement. The most careful arrangements were accordingly made for their comfort during the railway journey. Hot water was provided at every third station, the trains were warmed, and special facilities were afforded for cooking, the

¹ Never as many as twelve military trains, according to Kuropatkin. Presumably the balance was required for other traffic.

travelling field kitchens being again found of the utmost use for the purpose ; but, in spite of all this, we can imagine the cramped state of the Russian rank and file after their long railway journey, as compared with the condition of their opponents after a very short sea voyage. Kuro-patkin wrote after the war that the long railway journey had a bad disciplinary effect, especially upon some of the newly raised reserve units, and it would have been better for them for this reason to have marched the last part of the journey.

We have devoted a good deal of space and attention to the Russian single railway line, and I am sure that you will agree with me that this was necessary. The fact I want to bring out is that Japan, in carrying out her 'limited object,' need not expect to face the whole Russian army, although the territory in which the operations must take place was continental, and adjoining the home territory of her enemy. At the beginning of 1904 the Russians had no less than 4,540,000 more or less trained men, and I do not know how many more untrained men who were liable to service, while the number of Japanese more or less trained, and liable to military service, did not exceed 850,000. The total number of untrained men in Japan was about 4,250,000 of suitable ages. We shall study later on the numbers which each side put in the field in the several battles, and I should like again to recall the fact that the country contained both supplies

and transport for the use of the armies. The fact that forces of a given size were employed in the field in Manchuria, at the end of a single line of railway, in no way proves that forces of the same size could be employed in countries devoid of such supplies, though possessing the same railway facilities, and in waterless countries the size of forces so employed must again be largely reduced.

In the course of our examination of the problem which presented itself to Japan, we have noticed the great advantage which the configuration of the coastline conferred upon her from the point of view of military strategy, and we cannot too often recall the fact that, in order to apply this advantage, she required to be relatively strong enough at sea in local waters to safeguard the transports conveying her military forces. We must therefore study the naval, as well as the military, forces at the disposal of the combatants when war broke out in February 1904, but before doing this it will be valuable for us to consider the organisation for co-ordinating the work of the land and sea forces, so as to ensure their co-operation, and so as to time the blows struck by each service to produce the maximum results upon the general situation.

The movements of the Japanese fleet and armies were controlled by the Emperor, who commanded the forces in person. He had under him the council of Japanese marshals, and a

military council, in which executive functions were invested. The members of this military council included on the military side the War Minister, and the Chief of the General Staff for the army, on the Naval side the Naval Minister, and Chief of the Naval General Staff; the Inspector General of Military Education was also a member. Among these officials the name that stands out conspicuously is that of Marshal Yamagata. You will remember that he commanded the land forces in Korea during the early part of the war with China, but bad health prevented his remaining in the field for the whole war. He is described as Japan's ablest general and best statesman, and is given the credit for having had a leading influence in military and political affairs, having enjoyed the complete confidence of his Emperor, and having filled the important post of President of the Privy Council; soon after the crisis occurred he was appointed Chief of the General Staff in the place of Marshal Oyama, who took command of the armies in the field. When beginning this letter to you, you will remember that I referred to the extraordinary complication of the problem which presented itself to the Japanese in continuing their policy by warlike operations, when diplomacy could no longer be the instrument, and I wondered how many brains could be found to grasp such a problem. From all accounts, the brain of Yamagata was one of those capable of this wide mental

grasp, and of the mastery of detail by which alone a plan could be carried to a successful issue.

From the prompt action taken by the Japanese in putting their plans into effect on the outbreak of war, we can infer that these plans must have been studied for several years beforehand, and that every detail had been worked out to use the fleet and army to the best effect, when required to act by those responsible for the policy of the country. As our own manual puts it, the strength of forces to be maintained in peace, or mobilised for war, is a matter of policy, for which the Government is responsible;¹ the War Office, and, we may add, the Admiralty, are responsible that the forces voted by Parliament are efficiently organised, trained, and equipped for war.

The organisation, training, and equipment of the naval and military forces at one time completed the functions of our own Admiralty and War Office, but since Germany showed to the world in 1866, and again in 1870, the advantages which nowadays can be gained by a country which works out plans of campaign in every detail beforehand, we have gradually realised the necessity for establishing a special department for working out plans in order to make the best use of our available forces. The department responsible for this work is called in Germany the General Staff, and as you know we also have a General Staff, somewhat differently constituted,

¹ *Field Service Regulations*, Part II. pp. 17-18.

for our military forces. There is talk in the newspapers of a similar organisation for our naval forces, and whatever they may be called, we can be sure that some of our naval officers must be engaged upon work of this nature. What was especially conspicuous about the Japanese system was the co-ordination of the naval and military work, and this I think we may attribute to the constitution of the Imperial Headquarters. In our own case we have an advisory body, the Committee of Imperial Defence, upon which both services are represented. The Prime Minister presides over the full committee, and sub-committees are appointed from time to time to deal with special questions affecting one or both services.

Turning to the Russian side, we find what on paper seems an ideal organisation for ensuring the co-ordination of political, naval, and military work for a given object. Local control of all those departments of work was invested in a single man, Admiral Alexieff. Unfortunately a system so apparently perfect on paper requires a perfect individual for its execution, a perfect executive machinery, and a perfectly free hand in all matters for the responsible authority. Since August 1903 Alexieff, whose headquarters were at Port Arthur, had had full powers over the civil administration, over diplomatic negotiations, and over the Russian naval and military forces in the Far East, and he had a special staff

to advise him in all these matters. In these circumstances one would assume that foreign policy and warlike preparations would keep pace with each other, that all plans would be worked out in detail, and that the work of all services would be co-ordinated for the attainment of a common object, but we shall see, when we come to our study of the operations, that this was by no means the case.

After the first naval disasters in February 1904, an imperial telegram¹ reached Alexieff directing him to move to Harbin 'or any other place of his choice,' and informing him that 'for his assistance' General Kuropatkin had been appointed commander of the land forces with the rights of a Commander-in-Chief, and Vice-Admiral Makaroff, Commander of the Naval Forces with the rights of an Admiral of the Fleet. The Emperor's telegram concluded with the words: 'I am convinced that the appointment of these independent and responsible chief commanders will ensure for you, as my Viceroy, the fulfilment of the difficult and eminent task that has been allotted to you.' The system so created was found to be unworkable, and Admiral Alexieff was recalled in the following October.

We find no traces of any co-ordination of the operations of the Russian fleet and army work from any central body like the Japanese Imperial

¹ See *German General Staff Account*, Von Donat's translation (Hugh Rees and Co.).

Headquarters. We noted the Russian General Staff opinion that the initiative lay with the Japanese, and that for this reason the bulk of the military forces should be collected at Harbin until the Japanese plan was disclosed, but as yet we have received no information about the Russian plan for the employment of their naval forces immediately upon the outbreak of war with Japan ; and, judging from results, it is doubtful whether any such plan was in existence. Had the Russian fleet been in a state of readiness, there was no apparent reason why offensive action should not have been undertaken against the Japanese fleet and transports from the first, but in the event Japan seized the initiative both by sea and by land ; the Russians never regained it during the whole course of the struggle, and were obliged to conform to the plans of their enemy. It would be difficult to find a more striking example of the disasters which attend the fleets and armies of a country, in which an aggressive foreign policy has been allowed to proceed unchecked, although far ahead of the strategical preparations for its continuity after the failure of diplomatic measures.

Having studied the time problem, it remains for us to consider the strength and distribution of the fleets and armies at the disposal of the two combatants when war became inevitable on the 5th of February.

You will find at the end of this letter a list of the

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Japanese and Russian war vessels in Eastern waters in the beginning of 1904, and I give a summary below for purposes of comparison :—

JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN WAR VESSELS AVAILABLE (FEBRUARY 1904)

CLASS	NUMBER	
	JAPAN	RUSSIA
First-class Battleships,	6	7
Second-class Battleships,	1	0
Coast Defence Vessels,	2	0
Armoured Cruisers,	8	4
First-class Protected Cruisers,	0	5
Second-class „ „	12	0
Third-class „ „ (Fast, over 19 knots),	4	2
Third-class „ „ (Slow),	4	0
Third-class Unprotected Cruisers (Fast, 19 knots),	2	0
Third-class „ „ (Slow),	7	0
Torpedo Gunboats,	1	2
Destroyers,	19	25
Sloops and Gunboats,	15	10
First-class Torpedo Boats,	58	10
Second-class „ „	27	7

The Japanese naval personnel, including reserves, numbered 50,000, and was trained on the British model.

The main Japanese fleet was concentrated at Sasebo, ready for action under the command of

Admiral Togo. The number of ships in commission had been gradually increased in former years on various pretexts, so that practically the whole fleet was fully manned, and mobilisation therefore occasioned no delay. Two powerful armoured cruisers, the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*, had been ordered in Italy, and were on their way to the East; it is an interesting coincidence that diplomatic negotiations were broken off on the day that these two vessels left Singapore. The only other ships detached from the Japanese main fleet under Admiral Togo were two fast third-class cruisers, one at Chemulpo, and one in the Yellow Sea.

The main Russian fleet was at Port Arthur under Vice-Admiral Stark, who was under the orders of Alexieff. Four first-class protected cruisers, three destroyers, three sloops and gunboats, ten first-class and fifteen second-class torpedo boats were at Vladivostok under Rear-Admiral Baron Stakelberg, one first-class protected cruiser at Chemulpo, and one sloop or gunboat at Chemulpo, Newchuang, and Shanghai respectively.

Remembering Mahan's remark ¹ that the command of a maritime region is ensured primarily by a navy, and secondly by positions suitably chosen upon which the navy rests, and from which it can exert its strength, we note that Japan had naval bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, Sasebo,

¹ *The Interest of America in Sea Power*, p. 102.

and Takeshiki, in addition to her private dock-yards at Yokohama, Nagasaki, and Kobe, where repairs could be executed. Russia had naval bases at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, but the latter place was not an ice-free port, and a channel could only be cleared by means of special ice-breaking vessels. The resources of Port Arthur for the execution of repairs could not be compared with those at the disposal of the Japanese.

The Japanese army had been organised on the German model, and when it was established the most careful attention was paid in the first place to the education of officers ; the effect was that, through these officers, a good system of training permeated throughout the army, and, owing to the soundness of the instruction, the greatest keenness to learn was shown by all ranks. Much credit for the efficiency of the Japanese military officers must be attributed to the influence of Major Meckel, of the German Army, who went to Japan about eighteen years previously.

At the outbreak of the war with China in 1894, the Japanese could put only seven divisions in the field, but by 1904 the strength of her field army had been increased to thirteen divisions,¹ including one Guard Division. To every division was attached an extra reserve brigade called a Kobi brigade, and during the war four extra divisions were raised, with their corresponding Kobi

¹ The strength of a Japanese division is given on pp. 224, 345.

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brigades. The strength of a Kobi brigade was about 3500, and of a Kobi brigade, mixed, 5000 men. In addition to the divisions of all arms, there were two brigades of cavalry, and two of artillery, besides depot troops, the Formosa garrison of three mixed brigades, and the detachments in Korea. There were 2300 sabres in the two cavalry brigades, and 180 guns in the artillery brigades. Our own official history puts the number of Japanese field troops available at the outbreak of war at about 284,000 rifles, sabres, and engineers, and 894 guns, and adds that 400,000 trained men were available to replace casualties in the field forces. Basing his estimate on the medical statistics, Kuropatkin writes that the Japanese must have sent 1,500,000 men altogether to the war.

The distribution of the field forces was as follows: In Formosa about 15,000 men of the field army, who were replaced by reserve troops, and so became available. In Korea about 1000, including companies of infantry at Seoul, Fusan, and Gensan respectively, and 200 military police protecting the telegraph lines; the remainder in Japan ready for embarkation. The Japanese islands were held by special troops, and the various coast fortifications were manned and equipped, but the fortresses were not all mobilised.

The Japanese mobilisation worked smoothly—all the divisions, with the exception of the Guards, were organised on a territorial basis, and could be

brought up to war strength by the reservists in their own districts.

The result was that the troops could be mobilised as soon as the transports could be got ready for them. Three divisions were ready by the 9th of February, the 5th being the first day of mobilisation.

On the Russian side we need not consider again the total strength of the field army because, as we have seen, the means of communication at their disposal made it impossible to despatch more than a certain proportion to the theatre of operations at the outbreak of hostilities. Russia is said to have hesitated about reinforcing the troops in Southern Manchuria before diplomatic negotiations were broken off, for fear of bringing on war before her preparations for it had been completed.¹ The German official account puts their strength in the Far East in the beginning of February at 86,500 field troops and 9100 on the way out from Europe, making a total of 95,600. There were, in addition, 43,100 fortress and railway troops, and railway guards.

When the 9100 reinforcements arrived by the middle of February the 95,600 were distributed as follows: about Vladivostok 45,000, at Harbin 8000, about Yingkou (Newchuang) 9100, on the Yalu 11,000, and in the Kuantung Peninsula 22,500.

Our own official account estimates the number

¹ Compare South Africa, 1899. See *Official History*.

of field troops at 83,350 at the beginning of February, and the number of fortress and railway troops and frontier guards at 41,557, making a total of 125,907, in addition to about 16,500 non-combatants.

The Russian system for mobilising large units was not well suited to war in these regions ; it was intended, doubtless, to meet the requirements of European warfare, and the proper army corps organisation could not be employed for rapid action in Eastern Asia. The troops eastward of Lake Baikal were hastily organised into three army corps, which received on the 5th of February the order to mobilise on the 10th. There was considerable delay because many of the reservists had to be brought from the country to the westward of the lake, and the formation of the three army corps was not complete until the middle of April. Three more properly mobilised army corps arrived from Europe by the end of August.

The Japanese General Staff is said to have underestimated the strength of their prospective enemy in the area of operations, and to have put it at less than 50,000 field troops at first, to be increased to 150,000 which could be assembled about Mukden by August. They did not give Russia credit for the great efforts which were made to overcome the railway difficulties.

The Japanese field forces were commanded by Marshal Oyama, who had a most capable

Chief of the Staff in Kodama, formerly deputy War Minister. Kuroki, Oku, Nodzu, Nogi, and Kawamura commanded armies, and all had been tested in the war with China.

General Kuropatkin, the Minister of War, was appointed Commander-in-Chief on the Russian side on the 20th of February, and on the 27th of March he took over the command of the Manchurian army from Lieut.-General Linievitch, to whom Alexieff had entrusted it. Kuropatkin does not appear to have had a free hand until after the withdrawal of Alexieff in October 1904. After the battle of Mukden in March 1905 he handed over the supreme command to Linievitch.

We have studied the reasons why, in the circumstances, it was necessary for Japan to assume the offensive at once if she wished to attain her object, which was the effective occupation of Korea, and the freedom of Manchuria from Russian influence. We must take care not to generalise too much from this war, or to assume that the only way to obtain a limited object in a certain territorial area is to conduct all one's operations in that area. To illustrate this by a personal reference, if one's object were to take a man's boots it might take a long time to obtain it by treading on his toes, while on the other hand one might knock him on the head quickly, and then remove his boots at one's leisure. The object of the Japanese Government, in continuation of the national policy, was to force their

will upon the Russian Government, and check the progress of Russian expansion in Manchuria and Korea. A blow at the main Russian army, and at the Russian centre of organisation and commercial activity, was out of the question, and the only course open was to operate in the territory under dispute.

We have seen that Japan had available military forces superior in strength to any forces which Russia could bring into Korea or Southern Manchuria in the early days of the war ; the most careful arrangements had been made for acquiring suitable merchant vessels to embark these forces, and I believe that for some years her mercantile marine had been subsidised to ensure that the necessary vessels should be properly adapted, and carry special fittings for the express purpose of carrying troops.¹ But the sea intervened between the Japanese armies and their objective, and it was necessary to ensure the security of the transports on their voyage.

It is true that the distance to the south-eastern Korean ports of Masampo and Fusan was short, and that a railway was in process of construction from thence to Seoul, but by confining her operations to this single line of communication she would be little better off than Russia in the speed of concentration, and she would abandon the great advantages pertaining to the side which

¹ See remarks on p. 116 on the subject of facilities for carrying heavy weights in transports, and for hoisting them out.

can employ amphibious strategy in a country with a long and accessible coastline. During the early part of the war between Japan and China both sides had used their fleets defensively to guard their transports, and the disembarkation of their troops, against the depredations of the enemy's fleet, but such a course is strategically suicidal if several places are selected for disembarkation. To guard them all, it is necessary to scatter the fleet, and this gives the enemy's concentrated fleet the opportunity to deal with the various detachments in detail, the one thing to be avoided in all strategy.

Then again, it is open to question whether the gap between Japan and Southern Korea could be properly secured for the passage of transports in any other way than by a victory over the enemy's fleet. Armies can make use of defiles to cause temporary delay to the advance of far larger armies, but this principle does not apply to fleets, because their full strength can be developed immediately, and they are not subject to the delay which a large army requires for its deployment or for turning movements. Fleets, moreover, which are hampered by the necessity for guarding transports, are by no means at their best for fighting a general action. I believe that the Japanese Headquarters had contemplated the possibility of being forced against their will to confine the disembarkation of their troops to the southern Korean ports, but

had they been so compelled, the ultimate result of the war might have been very different.

In the war with China, one Japanese army had landed in Korea, partly on the south coast, and partly as far north as they could get on the western side, while a detached force landed at Gensan on the north-east. These forces had combined against the hostile field army at Ping Yang, had then crossed the Yalu, and had driven their enemy to the north-west. A second army had landed on the eastern coast of Manchuria, had driven the Chinese fleet from Port Arthur to Wei-Hai-Wei, and had captured the fortress of Port Arthur. A third force had landed eastward of Wei-Hai-Wei and, in conjunction with the fleet, had destroyed the Chinese fleet in that harbour. Having secured the sea routes for military reinforcements, they had then combined the First and Second Armies and had defeated the Chinese army near Liao Yang.

The military strategy in 1904 was almost exactly the same, excepting that there was no necessity to follow up the hostile fleet, because it remained at Port Arthur ; a communicating force, landed at Takushan, was employed to keep up touch between the armies advancing, from Korea and Port Arthur respectively, to their destination at Liao Yang ; and the Gensan line was not used for the concentration at Ping Yang. We can hardly find a better example of the value of studying the history of campaigns conducted by

a prospective adversary, and the Russians should have derived great value from their knowledge of the previous campaign, which had been fought by the Japanese over the same theatre of operations.

Let us for a moment look at the problem before the outbreak of war from the Russian point of view. They hesitated, as we have seen, to concentrate large forces in Southern Manchuria for fear of precipitating hostilities, and they had to leave the initiative to the enemy, always provided that their enemy's military forces could safely cross the intervening sea. Here again we can compare the defending side in amphibious warfare to 'a man in the dark at a loss which way to go to guard against the stroke of an invisible hand.'¹ The only chance of bringing about a better situation on land would be to obtain a victory over the Japanese fleet, and for this purpose it was essential that their own fleet should be concentrated and not divided. We have no information why the main fleet, and the large Vladivostok cruisers and other outlying craft at Chemulpo and elsewhere, were not so concentrated. The harbour of Vladivostok, it is true, is icebound during long periods every winter, but icebreakers for many years had kept the channel clear for the vessels of the Russian volunteer fleet, when they ran regular trips to this destination. Possibly the Russians may have considered that the concentration of their fleet would have precipitated

¹ *Conjunct Wars*, published in 1759, quoted on former pages.

hostilities¹ to the same extent as the reinforcement of their armies, but it seems highly probable that they were taken completely by surprise by the Japanese policy ; not only was the main fleet at Port Arthur weaker than it need have been, but it was anchored in the outside harbour exposed to torpedo attack. A few Russian ships were in the Red Sea and the Mediterranean early in the war, but as they were obliged to turn back again, and as their operations were confined to harassing neutral merchant vessels, they did not produce any appreciable effect, and I propose therefore to defer considering them until a later period, when they came into the Eastern seas.

We now come to the definite problem presented to Japan, how to employ her forces offensively to attain the required results, and what objectives to select for them. I do not think that it will be profitable for us to discuss together the various geographical objectives which presented themselves, and I propose to consider only the mobile forces—fleets and armies—which Russia could employ by sea or land, and the fortified places which could affect the action of those forces, or of the forces employed for their destruction. You remember Emerson's opinion about concentration being the secret of success in all walks of life, and in the conduct of war, no less than in commercial enterprise, concentration of purpose must be

¹ Our own official account suggests that the strength of the detachment at Vladivostok was 'probably due to the congested state of the harbour at Port Arthur' (Part I. 2nd edition, p. 41).

kept in view, as well as such concentration of forces as may be required to ensure decisive action. If attention can be concentrated upon the enemy's available mobile forces, and these can be attacked and defeated, then geographical and other objectives can be ignored, and the political object of the struggle will *ipso facto* be attained.

Let us therefore concentrate our attention upon the Russian mobile forces as objectives for the Japanese. Taking the fleet first, we have noted the detachments at Vladivostok and Chemulpo, and the main fleet at Port Arthur. The first and last of these were protected by formidable fortifications as long as they chose to shelter in harbour. The Chemulpo detachment was weak, and could easily be overwhelmed, unless it was immediately withdrawn, or strongly reinforced. Passing to the land forces we find that Russia had detached forces pushed forward to Vladivostok, to the Yalu, and to the neighbourhood of Port Arthur. Here again the first and last could take shelter in fortresses for a time ; the only course open to the Yalu detachment was to retire north-west if opposed by superior forces, after causing all possible delay to the attackers by offensive or defensive action, as opportunities occurred.

The time factor was all-important to the Japanese. To apply the military advantages afforded by the configuration of the coastline, it was necessary, in the first place, to ensure that the Russian fleet did not interfere with the movements of transports by sea, or with the disem-

barkation of armies. In the second place, it was necessary to land troops quickly enough to strike at the advanced portions of the Russian army, and to follow up successes promptly. If allowed sufficient time the Russians would be able to reinforce their field army, and the farther north, in the direction of Harbin, the decisive battles on land took place, the more would Japan's amphibious advantage disappear. The longer the decisive conflict could be delayed, the smaller would be the prospect of success. You will remember that passage in Von der Goltz's *Conduct of War*,¹ where he writes that the time for landing expeditionary forces is at the very commencement of hostilities, when their effect is most felt, because all the hostile field troops are on their way to the frontier. He also points out that bodies of troops which have been landed are ill adapted for a rapid and distant advance from the coast, because their proportion of mounted troops, and especially of transport, must usually be small.

The Japanese had also to consider the influence of the financial question. Modern wars are costly and become more so every day. The necessary funds for them must be provided either out of capital or out of revenue, and both methods seriously affect the power of the population to get a livelihood, especially if engaged in industrial pursuits. The sooner a victory could be obtained by sea or land, the better would be the terms upon which loans could be raised, and the shorter the

¹ Page 282, translated by Major G. F. Levenson (Kegan Paul and Co.).

period during which extra taxation must be imposed to provide extra revenue, the less seriously would the population be affected.

All causes pointed to the necessity for rapid offensive action by the Japanese against such of the Russian mobile forces as they could get at by sea or land, and it was of dominating importance to strike at the main Russian fleet, even though it might shelter under the fortifications of Port Arthur, because that fleet would otherwise be a constant menace to the movement of military forces and stores by sea. The Russian naval detachment at Chemulpo, and the military detachment on the Yalu, presented themselves as the most vulnerable, and the most accessible, of the Russian mobile forces in the theatre of operations.

On former occasions, when studying the Chilian and the Spanish-American wars, we noted the importance of keeping all plans secret in amphibious operations. Without this secrecy the advantages to the Power moving troops by sea are much curtailed, and the military forces landed on the coast may meet with opposition which may cause the failure of the whole plan, because of the efficacy of modern weapons under conditions so favourable to the defence. To quote as an example the famous Walcheren expedition, when a fleet was the real objective of an army, as it was in the wars conducted by Japan against both China and Russia, we read in the journal of a midshipman ¹ in the British fleet off the mouth of

¹ See *My Youth by Sea and Land*, by Charles Loftus.

the Scheldt that for months he had known about the great expedition preparing in England to destroy the French fleet at Antwerp. The destination of this expedition was well known in England and 'it was foolishly supposed that the French, who had possession of Holland, would not hear of this intention. The real fact was that, no sooner was the idea suggested by Ministers, than the secret was across the water—like most of our secret affairs at that time; certain it is that, in almost every instance in which the success of an expedition depended upon secrecy, the only persons mystified were the officers who were appointed to the command of it.'

During the century intervening between our own amphibious wars with France, and the Japanese amphibious struggle with Russia, the electric telegraph and submarine cables had been introduced, and the modern Press had established its representatives in every region; but in spite of all this, the Japanese succeeded in maintaining a complete secrecy, which we found unattainable under more favourable conditions a hundred years previously. Their plans had been worked out in every detail, the most favourable moment for naval and military action was chosen to break off diplomatic negotiations, and their forces were put in movement without delay against the mobile forces of the enemy which had been selected as objectives.

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STRENGTH AT SEA IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-5

FIRST PHASE—UP TO THE FALL OF PORT ARTHUR

[From the Official History, Part I., Second Edition.]

CLASS.	JAPAN.	RUSSIA.
Battleships—		
First-class,	<i>Mileasa, Asahi, Hatsuse, Shikishima, Yashima, Fuji</i>	<i>Tsarevitch, Retvisan, Pobyeda, Peresvyet, Petropavlovsk, Poltava, Sevastopol</i>
Second-class	<i>Chin Yen</i>	
Coast defence vessels, .	<i>Fuso, Hei-Yen</i>	
Armoured cruisers, .	<i>Yakumo, Idzumo, Iwate, Tokiwa, Asama, Adsuma, Kasuga,¹ Nisshin¹</i>	<i>Bayan, Gromoboi,³ Rossiya^{3,4} Rurik^{3,4}</i>
Cruisers—		
First-class, protected, .		<i>Bogatuir,³ Askold, Varyag, Diana, Pallada</i>
Second-class, protected,	<i>Tsushima,² Nütaka, Chitose, Kasagi, Takasago, Yoshino, Akitsushima, Hashidate, Matsushima, Itsukushima, Naniwa, Takachiko</i>	
Third-class, protected, 19 knots and above,	<i>Chihaya, Suma, Akashi, Chiyoda</i>	<i>Novik, Boyarin</i>
Slower speed,	4 in number	
Third-class, unprotected, 19 knots and above,	<i>Miyako, Yaeyama</i>	
Slower speed,	7 in number	
Torpedo gunboats, . . .	<i>Tatsuta</i>	<i>Gaidamak, Vsadnik</i>
Destroyers,	19 in number	25 in number
Sloops and gunboats, .	15 in number	10 in number
Torpedo boats—		
First-class,	58 in number	10 in number
Second-class,	27 in number	7 in number

N.B.—The spelling has in some cases been altered to that of the letterpress.

¹ On passage to Japan in February 1904.

² Under construction in Japan, joined the fleet in March.

³ At Vladivostok.

⁴ Armament practically unprotected.

SEVENTH LETTER

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1904-5—*Continued*

MY DEAR TOM,

In my last letter to you I tried to bring out several points in connection with the strategy to be adopted by the Japanese in order to free Korea from Russian influence, and to check the development of Russian power in Manchuria. To attain these 'limited objects' it was necessary to defeat the armies which Russia could put in the field in these areas, and the further southward the hostile armies could be drawn, the more favourable would be the conditions for the Japanese, because of the configuration of the coastline, and the facilities possessed by Japan for moving her troops by sea. The strength of the Russian armies to be met with in the front line would depend upon the resources of the country and attitude of the population, upon the number of trains which she could pass along the single railway line from Europe, and upon the time at her disposal.

For financial as well as for purely strategical reasons the time factor was all-important. The longer the decisive issue was deferred, the stronger the Russian armies would become, and if this

issue was postponed for too long it was a question whether one or both sides would be able to stand the financial strain. The whole cost of the war could not be met out of revenue, and the price at which loans could be raised would be seriously affected by the result of early battles.

Should the Russian fleet obtain a success over the Japanese, the movement of Japanese transports and storeships for the army would be insecure and the military situation on land would, under these conditions, be ultimately in favour of Russia.

The Japanese accordingly selected as their first objective on land the Russian detached force on the Yalu, and as their objectives on the sea the Russian war vessels detached at Chemulpo and the main Russian fleet at Port Arthur. If this latter force could not be met and defeated at sea it was necessary to destroy it in the fortified harbour of Port Arthur, and if naval forces could not accomplish this result the fortress must be attacked on the land side and the fleet captured, as several fleets have been before, by invoking the assistance of an army for the purpose. Such an army must be landed out of reach of the fortress, and before it could expect to attain its object the hostile field army in the Liao-tung Peninsula must be defeated.

While the fleet at Port Arthur, and not the place itself, was the true objective of the Japanese, yet we must remember that attacks upon the

fortress would tend to draw the main Russian army to the southward, where the Japanese could attack it to the greatest advantage, and if success could be attained, then the harbours of Port Arthur, Dalny, and Ta-lien-wan would afford excellent bases for the subsequent operations of the Japanese army. A serious attack upon the Russian cruisers in the fortified harbour of Vladivostok was not included in the Japanese plans, but they were obliged from time to time to detach, in order to watch them, a portion of the naval force which was badly wanted with the main fleet.

Having studied the Japanese plan, and the reason for its adoption, we can now pass to its execution. I propose in the first place to deal briefly with the destruction of the Russian naval detachment at Chemulpo, and the combined operations against the detached military force upon the Yalu river; we can then study the operations against the Port Arthur fleet, and against the field army and fortress troops which were available to guard it. In our consideration of the employment of the Japanese forces against the Russians on the Yalu, we shall constantly realise that their success depended upon freedom of movement by sea, and the Port Arthur operations will show us how this freedom of movement was attained by the constant activity of the Japanese naval and military forces against the Russian war vessels.

The Japanese plan was to employ three divisions, the Twelfth, Second, and Guard, against the Russians on the Yalu. In order to shorten their line of communication, so as to enable them to get at the Russian detachment in a shorter time, it was most important to land on the west coast of Korea as far to the northward as possible.¹ On account of ice, it was estimated that landing at, and to the northward of, Chinampo would not be practicable until the 10th of March, but Chemulpo, the harbour of Seoul, and the neighbouring bay south of Hai-ju, were available for the purpose.

In Chemulpo harbour on the 6th of February was a small Japanese cruiser, the *Chiyoda*, and the Russian cruiser *Varyag* and gunboat *Koryetz*, as well as some neutral war vessels. On the 7th of February the telegraph cable from Port Arthur to Chemulpo was cut. On the 8th of February the Russian transport *Sungari* arrived early and reported the approach of Japanese war vessels. At 4 P.M. on that day the *Koryetz* put to sea for Port Arthur, but met Japanese torpedo boats in the entrance channel; accounts differ as regards whether the Japanese discharged torpedoes before or after the Russian gunboat fired at them, and so committed the first act of war; but the result was that the *Koryetz* returned to Chemulpo. Soon afterwards a small Japanese squadron, consisting of six cruisers and three transports

¹ See Map V. for these operations.

under Admiral Uriu, who had received reports from the *Chiyoda* at sea at 8 A.M., entered the harbour. Japanese troops were landed between 8 P.M. and 8 A.M., and some were despatched at once to Seoul. These troops consisted of four battalions; their total strength did not exceed 2500 men, as the battalions had been sent off on a peace footing, without waiting for proper mobilisation, in order to save all possible time. Officers and men were drawn from six different battalions, and they embarked with only eight hours' notice. They were carried in two of the transports, while the third carried landing stages, and material to facilitate the disembarkation.

This employment of troops on a peace footing for rapid action at the outbreak of war is of special interest. In time of strained relationship, the issue of an order to mobilise will always tend to precipitate hostilities, and, if a rapid blow is to be struck, it may be of great importance to save the days required for proper mobilisation, and for calling up reservists to bring units up to their war strength. The Japanese naturally did not want to give notice of their intentions by ordering mobilisation too soon, and at the same time it was part of their plan to get troops to Chemulpo and Seoul before they could be anticipated at these places by the Russians. Hence their employment of battalions on a peace footing to strike the first blow.

The Russian war vessels at Chemulpo did not

attempt to interfere with the disembarkation, and at 6 A.M. on the 9th of February the Japanese war vessels put to sea again, leaving one vessel behind to deliver messages. Three or four hours afterwards the Captain of the *Varyag* received a demand to quit the anchorage before noon, or he would be attacked in neutral waters. The *Varyag* and *Koryetz* left the harbour at 11.30 A.M., and were met outside by the Japanese squadron which opened fire upon them and drove them back, and the two Russian war vessels, and transport *Sungari*, were scuttled or blown up to prevent their falling into the hands of the Japanese. The crews took refuge on board neutral men-of-war.

The chief interest in this incident from a strategical point of view is that it illustrates the danger incurred by detaching small naval forces without prospect of support in times of strained relationship. Acts of war under modern conditions are seldom preceded by formal declarations; the best prepared side selects the right moment for breaking off negotiations, and for taking immediate action in order to secure the initiative, so as to carry out a carefully thought-out plan without fear of its interruption by the enemy.

It has been asserted that the Russian authorities responsible for the distribution of naval forces at this period had no knowledge of the imminence of war, but in reply to this we are told that Alexieff, on the 28th of January, warned the

officer commanding the troops in the Vladivostok area to be ready for war, and that on the 1st of February the Governor of that place asked the Japanese Commercial Agent to arrange for the withdrawal of all Japanese residents in the event of hostilities. The despatch of Russian reinforcements to the Yalu also pointed to their knowledge of the situation; Cossack patrols had reconnoitred in Korea; at Port Arthur the Russian fleet had come out of the inner anchorage on the 3rd of February in readiness for subsequent movements; the Japanese Consul at Chefoo had arranged for the withdrawal to a British merchant ship, on the 6th and 7th of February, of all Japanese residents from Port Arthur, and he left the harbour with them on the 8th. It would appear therefore that the Russian authorities responsible for the *Varyag*, *Koryetz*, and transport *Sungari*, being at Chemulpo and unsupported, must have been aware of the state of strained relationship, and of the imminence of hostilities. If you want further proof, read the first chapter of *Rasplata*, describing how the author, who was A.D.C. to Admiral Makaroff at Cronstadt, asked in the autumn of 1903 for an appointment to the Eastern fleet which was 'preparing for war,' and how he left St. Petersburg on the 29th of January to join the *Boyarín* at Port Arthur.

Attempts have been made to justify the sacrifice of the Chemulpo detachment on the score that

it ' contained ' a superior force of the enemy, but we have seen by former examples that a naval force requires the shelter of a defended harbour to give it any such power. A small naval detachment, which can be sunk almost instantaneously by the enemy, cannot be compared in this way with a small army, which can for a long time keep a superior army away from the decisive point by causing it to deploy, and so delaying its progress.

War was formally declared by the combatants on the 10th of February, and between the 9th and the 11th most countries issued declarations of neutrality. On the 12th of February, China announced that she would remain neutral, and this proved the wisdom of the Japanese policy initiated in 1898, only three years after the Chino-Japanese war. On the 23rd of February an alliance was announced between Korea and Japan, by which Korea allowed privileges to the Japanese, in return for a guarantee of independence.

In pursuance of their plan for dealing with the Russian military forces on the Yalu, the Japanese disembarked their Twelfth Division, and part of the Second and Fourth Divisions, at Chemulpo, between the 17th and 22nd of February. A small force disembarked at Hai-ju, and about twenty infantry reached Ping Yang as early as the 21st. By establishing supply depots on the route from Seoul, it was found possible to occupy Ping Yang effectively with the mounted troops

in advance of the Twelfth Division by the 23rd of February, and with the leading infantry of the Twelfth Division on the 25th.

On the 8th of March, 8000 Japanese engineers arrived at Seoul to commence a railway to Wiju, on the Yalu river. Some such means of communication were sorely needed, because the country contained few supplies, and the roads were very inferior. If movement by sea had been insecure, the employment by the Japanese of the forces which they subsequently used on the Yalu would have been impossible under the conditions which obtained.

On the 8th of March a small party of Japanese failed to land at Chinampo on account of ice, but by the 10th of the month the ice, in accordance with anticipations, had melted sufficiently for the purpose. The Guard, and remainder of the Second Division, were accordingly despatched from Japan, and between the 13th and 29th of March both divisions were landed, with the exception of some of the artillery, which was kept on board the transports. This disembarkation was well covered from interference by the enemy, since Ping Yang had been occupied before the end of February, the Twelfth Division was to the northward of that place on the 18th of March, and Anju had been occupied by advanced parties as early as the 10th of March. Great efforts had been made to improve the bad roads, and to bridge the rivers crossing the Japanese line of advance; but

although these roads were available from Ping Yang to Anju, and supply depots were established ahead of the troops, the effect of a thaw on the 14th of March made movement by road almost impossible. Kuroki, the commander of the First Army, arrived at Chinampo on the 17th of March, and, finding that little resistance need be expected south of the Yalu, ordered the advance northward to proceed. The main bodies, using the three parallel roads from Ping Yang to Anju, could only cover from two and a half to five miles a day. Beyond Anju it was only possible to use one road for the three divisions, with a small flank guard on a parallel road further inland, and the land transport difficulties became insurmountable.

Without the power of moving storeships by sea, the further advance of the Japanese First Army would now have been stopped for an indefinite period, until a railway could be made from Seoul, or good roads could be constructed, and more land transport could be collected. The difficulty of supplying the Japanese army was solved by sending supplies by water to five suitable places on the coast from which lateral roads led to places along the main road of advance, and by this method alone could the movement be continued. We have here a good example of the effect of the naval situation upon military movements. Had the Russians gained a success against the Japanese fleet, they would

have been in a position to stop the northward movement of the Japanese First Army, because they could have prevented the despatch of stores by sea.

By the 3rd of April the Russian parties in Korea had withdrawn behind the Yalu river. On the 8th Wiju was occupied by a small Japanese force covering the supply depots established along the road, and on the 14th the Japanese Twelfth Division began to arrive in the neighbourhood. By the 21st they had been reinforced by the remainder of the First Army, and we therefore find that it took about a month for the three Japanese divisions to cover the distance of about 125 miles from Chinampo, and to concentrate in the neighbourhood of Wiju. If the Twelfth Division had not been equipped with mountain guns it would probably have arrived at Wiju without any artillery.

The Russians have been criticised for not being more active in attacking the small advanced parties, which were pushed far ahead to establish and to protect the supply depots required for the strong Japanese columns which followed. Had they done so, considerable delay might doubtless have been caused, but here again we have an example of the great effect which can be produced in amphibious strategy by the side having the power of moving troops by sea without any reasonable prospect of interruption. The Japanese had organised a Second Army, under General Oku,

consisting of the First, Third, and the Fourth¹ Divisions, and the fighting troops of this army had arrived in transports off Chinampo on the 16th of April, where they had remained. Since the destination of this force was unknown, it had a considerable influence upon the Russian attitude.

Kuropatkin, who had arrived at Liao Yang on the 27th of March to take command of all the field armies, was in constant communication with Kashtalinski, who commanded on the Yalu until the 23rd of April, and afterwards with Lieutenant-General Zasulitch, who took over the command. The Japanese had maintained wonderful secrecy as to their plans, and the Yalu river was most useful to them as a screen. By means of spies, and by perusing reports in the Russian newspapers, they had accurate knowledge of the disposition of the Russian forces, while the Press of Japan behaved so loyally that no information reached the enemy from that source. When the Second Army embarked in transports from Japan, the proceeding produced in the minds of their enemy the usual bewilderment about the destination of troops which are moved by sea in amphibious operations, and to this bewilderment the purely defensive attitude adopted by the Russians may probably be attributed.

Kuropatkin's orders to Zasulitch directed him 'to resist the enemy with the necessary obstinacy,'

¹ A small portion of this division appears to have been previously landed in Korea.

but added that his force was 'not placed on the Yalu to fight a decisive action.' Our own official account hints that Zasulitch received different orders from Alexieff. By the end of April the Russian forces which might have been employed to oppose the Japanese on the Yalu numbered about 25,000,¹ or nearly 28,000 including non-combatants, but the effect of the doubts upon the Russian side about the Japanese movements was that only about 6000 of this number, spread out on a six-mile front, were available to resist the Japanese First Army at the crossing place selected. The remainder of the Russian forces in this area were extended along the coastline from Pitzuwo to the mouth of the Yalu under Major-General Mishchenko, and thence to Hsiao-pu-hsi-ho, about 70 miles up the river, a total distance of about 180 miles. Kuropatkin's information led him to suppose that the Sixth Division of the Japanese Second Army had been landed to reinforce the First Army under Kuroki, and that the First and Third Divisions would be landed westward of the mouth of the Yalu. This information was communicated to Zasulitch by the 18th of April; the constant communications this officer received from Headquarters, and Japanese naval demonstrations, kept him anxious about his right flank, and delayed his concentration to meet the real

¹ According to our official account (Part 1. 2nd ed., p. 59) Zasulitch had under his own command, on the 22nd April, 5000 cavalry, 15,000 infantry, and 60 guns.

attack from the neighbourhood of Wiju. On the 21st of April reinforcements from Haicheng were sent to Takushan, where a false rumour reported that the Japanese would land, and many other rumours were circulated. We can hardly find a better example than this of the moral effect produced by the great mobility of military forces which can be moved by sea, against others which can move only by land.

In the events leading up to the battle of the Yalu the Japanese army and navy worked together with excellent results. Naval carpenters helped the military engineers in much of the formidable bridging work which had to be performed to enable the First Army to pass the several rivers crossing their route. The stores, without which military movements would have been impossible, were landed at various points on the coastline, and finally, in order to increase the nervousness of Zaslitch for his right flank, and to prevent his moving troops to his left, naval demonstrations and bombardments were carried out up to the last moment as far up the Yalu as Antung. This service was carried out by some sloops, gunboats, and torpedo boats under Rear-Admiral Hosoya; I do not know the exact number, but Hosoya usually had under his command two coast defence vessels, one torpedo gunboat, and five sloops and gunboats, besides torpedo boats.

There are so many accounts, both official and

unofficial, of the battle of the Yalu that I do not propose that we shall treat the subject in detail. Kuroki's plan was to send the Twelfth Division across the Yalu at Suikuchin,¹ about eight miles above Wiju, during the night of 29th-30th of April. He covered his movement by an artillery bombardment further down the river, and, by noon on the 30th of April, the Twelfth Division had carried out its initial movement to a position on the Aiho river, on the right of the prospective line of deployment for attack. This movement was one of some difficulty, as they had to cross mountains on their way, and were exposed to attack between the two rivers, before the other two divisions had crossed the Yalu. The Russians were kept in complete ignorance, and so took no steps to interfere with the movement.

On the night of the 30th April-1st May the Second and Guard Divisions also crossed the Yalu. On account of the difficulty of making enough bridges, only one division could cross at a time, but by 5 A.M. on the 1st of May the whole force was over the Yalu, facing westward, and then prepared to cross the Aiho. The Twelfth Division was on the right, the Guard in the centre, and the Second on the left. At 8 A.M. the First Army advanced over the Aiho to attack the Russian forces in their front. These numbered about 6000 men, and had not been reinforced because the Russians were still in ignorance of the Japanese

¹ See Map VIII.

plan, and still nervous about their right. At 9 A.M. the Japanese were in possession of the Russian position, but lost touch with the enemy, as they were not in a condition for close pursuit. Fighting recommenced in the afternoon, and Zasulitch withdrew the whole of his force to Feng-Huang-Cheng, a distance of about eleven miles. He subsequently retreated to behind Mo-tien-ling,¹ where he remained until June. The Japanese occupied Feng-Huang-Cheng on the 6th of May. On the 10th a raid on Anju by a small Russian force, which had left the Yalu on the 26th of April, and had passed round the Japanese right, was easily repulsed by line of communication troops.

Accounts vary a good deal about the losses in the Yalu operations. Our own official account puts the Japanese losses between the 26th of April and the 1st of May at 203 killed, 808 wounded, and 10 missing, and the Russian losses at 625 killed, 1178 wounded, and 681 missing, according to information from Russian sources. The Japanese claim to have buried 1363 Russian dead up to the 7th of May, and it seems probable that the number of killed exceeded the original estimate.

We leave the First Japanese Army, under Kuroki, at Feng-Huang-Cheng in the month of May, preparing for a further advance. The men were all billeted in the town and in neighbouring

¹ Not shown on Map V. See Map VIII.

farms, and full use was made of large quantities of Russian stores which had not been removed during the retreat. The country for Kuroki's subsequent advance presented many difficulties, the roads to Liao Yang were bad and led over mountain passes, and it was necessary to have recourse to coolies for the transport of the necessary stores. Fifteen thousand of these coolies, the greater portion being Japanese, were collected for the purpose, and I believe that many men in good positions in professional life in Japan volunteered to do this work, when they were not selected for embodiment in the fighting troops. The reason I mention this is because it confirms the statement that the Japanese naval and military forces were supported in their operations by the feeling that they had the whole spirit of the population behind them, and we know how potent a factor this feeling is in bringing about success. Without it, the most wonderful strategic combinations are likely to fail, but with it, mistakes in strategy may often be corrected by hard fighting.

We left the Japanese Second Army in their transports on the 16th of April off Chinampo, where they remained until the fate of the Russians on the Yalu had been decided, and we have noted the moral effect which this force produced upon the Russian forces holding the Yalu line, and distributed along the coast from the mouth of that river to Pitzuwo. The German General Staff account tells us that the Russians on the out-

break of war had also expected a Japanese landing at Yingkou (Newchuang), to the westward of the Liao-tung Peninsula, and had placed their troops accordingly, so we can realise the temptation to disperse their forces, due to possible movements of the Japanese armies by sea.

The only cure for this state of uncertainty would have been a victory over the Japanese fleet, and we will now deal with the operations which made such a victory improbable.

We have studied the relative strength and distribution of the two fleets in the Far East on the 6th of February,¹ and we noted the facilities afforded by defended harbours where war vessels could be prepared for sea, and repairs carried out if necessary. The Japanese fleet under Admiral Togo was concentrated, while the Russian fleet under Admiral Stark at Port Arthur was not as strong as it might have been, because of the detachment to Vladivostok of three armoured cruisers, one first-class protected cruiser, and some smaller vessels. We have dealt with the question of the other small detachment at Chemulpo, so need not refer to the subject again. According to pure strategy the detachment of the Vladivostok cruisers under Rear-Admiral Baron Stakelberg could not be justified, unless it could cause the Japanese to detach a force superior to itself, and keep such force away from the decisive conflict with the Port Arthur fleet. The Vladivostok

¹ See p. 240.

detachment came near to the attainment of this result upon several occasions, as we shall see from the narrative of naval events.

You will remember that, in the war with China in 1894, the Japanese fleet protected the transports carrying troops to Korea by remaining in their vicinity, but when these movements of troops had been completed, they sought out the Chinese fleet and defeated it off the mouth of the Yalu. They then landed, in the Liao-tung Peninsula, an army which moved southward and drove the remnants of the Chinese fleet out of Port Arthur, which they captured without difficulty. The Japanese then followed up the Chinese fleet to Wei-Hai-Wei, and destroyed it there by the combined use of naval and military forces. In 1904 their naval strategy was different; they took the offensive against the Russian fleet from the beginning of the campaign, and, by constantly harassing the enemy, prevented his interference with the movement of transports to any position on the coasts of the Bay of Korea where they wished to disembark their armies.

Admiral Togo's orders were 'to destroy the Russian fleet,' and in order to carry out this policy he kept the bulk of his own fleet concentrated as much as possible. He left Sasebo early on the 6th of February, detaching some older vessels (one second-class battleship, two coast defence vessels, four second-class protected cruisers, eight sloops and gunboats, and sixty-eight

torpedo boats) to guard the Straits of Tsushima and the coast of Japan against the Russian vessels at Vladivostok. He also detached Uriu's squadron (one armoured cruiser, three second-class protected cruisers, two third-class protected cruisers, and twelve torpedo boats) to convey the troops to Chemulpo, and to deal with the Russian cruiser *Varyag* and sloop *Koryetz* at that place. The two new armoured cruisers *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*, which were on their way out from Europe, had left Singapore when the main fleet left Sasebo.

Admiral Togo, for his operations against the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, required secure anchorages nearer to his objective than were the ports of Japan. The harbours on the west coast of Korea were well suited to his purpose, but it was important to keep his position secret when in harbour because of the danger of night attacks by Russian destroyers. This secrecy was successfully maintained. Among the anchorages available for his use were Hako (Mokpo), which was connected by telegraph cable with Chemulpo and Sasebo, Asan Bay, Port Rooper, Hai-ju, and ultimately an anchorage at the Elliot Islands, off the east coast of Liao-tung Peninsula. In order to avoid having to detach war vessels to Japan for temporary repairs, or for any other reason, many merchant vessels were employed as fleet auxiliaries. I believe that about forty vessels were employed in this way, of which six

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were armed ; the number included repair and salvage ships carrying skilled workmen, hospital ships, water distilling vessels, old craft for blocking harbour entrances, and vessels carrying materials for the construction of booms to keep off torpedo craft. The most adverse weather conditions were likely to be met with. We read of gales and snowstorms during the third week of February and at other times, and we cannot have a better proof of the efficiency of the repairing facilities at Togo's flying bases than the fact that, after six weeks of work under the most trying conditions, all his nineteen destroyers were still in good running order.

The first attack upon the Russian fleet in the outer anchorage at Port Arthur was made by the Japanese destroyers during the night of the 8th-9th of February. One section of them explored Dalny harbour, and the other section steamed straight for their objective. The result of this attack was that two Russian battleships, the *Retvisan* and *Tsarevitch*, and the first-class cruiser *Pallada*, were seriously damaged. They were taken into the inner harbour for repairs, but the *Retvisan* grounded in the channel.

There has been much controversy about the state of readiness or unreadiness of the Russian fleet on this occasion. We have already dealt with the question of the Russian official knowledge of the imminence of war, so we need not refer to it again. It has been freely asserted

that many officers were absent from their ships at entertainments on shore, and that the state of discipline on board the Russian ships was not all that could be desired, but, on the other hand, we are told that the ships' companies had been exercised at drill by Admiral Stark until about 11 P.M., and were at 'man and arm stations' when the Japanese attack was delivered. We are also told that the Russian ships had steam up, and that a cruiser and four destroyers were under way patrolling the bay. The intention was to move the fleet to Dalny on the following morning, and in these circumstances it is difficult to conceive that leave could have been given to either officers or men. We are told that over £200 was taken at a performance of *Madame Sans-Gêne* at the theatre the night before, and that there was a performance of another play on the night of the 8th-9th of February; but this discloses the attitude of the population, rather than that of the naval personnel. The Russian naval officer who wrote *Rasplata* arrived at Port Arthur a few days afterwards, and was told by a brother officer that the Russian fleet, on the night of the 8th of February, was lying at anchor in the open roadstead with all lights burning, without steam, with no torpedo nets out, and without any guard vessels. This was said not to be the fault of Admiral Stark, who had taken all the measures of security which he was permitted to take on his own responsibility, and had ordered all officers

and men to be on board by sunset (about 5 P.M.), after which time no communication with the shore was allowed. According to the same authority, the difference of opinion whether the bay was being patrolled is accounted for by a statement that four Russian destroyers had put to sea for manœuvres and practice exercises against the Russian fleet, that this programme had been altered, and the Russian destroyers had been ordered to Dalny without the ships being informed of the alteration, so that when the Japanese destroyers appeared they were mistaken for Russians. According to our own official account, two Russian destroyers saw the Japanese approaching, and were reporting the fact when the attack commenced.

As regards the question of the spirit and discipline in the Russian fleet, it is only necessary to quote the words of the author of *Rasplata*, describing his arrival at Port Arthur: 'When I reached Port Arthur, one never heard the beautiful old terms, "our ship," "our squadron." All interest was centred in "getting on quickly."' If these words are true, there is nothing more to be said. The Japanese were fighting for a cause, and not for personal advancement.

On the 9th of February, Admiral Togo followed up the destroyer attack by a bombardment of the Russian vessels in the Port Arthur roadstead, and from that date until the following December he employed every means at his disposal to

damage the Russian fleet, without subjecting his own vessels to the close fire of the coast defence ordnance. The bombardment on the 9th of February was carried out at ranges of from 7000 to 8000 yards. The Russian forts and war vessels replied to the Japanese fire, and some few losses were caused among the personnel on both sides, but no permanent injury to the ships, although one of the Russian first-class battleships, and two first-class protected cruisers, were reported to have been damaged; the Russians withdrew to the inner anchorage in the evening. The Russian forts and garrison appear to have been no better prepared for war than the fleet; it is reported that the garrisons of the different forts were quartered in barracks in the town when the alarm was given, that the recoil cylinders of some of the gun mountings had not been filled, and that the guns were secured and 'housed in' for the winter. As the gun detachments of the forts became more efficient, Admiral Togo gave them a wider berth. He carried out bombardments on the 25th of February at a range of about 10,000 yards, and on the 10th of March at between 12,000 and 13,000 yards; on the 22nd of March the fleet showed off Port Arthur, while two battleships bombarded from Pigeon Bay;¹ on the 15th of April the two new armoured cruisers *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*, which had special gun mountings to give high elevation, are said to have bombarded

¹ See Map VII.

at a range of over 20,000 yards. I think that this is a fairly complete list of the serious bombardments. Perhaps the most interesting is that of the 10th of March, the day, if you remember, when it was found that troops could land at Chinampo, and the Second and Guard Divisions were leaving Japan for the purpose.

The intention, I believe, had been to bombard over the land from Pigeon Bay, but that locality was found to be full of Russian mines which we are told that the Russian mining ship *Amur* had laid there on the 23rd of February. Accordingly the plan was changed, and the bombardment was carried out from behind a ridge about 400 feet high running down to the sea from Lao-tieh-shan, the position chosen¹ being about 12,000 to 13,000 yards south-west of Port Arthur. Since none of the fortress guns could be brought to bear upon this position, the bombardment could be carried out deliberately. The Japanese ships fired about 150 heavy 12-inch shell between 10 A.M. and 2 P.M., and three cruisers under Rear-Admiral Dewa were stationed to the eastward to note and signal the results. The observation of fire was not very successful. Dewa could not get within 13,000 yards because of the good shooting of the fortress guns, and the weather was not clear enough to be favourable for signalling at long ranges. On one occasion a Japanese battleship of the bombarding fleet showed herself beyond the point

¹ See Map. VII.

of land, and the Russian forts made such good practice at her that she had to withdraw hastily under cover, although the range exceeded 12,000 yards. The Russian ships could not come out and keep under way to save themselves from the bombardment, because the harbour entrance was too shallow for the big ships excepting at high water, and the Japanese had commenced firing at low tide. The Japanese shell dropped almost vertically—I believe that, in order to get sufficient elevation, their ships had to be artificially heeled over before firing—but, although the Russian men-of-war and vessels of all descriptions were crowded together in the basin, and without screen or defence, no serious damage was done. One battleship, the *Retvisan*, which was under repair, was struck twice on her armour, but I do not think that these hits in any way delayed the work of preparing her for sea.

The author of *Rasplata* and other writers give us graphic accounts of the general feeling in Port Arthur during the bombardments from the sea between the 9th of February and the beginning of May. Considerable moral effect may have been produced, more especially amongst the Chinese population, but the information at present at our disposal does not encourage us to rely much upon bombardment from the sea as a method of destroying war vessels sheltering in a defended harbour. Bombarding vessels can be kept a long way off by efficient coast defence ordnance;

extreme accuracy of elevation is difficult to attain with ships' guns at very long ranges, and observation of results, upon which the effect must depend, is only possible under very exceptional conditions. We shall be able to compare the effect of land bombardments, with and without the assistance of an observation station from which the target can be observed, when we come to the later operations of the siege, but it was not until after many months, and after much loss of life and strenuous fighting, that the Japanese succeeded in capturing the observation station which rendered their land bombardment so effective.

Besides bombardments from the sea, Togo tried many other devices to destroy the Russian Port Arthur fleet. We have noted the attack by destroyers on the fleet in the roadstead on the night of the 8th-9th of February, and the Japanese destroyers constantly displayed activity during the following months whenever the weather was suited to their operations. We read of attacks on the night of the 13th-14th of February, on the 9th, 10th, and 21st of March, on the 12th of April, and so forth; but although some Russian destroyers and small craft were sunk, there was no further opportunity, during the period we are considering, of attaining successful results by destroyers against the big ships, like those attained in the attack on the night of the 8th-9th of February.

The offensive use of submarine mines by both sides formed a conspicuous feature of the opera-

tions. The most serious casualty from Japanese mines occurred on the 18th of April, when the battleship *Petropaulovsk* was sunk, and Admiral Makaroff drowned in her, and the battleship *Pobyeda* was damaged, while the Russian fleet was returning to harbour after a sortie. On the 15th of May the Japanese battleship *Hatsuse* was sunk by Russian mines off Port Arthur, and the battleship *Yashima*¹ so seriously damaged that she sunk soon afterwards. Every device was tried by both sides to clear away mines by grappling or 'sweeping' for them, that is to say, by towing a hawser or 'sweep' between two vessels, so as to catch any mine moorings which might lie between them when steaming along. When mines showed on the surface they were sunk by rifle fire, the object being to pierce the case, so that the water might get in, without exploding the charge. Mines, being dangerous things to handle, caused several casualties among the craft employed in laying them out. Thus, on the 11th of February, the Russian mining ship *Yenesei* was blown up by her own mines in Ta-lien-wan Bay, and the *Amur* was the only remaining vessel specially fitted for the purpose. The Japanese had several casualties amongst their small craft from the same cause.

You will realise that Togo's large vessels were obliged to give Port Arthur a wide berth, not only on account of the coast forts, and on account of

¹ Her loss was kept secret for many months.

the Russian destroyers and torpedo craft, which did not show much enterprise, but also on account of the danger from the mines which were constantly being laid in different places. Some of these mines broke loose from their moorings and were met with by the Japanese fleet a long way from Port Arthur. On the 25th of February they were met with eight miles off, and as much as nine miles off on the 15th of April.

Since Togo, in spite of all endeavours, was unable to gain decisive results in his attempts to destroy the Russian war vessels, he was obliged to do the best he could to prevent their coming out of harbour because, had they done so and evaded him, the military forces moving by sea would have been in great peril. Accordingly, he tried on several occasions to run old merchant vessels filled with stones or explosives into the entrance channel, and to sink them there. The first attempt was made on the night of the 23rd-24th of February when five such steamers were employed, escorted by five torpedo boats. On the night of the 26th-27th of March another attempt was made by four merchant ships, escorted by eleven destroyers and six torpedo boats. On the night of the 2nd-3rd of May a final attempt was made by twelve merchant vessels. None of these operations appear to have been completely successful, though it is said that the effect of the last one was to block the channel completely for a short period.

By his constant activity Admiral Togo gained the object desired, because he prevented the Russian fleet from interfering with the free movement of the Japanese troops and storeships by sea. He must have had many anxious moments, but he probably was well informed of the damaged condition of the Russian battleships at the different periods, and about the leadership and *moral* of the Russian naval personnel. On several occasions he was able to withdraw his main force to the flying bases on the Korean coast for rest in harbour, and to execute minor repairs and take in coal and ammunition. On one occasion in March his fleet is reported to have been weatherbound, which means that there must have been a very severe gale, as he was able to keep the sea at other times under the most adverse conditions.

I referred before to the possible 'containing' effect which the detached Russian cruisers, sheltering in the fortified harbour of Vladivostok, might produce upon the Japanese naval forces. These Russian cruisers must have caused considerable anxiety to Admiral Togo, because he detached a superior force from his fleet to deal with them on several occasions. At present I propose to carry the narrative of these naval operations only as far as the beginning of June, when a Japanese army was in a position to assist the fleet in its endeavours to destroy the Russian war vessels at Port Arthur.

As early as the 10th of February the Russian Vladivostok cruisers put to sea and applied their energies to capturing small Japanese steamers and sailing vessels, but did not in any way seriously threaten the population of Japan. Rear-Admiral Kamamura,¹ with five armoured cruisers and two second-class protected cruisers, was detached from Togo's force to Vladivostok, which was bombarded without much effect on the 6th of March. Kamamura was away on this mission I believe until nearly the end of the month. On the 16th of April he was again detached, this time with five armoured cruisers, three second-class and two third-class protected cruisers, four destroyers, and six torpedo boats. On the 22nd of April he touched at Gensan, where he left the transport *Kenshu Maru*, which he was escorting, and went on to Vladivostok. On the 23rd of April some Russian Vladivostok cruisers met and sunk this transport, which contained troops, and succeeded in escaping Kamamura, who was at Gensan again on the 26th of April, the Russians reaching Vladivostok safely on the same day. Thick weather made Kamamura's task very difficult.

In view of the possibility of naval reinforcements ultimately reaching the Russian Pacific fleet from the Baltic and Black Sea, Togo must have grudged the detachment of Kamamura's

¹ Also spelt Kamimura. I have followed the spelling in our *Official History*, vol. i., second edition.

superior force to watch the inferior force of Vladivostok cruisers. It is possible that this detachment was forced upon the Government by public opinion in Japan, because of the damage these cruisers were capable of inflicting upon trade, and the menace they were to the movement of transports from Japanese ports, and to the coast population of the Japanese islands. In considering the 'containing' effect of naval detachments in fortified harbours, against a power having important interests to guard upon the sea, it is interesting for us to remember that after Trafalgar the French naval forces were so distributed, and, between 1805 and 1812,¹ our naval personnel was raised from 120,000 to about 145,000 of all ranks. It was not until 1815, Waterloo year, that we were able to reduce the number to about 83,000. By 1817 the number fell to 20,000.

It will be useful now to look at the situation of the Port Arthur fleet from the Russian point of view, in order to realise better why they did not show greater activity. We are assisted in this study by several accounts written from inside Port Arthur, and notably by the account of the Russian naval officer who wrote *Rasplata*, the book to which we have referred on several occasions. The Russians had at Port Arthur, on the outbreak of war, seven first-class battleships, one armoured cruiser, and four first-class protected

¹ War broke out with America in this year.

cruisers, besides smaller craft. Admiral Togo had six first-class battleships and six armoured cruisers, besides smaller craft, and on the 16th of February two more armoured cruisers, the *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*, arrived in Japan, and so brought the number of armoured cruisers up to eight. The Japanese advantage in smaller craft was more marked, as you will notice by the tables enclosed in my last letter.¹ Bearing in mind the difficulty, before referred to, which a 'blockading' fleet must find in remaining in full strength within striking distance of a harbour containing a hostile fleet, and considering the constant detachment of Kamamura's armoured cruisers, we are inclined to wonder whether offensive action by the Russian fleet might not at certain periods have been successful. Apparently the answer is to be sought in the relative spirit and efficiency of the personnel, rather than in the relative paper strength in ships. Practically the whole of the Japanese fleet had been kept continuously in commission since July 1903, and had constantly been exercised together. In the opinion of many naval officers we ought to add at least a third to the fighting value of a fleet so trained, when comparing it with a fleet of which the units have been kept in reserve, and the crews only recently made up to full strength.

The Russian fleet had not been so exercised, and we read that on the day after the first Japanese

¹ See pp. 240, 256.

bombardment in March, when the Russian ships put to sea for manœuvres, under Admiral Makaroff, the *Sebastopol* rammed the *Poltava*, and in her turn was rammed by the *Peresvyet*, while performing quite simple evolutions. Then we read of another and more excusable incident, on the 13th of April, when the *Pobyeda* struck a mine as the fleet was returning to Port Arthur, after the loss of the *Petropaulovsk* with Admiral Makaroff. The fleet on this occasion lost all formation, and the guns were fired in all directions, although no enemy was in sight.

The fact seems to have been, as far as we can gather from published accounts, that the Russian want of activity may be attributed in the first place to their being unprepared, and so having their ships damaged by the destroyer attack on the night of the 8th-9th February, and in the second place to leadership. We are told that, being under the orders of Alexieff, Admiral Stark did not have a free hand at the outset. Alexieff left Port Arthur for Mukden on the 16th of February.

Admiral Makaroff, who arrived at Port Arthur on the 8th of March, seems to have taken most energetic measures to get the fleet into a condition to put to sea rapidly, and to be able to fight a fleet action if necessity arose. Among other things, he was able by his energetic measures to get the whole fleet out of the harbour in two hours, whereas before his arrival the operation required

two high tides, or twenty-four hours. He also took every opportunity to give his captains practice in taking part in fleet manœuvres, and constantly exercised the guns' crews. Admiral Makaroff commanded for less than six weeks, and after his death the command of the fleet again devolved upon Alexieff, the next senior Admiral being Rear-Admiral Witgeft, upon whom the command ultimately descended. Makaroff, during his short period of command, took all possible measures for protecting the fleet from Japanese attacks while the ships were undergoing repairs, so as to be able ultimately to put to sea in full strength. Merchant vessels were sunk as breakwaters near the entrance, booms were made to keep out torpedo craft, and torpedo nets were stretched from the booms to the bottom, to prevent Whitehead torpedoes fired through the entrance from reaching their destination. Special arrangements were made to guard against fireships by arranging floating booms to prevent burning petroleum from spreading over the waters of the harbour, and, in order to minimise the danger from bombardment, arrangements were made to come rapidly out of harbour and keep under way. A guardship was tied up to a sunken merchant vessel near the entrance, day and night, in readiness to put to sea, and drive off Japanese destroyers and mine-laying vessels.

Soon after the death of Admiral Makaroff, the war vessels were called upon to provide assistance

in the defence of the fortress, by the loan of guns taken out of the ships, and by providing working parties from the ships' companies.

It would be impossible to give too much credit to one branch of the Russian naval service, the dockyard personnel, which was reinforced by special men brought by Makaroff from the Baltic yards. The repairing facilities at Port Arthur were very poor, and the work done in repairing the damaged battleships astonished the whole world. There was not even a dock which could take the large vessels, but by great efforts, using mud docks, and working in cofferdams (water-tight wooden frames built against the damaged parts, and extending above the surface of the water), the most important repairs were executed, and ships got to sea again wonderfully quickly, considering the appliances available. During the period we are considering, these repairs included, in addition to minor operations: raising the *Tsarevitch* and *Pallada*, the day after they grounded in the entrance channel after the torpedo attack on the night of 8th-9th of February; raising, by the 8th of March, the battleship *Retvisan*, which grounded at the same time and place with a hole in her bows under water, and with water pouring constantly into the ship through the ventilating shafts; repairing damage done to the *Retvisan* by shell fire on the 10th of March; repairing the battleships *Sebastopol*, *Peresvyet*, and *Poltava*, after they damaged each other at

steam tactics in March ; repairing the battleship *Pobyeda* after she struck a mine on the 18th of April ; besides repairing underwater damage to the first-class armoured cruiser *Bayan* from a mine, to the first-class protected cruiser *Pallada* from a torpedo, and to the mine-ship *Amur* from being rammed.

You will realise that material and machinery play a rather more important part in naval than they do in military strategy, because the power of movement at sea depends upon these things, while on land it depends upon the marching powers of men and horses ; hence you will deduce the great importance of the work done by those who are responsible for executing repairs to ships, and for keeping them in running order. Considering the want of docks and of appliances, the greatest credit is due to those on the Russian side who were engaged upon these operations. On several occasions their efforts made it possible for the Russian Port Arthur ships to put to sea with a strength superior, on paper, to the force which the Japanese could immediately bring against them.

So far we have considered the efforts made by Admiral Togo to attack the Russian fleet, so as to make sure that it should not interfere with the movements of the First Japanese Army against the Russians on the Yalu, or with the Second Army, which we left in transports off Chinampo up to the 2nd of May. We noted the Japanese

partly successful attempt to block the entrance to Port Arthur harbour on the night of the 2nd-3rd May, and Togo's object now was to cover the disembarkation of the Second Army under General Oku, on the east coast of the Liao-tung Peninsula. He accordingly moved his base to the Elliot Islands, collected about sixty torpedo craft, destroyers, and torpedo boats, and even blocked the channel between the Elliot Islands and the mainland by booms, nets, guardships at anchor, and patrol boats; the fleet was kept within striking distance in case of a sortie by the Russians.

Early on the 5th of May the disembarkation of the Japanese Second Army (First, Third, and Fourth Divisions, and First Artillery Brigade) was commenced, and from this date the combined naval and military operations against the Russian Port Arthur fleet were carried on continuously, until its final destruction in the following December. Admiral Alexieff, who had come back from Mukden after Makaroff's death, left Port Arthur by train just in time to escape the Japanese troops.

You will remember that the Russians had expected a landing at Takushan, and up to the 1st of May, the date of the Yalu battle, General Mishchenko's mounted troops had watched the coastline from Pitzuwo, where the Japanese landed in 1894, to the mouth of the Yalu. When the actual landing took place, Mishchenko's troops were not in a position to offer any resist-

ance to the disembarkation as they had temporarily fallen back to Feng-Huang-Cheng in accordance with orders from General Zasulitch. The nearest Russian force likely to interfere with the operation was one hundred miles away at Ta-shih-chiao, but there were small bodies at Pu-lan-tien and at Chinchou, the last-mentioned force being employed in fortifying a position at Nanshan,¹ and so unlikely to undertake offensive action. As matters turned out, the disembarkation of the Japanese was not opposed. Pitzuwo itself was not selected because of the extent of the mudflats which were exposed at low water, and the first landing took place at Hon-tu-shih,² near the mouth of the Ta-sha-ho river. This place had not been reconnoitred for fear of attracting attention, and was found to be so unsuitable that, on the 9th of May, the transports were moved to San-chia-tzu,³ about four miles to the westward.

The first force to land, on the 5th of May, was a small naval brigade, which took up a position to cover the disembarkation until relieved by the first troops. The Second Army was conveyed in about eighty transports, so you can imagine what a target they would have made for a hostile fleet had there been one in a fit state to interfere with the operation. According to our own official account, the transports had to anchor three miles from the shore. During part of the operation

¹ See Map VII.

² See inset map on Map V.

³ *Ibid.*

there was a strong south-easterly wind, and a high sea ; there was no shelter from the prevailing wind, but, in spite of all difficulties, the work proceeded day and night.¹ At high water the troops landed on wharves made by the military engineers, and by civilian carpenters from Japan. At low water the lighters were run aground and the troops waded on shore, the guns and wagons being hauled along plankways laid on the mud, to prevent the wheels sinking in. The ammunition was carried by hand. Only the fighting units of the army were disembarked, and the transports went back to Japan for the ammunition columns, field hospitals, and supply columns, so that the Japanese would not have been able to make any distant movements excepting along the coast-line, where communication with the storeships would be possible at certain places in favourable weather.

On the 7th of May the Japanese occupied Pitzuwo from the land side, driving some Russian cavalry away to the northward. The Third Division was on shore by the 11th, and the First Division by the 13th of May ; the Fourth Division was disembarked between the 10th and 13th. General Oku landed on the 8th of May, and was

¹ I have heard it suggested that the Japanese specially selected an anchorage of gently shelving mud, because, if any transports were sunk by Russian destroyers, they would rest on the bottom with the decks out of water, and the troops would be saved. Considering that nearly the whole available coast was of this nature, the suggestion seems rather far-fetched.

soon in telegraphic cable communication with Imperial Headquarters in Japan *via* Antung. A cable ship followed up the transports to lay this line, and here, as on other occasions, we note the forethought displayed by the Japanese in laying cables to enable their own commanders to communicate with Headquarters, and in depriving the enemy of such communication at critical periods. You will remember that Chemulpo was cut off from Port Arthur just before the advanced Japanese troops were landed. That Korean harbours used by Togo as bases were joined up immediately with Chemulpo and Japan, and that on the 16th of February the Port Arthur-Chefoo cable was reported to have been cut. We dealt with the question of cable strategy at some length when we were studying the Spanish-American War, and the Japanese had evidently noted the importance of the subject before 1904, had made their plans, and had secured a trained personnel and prepared the necessary material.

The Russian force at Pu-lan-tien, which consisted of one battalion, was withdrawn to the northward, by orders from Kuropatkin's Headquarters at Liao Yang, after having been in touch on the 6th of May with the Japanese troops who were in possession of San-chia-tun,¹ and there were no hostile field troops between the Second Japanese Army and the force near Chinchou,

¹ See inset map on Map V.

which was engaged in fortifying the Nanshan position on the road to Port Arthur, excepting a brigade of infantry and a battery under Major-General Nadyein at Shih-san-li-tai,¹ guarding the railway.

Temporary damage was done to the railway near Pu-lan-tien on the 6th of May, but a Russian train passed safely to the southward along the line on the 9th, and Pu-lan-tien was not permanently occupied by the Japanese until the 14th of May. By the 16th of May Oku had driven back the Russian detachment under Nadyein, and Port Arthur was thus cut off from all communication by land with the Russian forces to the northward.

In order to divert Kuropatkin's attention, and to prevent interference with Oku's subsequent operations, a detachment from the fleet, under the orders of Rear-Admiral M. Togo, made a demonstration by sea against the Russian army corps at Yingkou and Kaiping, in order to increase the impression, already in the minds of Russian Headquarters, that a landing was contemplated in that neighbourhood.

On the 19th of May the Tenth Japanese Division, which was to keep up communication with the First Army under Kuroki at Feng-Huang-Cheng, began to land at Takushan, and we can imagine the state of uncertainty which the Japanese use of their amphibious power must have produced

¹ About five miles north of Chinchou.

in the minds of those responsible for the distribution of the Russian army.

Oku meanwhile kept the Second Army distributed between Chinchou and Pu-lan-tien, awaiting reinforcements. Transports carrying the Fifth Division and First Cavalry Brigade arrived from Japan between the 15th and 23rd of May. The operation of disembarking these troops was carried out by day only, and the transports repaired every night to an anchorage off the Elliot Islands where it was easier to defend them. This may have been due to the situation on land having been cleared up, and to the Japanese no longer fearing an attack in strength by the Russian military forces from the north, or it may have been due to the Japanese having lost two battleships by mines off Port Arthur on the 15th of May, and to their fearing that, in consequence of this loss, the Russian fleet might make a sortie, and so cause danger to the transports and troops.

By the 24th of May Oku's army was ready to attack the Russian field troops near Nanshan,¹ covering the line of advance on Port Arthur, and was awaiting the arrival of four gunboats and some torpedo craft which Admiral Togo had promised, to support the right flank of the Japanese army from Chinchou Bay. The Russians had about four hundred men in Chinchou, and their main position at Nanshan extended across

¹ See Map VII.

the isthmus from Chinchou Bay to Ta-lien-wan harbour, a distance of about 4500 yards between high-water marks. At low tide, about 2000 yards of mud was exposed on both flanks. The Russian position had been strengthened with field works, trenches, and obstacles, and two battalions had been employed on this work since the beginning of February, with the assistance at times of as many as 5000 Chinese coolies. In the main and subsidiary positions nearly seventy guns were mounted, including fourteen fortress and siege guns, some of which were of 6-inch calibre. The Russian right flank was secured from bombardment from the sea by mines at the entrance to Ta-lien-wan Bay, by a coast fort with heavy guns at Ta-lien-wan, and by a Russian gunboat and two destroyers in the bay. It is not surprising that, in these circumstances, the Russians considered their position to be impregnable.

You will find a full description of the battle of Nanshan in our own official account, and in many other works, so I do not propose to enter into any detail on the subject. Oku placed his Fifth Division at Pu-lan-tien, to cover his force in case the Russians should move from the north against him, and, as the whole of this division had not yet landed, he also detached portions of the Third and Fourth Divisions for the same purpose. Chinchou was captured on the 25th of May, and with the bulk of the First, Third, and Fourth Divisions, and the First Artillery Brigade, he succeeded,

after many attacks and much loss of life,¹ in driving the Russians out of the Nanshan position on the 26th of May.

As we are studying the war from the amphibious point of view, the question of naval co-operation by gunfire in the Nanshan battle is important to us. On the Japanese left, we gather that considerable inconvenience was suffered at first from the guns of the Russian vessel in Ta-lien-wan Bay, but she is reported to have withdrawn to Dalny by noon. The ultimate success of the Japanese army was gained against the Russian left flank, which was bombarded by the Japanese vessels in Chinchou Bay. This, as we gather from our study of the Chilian War, was an ideal case for naval co-operation by gunfire with an army, because the war vessels could be placed so as to enfilade the hostile position. Unfortunately accounts differ as regards the definite results produced by the naval guns on this occasion. The naval bombardment against the Russian left began at 6 A.M., and was continued intermittently when the tide and depth of water allowed the gun vessels to approach within range. It has been claimed that they succeeded in keeping down the fire of the batteries of small guns, which were all that the Russians had mounted on this flank. Our own official historian quotes a report, received from the

¹ The Japanese losses were 683 killed, 3927 wounded, and 3 missing—total 4613.

Russian General Staff, to the effect that the troops holding the left of the Russian position retired at 6.45 P.M., by order of General Stessel, and not on account of the fire from the Japanese gunboats 'which was stopped at about 2 P.M.' In considering the difficult problem of co-operation between our own field artillery and assaulting infantry, it is usual to assume that fire must be kept up until the very last moment for such co-operation to be effective. Whether heavy shell, delivered from war vessels, can drive infantry out of an entrenched position without an assault being delivered is a question yet to be decided. It is of course impossible to lay down any general rule, as the results will depend upon local conditions in each case, upon the range and facilities for observation, and upon the accuracy that can be attained; but it is necessary to remember that results so obtained must be only temporary, and the defenders will be able to reoccupy the position at nightfall, or as soon as the bombardment ceases.

After the battle of Nanshan the Russian field force retired towards Port Arthur, and the result of the action was that the Japanese obtained possession of two good harbours, at Ta-lien-wan and at Dalny, both being in communication by railway with the main line from Port Arthur to the northward. Ta-lien-wan was occupied on the 27th of May, and was ultimately allotted to the Japanese forces operating to the northward,

and Dalny was occupied on the 29th of May, and was allotted to the army employed to attack the land front of Port Arthur; but before either harbour could be used it was necessary to clear the approaches of the numerous Russian mines which had been strewn about the entrance to the bay. Since this operation took a considerable time, the Eleventh Japanese Division was landed between the 20th and 31st of May at Yentai Bay, about ten miles south-west of Pitzuwo,¹ and moved southward to reinforce the First Division which was watching the Russians at Port Arthur.

The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Division, First Cavalry Brigade, and First Artillery Brigade, now formed the Second Army, and were collected at and about Pu-lan-tien. This Second Army ultimately moved northward, under command of General Oku, and on the 15th of June drove back,² at Telissu, a Russian force of about 35,000 men under Lieutenant-General Stakelberg, who had been sent to try and relieve Port Arthur. We will leave them for the present in order to consider the combined naval and military operations which led to the destruction of the Russian Port Arthur fleet. This is the subject with which I propose that we should deal in the next letter.

Up to the first week in June, we have seen that Admiral Togo had sunk one Russian battleship,

¹ See inset map on Map V.

² Japanese losses : 206 killed, 983 wounded, 1 missing—total 1190. Russian losses uncertain.

the *Petropaulovsk*, but he had not been able, with naval resources alone, to disable permanently any of the other Russian battleships or large cruisers. Two out of the six Japanese battleships with which he had commenced operations in February, the *Hatsuse* and *Yashima*, had been sunk by Russian mines. In destroyers the Russians had suffered some loss.

During the whole period under review, many of the older Japanese craft were detached from the main fleet to assist in landing armies, and to make various demonstrations calculated to deceive the Russians as regards the real points of attack by military forces, and on several occasions Togo was obliged to send away an important detachment from his main fleet, in order to check the depredations of the Vladivostok cruisers.

The Japanese military forces under Kuroki had defeated and driven back the Russian detached force on the Yalu river ; those under Oku had defeated at Nanshan one field army which covered the advance on Port Arthur, and by the middle of June they defeated, at Telissu, another Russian force which had been despatched from the north to attempt to relieve the fortress.

EIGHTH LETTER

PART I

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR OF 1904-5—*Continued*

MY DEAR TOM,

In the opinion of some authorities, the month of June 1904 was the most critical period in the whole of the Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese had landed altogether nine divisions on continental territory. Kuroki, with the Second, Twelfth, and Guard Divisions, composing the First Army, was operating in the country near Feng-Huang-Cheng, and Hsiu-yen.¹ The Tenth Division, which had landed near Takushan, was ready to operate on his left flank. Oku, with the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Divisions, First Cavalry Brigade, and First Artillery Brigade, composing the Second Army, was advancing northwards *via* Telissu, and the Sixth Division from Japan was on its way to join him. Nogi, with the First and Eleventh Divisions, forming the Third Army, was operating against Port Arthur. In addition to the nine divisions, Cavalry Brigade, and Artillery Brigade, the Japanese had landed several of the Kobi brigades belonging to the respective divisions. This large army could not be maintained upon the mainland

¹ See Map VIII.

entirely upon the resources of the country, and we therefore realise how vital to Japan was the free movement of transports and storeships over the sea which intervened between her armies and the Japanese islands which formed the base of operations.

Everything pointed to the necessity for destroying the main Russian fleet, which was sheltering in the defended harbour of Port Arthur. Owing to the efforts made, with the inferior appliances available, to repair the Russian ships which had been damaged, the paper strength of the Russian main fleet under Admiral Witgeft was at this time little, if at all, inferior to the fleet at the disposal of Admiral Togo. The depredations of the Russian Vladivostok cruisers under Baron Stakelberg, and afterwards under Rear-Admiral Essen, were able to cause such unrest in Japan as to compel Admiral Togo to detach a superior force to deal with them, and so weaken the main body of the fleet available to deal with Witgeft's force, which at any time might put to sea from Port Arthur. Togo, having lost two battleships by mines, had now only four first-class battleships against six in Witgeft's squadron, but the Japanese still had eight first-class armoured cruisers against four on the Russian side, of which one—the *Bayan*—was at Port Arthur, and three—*Gromoboi*, *Rossiya*, and *Rurik*—were at Vladivostok. In unarmoured vessels and torpedo craft the Japanese superiority was more pro-

nounced, but these vessels were much scattered, watching the coasts of the Liao-tung Peninsula, the Japanese coasts, and the Korean Straits, and assisting the army by making demonstrations at Yingkou, Kaiping, and elsewhere. The best conditions for offensive action against Togo's fleet would be afforded if the Russian Vladivostok cruisers could cause him to detach a superior force to deal with them, and if Witgeft could then sally out from Port Arthur to fight a decisive action before its return.

Admiral Togo, in spite of employing bombardments, mines, torpedo attacks, and every device at his disposal, and in spite of the constant energy he had shown in all weathers, had so far been unable to disable permanently more than one Russian armoured ship. There was no prospect of his fleet being reinforced by any more large vessels during the war, and, on the other hand, there was always the possibility of his enemy being reinforced by the arrival of the fleet still kept in reserve in the Baltic, although such a contingency at this time appeared to be somewhat remote. His main objective, the Russian Port Arthur fleet, was inaccessible because of the mines, the coast defence ordnance, and the obstructions at the entrance to the inner harbour. The Japanese army had at this period succeeded in cutting off the fortress from communication on the land side, but strong positions and formidable fortifications intervened between the Japanese

land forces and their objective, and the Third Army, under Nogi, consisted of only two divisions, and was inferior in strength to the Port Arthur garrison. For decisive operations more troops and a siege train were required, and these had not yet been landed.

Before we follow the combined operations of the Japanese fleet and army which resulted in the destruction of the Port Arthur fleet, there is one feature to which we ought to devote some attention, and that is the possession by the Japanese of the harbour of Dalny.¹ General Kuropatkin writes with much feeling on this subject in his book on the war, and having been Minister of War at the time when the port of Dalny was established and equipped, he vouches for the fact that this was done without any reference to the War Department, even for a recommendation as to the best style of gun to be employed for its defence. As matters turned out, the Russians possessed a well-defended place, Port Arthur, which was badly equipped with repairing facilities, while Dalny was well equipped with them. The capture of the latter place by the Japanese gave them the use of those appliances, and every facility for landing the heavy weights of a siege train, without which they could not expect to conduct operations successfully against the land defences of Port Arthur, or destroy the ships in the harbour.

¹ See Map VII. for Port Arthur operations.

Let us now consider briefly the combined operations against the Port Arthur fleet. You will find the land operations fully described in Part III. of the *Official History of the War*, brought out by the Committee of Imperial Defence, and I propose to take our information chiefly from that source, interposing, where necessary, some naval information derived from other authorities.

Let us keep in view the whole time the fact that the Japanese objective was the Port Arthur fleet, and not the fortress itself. Should this fleet be able to fight even an inconclusive action against Admiral Togo, then the Japanese military strategy would have been much upset, and later on, if naval reinforcements reached the Russians from Europe, the Japanese armies which had been landed would have been in a perilous state, because their communications with the home territory would have been insecure. The time factor was even more important than it usually is in strategy. Not only was it necessary to consider the time required for a new fleet to reach local waters from the Baltic, but it was also necessary to remember that Kuropatkin's army was daily being strengthened by reinforcements from Europe, and the Third Japanese Army, which was attacking Port Arthur on the land side, might soon be urgently wanted to co-operate with the other armies in the northern area.

Purely naval operations against the Port Arthur fleet having failed to disable permanently more

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than one Russian armoured vessel, the alternatives were, either to force the Russians to put to sea by operations on the land side, and then attack them, or to destroy them in the harbour by bombardment from heavy ordnance. This latter operation, in order to be effective, required an observation station from which the fall of the shell could be observed and communicated to the batteries.

In June 1904, after the Japanese had succeeded in cutting communications with the north, the total Russian regular forces in the Kuan-tung Peninsula amounted to 41,600 men, or, if we include naval landing parties and the Town Guard, to a total of 47,000. There were 282 pieces of heavy ordnance of 4-inch calibre and above, of which 187 were mounted on the land front. There were also 80 light quick-firing and machine guns, and 202 field guns, and from time to time about 148 naval guns were landed from the fleet to assist in the defence.

Up to the 20th of June, Nogi, having only two divisions available, the First and Eleventh, was not strong enough for offensive action, and the Japanese Third Army accordingly held positions covering Dalny, while the neighbouring waters were being cleared of mines so that the harbour and quays should be available for landing additional troops and heavy guns. The First Kobi Brigade and a naval brigade were the first of these reinforcements to land.

On the 26th of June the Japanese captured Chien-shan, a height from which the Russians had up to that time been able to overlook the harbour of Dalny, and note all that was going on there. The Japanese left flank in this operation was open to bombardment from the sea, and about this period the Russians took every advantage of this fact, and employed two first-class and one second-class protected cruisers, four sloops or gunboats, and fourteen destroyers for the purpose with some effect, but on this, as on other occasions, the co-operation between the Russian fleet and army was not particularly well organised. Togo's fleet was unable to come close enough inshore to interfere with the Russian vessels, for fear of mines, from which he had already suffered such serious loss to his strength.

During the month of June, the chief naval operations were, on the 4th, the loss of a Russian gunboat off Port Arthur by mines ; on the 13th, the Japanese flotilla laid mines off Port Arthur and shelled the Russian troops ; on the 23rd, the Russian fleet (six battleships, one armoured cruiser, and smaller vessels) put to sea, but returned to the harbour again by 10 P.M., on sighting Togo's fleet.

If the month of June 1904 was the most critical month of the war, perhaps the 23rd was the most critical day. Although superior in armoured cruisers, Togo's fleet was inferior in battleships, and there was constantly the necessity to make a detachment from his force to watch the Russian

Vladivostok cruisers. These cruisers were particularly active at this period. They put to sea on the 12th of June, and on the 15th to 16th were in the Korean Straits, where they sank two Japanese transports, the *Idsami Maru* and *Hitachi Maru*, and damaged another, the *Sado Maru*. They also took the British s.s. *Allanton*, and some Japanese sailing craft, before returning to Vladivostok. On the 28th they again put to sea, and bombarded Gensan on the 30th of June. Altogether, Admiral Togo's situation at this time was hardly to be envied. With his weak force he had to maintain as effective a blockade as possible of the whole coastline of the Liao-tung Peninsula, he had to guard the sea communications of the Japanese armies with Japan, and at the same time to maintain in a constant state of readiness a fleet of sufficient strength to engage the Russian Port Arthur fleet, if it should come out of harbour.

The month of July was spent by the Japanese military authorities in landing reinforcements at Dalny for the Third Army. Up to the 26th, they had landed the Fourth Kobi Brigade, a considerable amount of heavy ordnance up to 4.7 inches calibre, and practically the whole of the Ninth Division. They thus had available three divisions, two Kobi brigades, a field artillery brigade, some heavy ordnance, and a naval brigade. The Russians, having failed on the 9th of July to drive the Japanese off the high ground

at Chien-shan, were, on the 26th, occupying what was called the ‘Position of the Passes.’¹ The Russian force in this position was under the command of General Fock, and its strength was from 19,000 to 20,000 bayonets, one squadron, seventy field, and thirty machine guns. The Japanese launched an attack on the 26th of July; early on the 28th the Russians commenced to retire, and by the 31st, after making a further stand in a weakly fortified position extending from Louisa Bay to Takushan and Hsiao-ku-shan, they fell back to the permanent defences covering Port Arthur on the land side, holding also Takushan and Hsiao-ku-shan. From this date the Russian military defence was of a passive nature.

During July the naval operations were again of some interest. On the 2nd to the 4th, some Russian vessels (one second-class protected cruiser, four smaller vessels, and about twelve destroyers) co-operated with the army in the attempt to recapture Chien-shan, and again the Japanese fleet was unable to approach the coast for fear of mines. Later in the month, the Japanese fleet appears to have been more successful in saving the left flank of their army from bombardment from the sea. On the 9th the Russian armoured cruiser *Bayan* came out, and is reported to have been driven back by two Japanese protected cruisers and some destroyers. On the 26th the armoured cruiser, three first-class and one third-

¹ See Map VII.

class protected cruisers came out and were driven in again. On the 27th a first-class battleship (*Retvisan*), the armoured cruiser *Bayan*, three protected cruisers, and some smaller vessels, made a similar attempt ; they had to return to harbour by 3 P.M., and suffered serious loss, as their only armoured cruiser in Port Arthur, the *Bayan*, was hit by a shell and struck a mine, thus being placed temporarily out of action. She took no further active part in the operations. Besides saving their own army from molestation to a great extent, the Japanese fleet is reported to have produced some effect against both flanks of the Russian army by sea bombardment during the month. Togo was again, during July, compelled to keep a proportion of his force detached for operations against the Vladivostok cruisers. These cruisers were driven northwards from the Korean Straits by Kamamura on the 1st of July, but about the 20th they are reported to have sunk two steamers, one containing railway material badly wanted for the Japanese armies in Manchuria. Togo's force during the month, in addition to doing all that was possible to save the army from molestation, as far as he could do so without exposing his vessels to too much risk in the mine-strewn waters near the coast, made every effort to harass the Russian fleet in Port Arthur harbour. A boom had now been constructed across the entrance, but efforts were made to send in junks with explosives, and even to send

in small steam picket boats to destroy the boom and get at their objectives inside. Individual Japanese seamen even attempted to swim in with lines attached to them, to be made fast to leading blocks on the sides of the Russian ships, thus enabling friends outside to get charges of explosives in contact with the Russian ships, and to blow them up. The Japanese lost one small vessel, the *Kaimon*, on the 5th, and in addition to the damage to the *Bayan*, the Russians, towards the end of July, lost their small sloop or gun vessel, the *Sivutch*, which had been sheltering in the Liao river, near Newchuang.¹

August in 1904 was a very important month, because it was in this month that the Russian Port Arthur fleet received a blow from which it never recovered. Admiral Togo was not strong enough to maintain a really efficient blockade, but he distributed his forces to get the best value out of them, using the older vessels on the western side of the peninsula, while keeping as many new vessels as possible concentrated on the eastern side, in order to deal with the Russians if they should come out in strength.

In order that we may the better realise why they did come out, on the 10th of August, we must now return to the operations on land. The Japanese Third Army had succeeded in closely investing Port Arthur on the land side by the 1st of August; the sea investment was not quite

¹ Shown on Maps V. and VIII.

complete, vessels of various descriptions continued to run the blockade, and to bring in a certain amount of supplies. The Russians held their line of permanent fortifications, and advanced positions at Takushan and Hsiao-kushan. When considering former examples of the effect which an army could produce upon hostile ships taking refuge in a defended harbour, we noted that there were two courses possible, either to capture the fortress by one of the usual methods, and so capture the ships, or force them to sea, or else to throw heavy shells on to their decks from howitzers mounted in positions protected from the ordnance of the land defences.

Our official historian points out that the line of Russian permanent forts was too close to Port Arthur to prevent bombardment of the ships by Japanese ordnance which could pitch shells at a range of 10,000 to 12,000 yards. To this we may add that the Russian defences prevented the Japanese from observing accurately the fall of the shell, because there was no available high ground outside the defences from which the whole of the harbour could be observed. Besides the fire of the ordnance on the land side, described when we were considering the operations in June, the Russians succeeded in reversing the guns and howitzers of the coast defence batteries, and in bringing their fire to bear upon the besieging force.

Up to the end of July, the Japanese had not been able to bring up sufficiently heavy ordnance

to reply at such long ranges. By the 7th of August, however, some 4.7-inch guns had been mounted—only two of them according to our official account—and we shall see how important a part these two guns played in forcing the Russian ships to leave the harbour. On the 7th-8th of August the Japanese attacked and captured the Russian advanced positions of Takushan and Hsiao-ku-shan; on the 9th the Russians failed to recapture these positions, and from this time they were shut in to their line of permanent forts. There was some criticism of the Japanese navy during these operations, because they did not prevent the Russian second-class cruiser *Novik*, and other vessels, from inflicting considerable loss upon the left flank of the Japanese army during its advance; but Admiral Togo could hardly have been expected to subject his reduced fleet to probable further loss from submarine mines, and the ultimate result justified his action. By the 10th of August a coast battery of naval quick-firing guns was established to guard the left flank of the army, and this course was found to be effective.

On the 7th, 8th, and 9th of August the two Japanese 4.7-inch guns carried out a bombardment—the first bombardment of Port Arthur itself from the land side, as it is termed by the author of *Rasplata*. It is most interesting to compare the effect on the Russian fleet of this bombardment by two 4.7-inch guns from the land

side, with the effects produced by the previous naval bombardments using heavy ordnance up to 12-inch calibre. The latter failed to force the Russian ships to put to sea, but after reading *Rasplata* we cannot avoid coming to the conclusion that the former, combined with the investment on the land side, succeeded in this object. As early as the 3rd of July, a destroyer had arrived at Port Arthur carrying the following order from the Viceroy, Admiral Alexieff, to Admiral Witgeft, holding the naval command on the spot: 'Keep before your eyes that the squadron can only remain in Port Arthur as long as it is safe there. In the other eventuality, go to sea in good time and proceed, without engaging in battle, if this be possible, to Vladivostok.'¹ This order has been severely criticised, and its meaning hinges upon the insertion or absence of the comma after the word battle, but we are not concerned with this controversy, but only with the question whether the Russian fleet was forced to sea by the land operations.

On the 7th of August the Russian battleship *Tsarevitch* was hit by a 4.7-inch shell. Her wireless telegraph office was struck, and the operator killed. Admiral Witgeft was slightly wounded. On the 8th, a shell set on fire some tanks of lubricants in the dockyard, and on this day the *Peresvyyet's* fire is said to have compelled the Japanese battery to change its position. On the

¹ In *Rusplata*.

9th, the *Retvisan* was struck below the water line, and on her turrets and casemates, and took in about four hundred tons of water. A lighter lying alongside filled with shell was struck and sunk. We read that, on this date, 'The ships of the squadron hastily filled up with coal and stores,' and that 'it was clear to all that we were bound to go out.'¹

In view of this account, I think we are justified in assuming that the Russian fleet was forced to sea by the success of the Japanese Third Army in investing and bombarding the harbour on the land side. Nearly 6000 officers and men, killed and wounded, had been lost by the Japanese army between the 26th of June and the 9th of August, and large numbers were down with beri-beri and other diseases, so the object had not been attained without heavy loss. The Russian ships came out, we are told later, by direct order of the Emperor, but we cannot avoid the conclusion that this order was brought about by the circumstances which we have considered. The exact terms of the order, and how it reached Port Arthur, I have been unable to ascertain. It appears to have been received by Witgeft early in August.

On the 1st of August a Japanese picket boat or small mine-laying vessel is reported to have been blown up by a mine, and on the 5th some Japanese destroyers drove back some Russian destroyers which attempted to come out; but,

¹ In *Rasplata*.

generally speaking, Admiral Togo seems to have somewhat relaxed his efforts to get at the Russian ships during the early days of August, possibly because the policy was to induce them if possible to leave the harbour. We read in *Rasplata* that, on the 9th of August: 'The Japanese fleet had not been in sight to seaward these last two days, and during that time they had not laid out any mines in the roads.'

We have now brought the narrative of the combined operations by the Japanese army and war vessels against the Russian Port Arthur fleet up to the 10th of August, and it will be interesting to review the naval situation at this date. We have few published accounts to go upon, but it seems that Togo had been compelled almost permanently to detach a considerable portion of his armoured cruisers, under Kamamura, to operate against the Russian Vladivostok cruisers, and prevent their cutting off any more transports and army storeships, or carrying out raids upon shipping, and threatening the coast population of Japan. As far as I can gather, the only armoured vessels which Admiral Togo had ready concentrated to meet the Russians on the 10th of August were the four battleships, and the cruisers *Nisshin* and *Kasuga*. In view of the Russian available strength, we therefore must realise how important it was not to accept risk of serious damage to his small fleet. Rumours of the equipment of the Baltic fleet were already

reaching the Far East, and even if Togo's vessels suffered serious damage, without actual loss, it was doubtful whether such damage could be made good in time for further operations. Without secure sea communications, the Japanese armies would in the meantime be paralysed, and could not receive the badly needed reinforcements. We must bear this fact in mind when considering the naval battle which ensued.

On the 10th of August, the Russian fleet began at daybreak to come out of Port Arthur harbour. In spite of all efforts, they had been obliged to leave behind ten of the 6-inch guns which had been lent to the army, to be employed in the Port Arthur defences.

The Russian fleet got to sea successfully without loss by mines, and everything now depended, as usual in strategical movements, upon the time problem. If they could reach the Korean Strait ahead of Admiral Togo, there seemed every probability of their being able to effect a junction with Admiral Essen's cruisers and reach Vladivostok, a secure base for further operations, now better suited for the purpose than Port Arthur.

Since our object in studying these amphibious wars is to consider combined, rather than purely naval, or purely military, operations, we will not devote too much attention to the detailed account of the naval battle of the 10th of August. The best published account which I have been able to find from the Japanese point of view is that

brought out by the *Times* soon after the battle took place. A diagram is appended which affords material for most interesting study, especially if you divide it up into periods, and consider each separately. It is especially interesting to read the *Times*' account in conjunction with the account, from the Russian point of view, which you will find in *Rasplata*. We shall know more when our own official account comes out, but the authorities mentioned give us quite a good idea of what took place, and the following is a brief summary compiled from those sources.

The Russian ships having begun to come out of the harbour at daybreak, were all at sea by 8.30 A.M. The six battleships were all present, but the only first-class armoured cruiser, the *Bayan*, had to be left behind, as her damages had not yet been repaired. The mine-sweeping flotilla cleared a passage for the fleet and, together with the small gunboats and some of the destroyers, was sent back to Port Arthur at 10.30 A.M. A fog hung over the land and the sea near the coast, but by 11.30 A.M. the Japanese fleet was sighted to seaward.

The Russians tried to escape in a southeasterly direction. Both fleets were in 'single line ahead,' and the Japanese were steering W.S.W., a course which took them across the bows of the Russians, but far out of range, and the distance was increased by the Japanese turning away four points (45°), all ships turning

together, at about 12.20. At 12.35 they resumed their original course until they had passed beyond the line of advance of the Russians. Just before 1 P.M. they turned 16 points (180°) together, this made the course E.N.E. and brought Togo's ship, the *Mikasa*, which had been leading, to the rear of the line. At 1.5 P.M. the Russians altered their course and edged away to the eastward, probably to avoid real or imaginary floating mines laid across their course by the Japanese. At 1.35 P.M. they turned southward again, but found Togo's fleet again steaming across their bows. Togo immediately turned his ships 16 points (180°) together and steered W.S.W. again. The Japanese were on their new course by 1.35, and the Russians altered their course to the eastward, apparently to try and get away from them. Soon after 2 P.M. Togo turned his fleet 'in succession' to the eastward, this bringing the *Mikasa* in front. Between this time and 3 P.M. the Russians made several attempts to turn to the southward, but always found the Japanese in a position to cross their bows, and between 3 and 6.30 P.M. both fleets were steering to the eastward on parallel courses, the Japanese being on the starboard quarter of the Russians.

So far no material advantage had been gained. The Russians, as we have seen, had six battleships against the Japanese four battleships and two armoured cruisers (*Nisshin* and *Kasuga*). Studying the action, one can hardly avoid the

conclusion that the Russians, had they been able to keep up their paper speed, would have been able to avoid being cut off. We are told in *Rasplata* that there were several delays caused by the engines of the *Tsarevitch* giving trouble. An error is said to have been made in building them, and new eccentrics, sent out before the outbreak of war, were lying at Shanghai. This incident brings strongly to our notice the important part played by material in naval warfare. Had the *Tsarevitch* been able to keep up her speed it seems quite possible that the Russians might have been more successful in their attempt to reach Vladivostok.

During the early stages there was a certain amount of firing at long bowls, but no very serious damage resulted. Togo's rather tentative tactics may doubtless be attributed to his wishing to wait for further reinforcements, and to save his few ships from serious engagement until their arrival. Most of his armoured cruisers appear to have been detached with Kamamura, but several vessels, amongst them the armoured cruiser *Asama*, joined him during the course of the day. Togo's flagship was hit twice by 12-inch shell, and the bursting of one of these is said very nearly to have killed the Admiral himself. Between 3.30 and 5.30 P.M., fire ceased because the ranges were too great, but after that the Japanese fleet had overhauled the Russians and reduced the range, and at about 6.30 P.M. a Japanese

12-inch shell hit the conning tower of the *Tsarevitch*, Admiral Witgeft's flagship, and killed the Admiral; the steering apparatus was damaged, and the ship turned abruptly to port. This settled the result of the action, and possibly the ultimate issue of the war.

You will remember that the Russian captains had had little experience in fleet manœuvres, and that in Makaroff's time an attempt had been made to improve matters, but the ships had rammed each other when carrying out simple evolutions under peace conditions; you can imagine the confusion that resulted on this occasion when the flagship lost control. By very bad luck the *Peresvyet*, flagship of the second in command, Rear-Admiral Prince Uktomsky, had lost her top masts and could not hoist signals. A signal, displayed on her bridge rails, to form single line ahead again was not seen, the fleet lost formation, the ships were in a disorganised clump, and it is a wonder that they did not ram each other in the confusion. The Japanese seized their opportunity and steamed in to close range (about 3800 yards), but it was now about 7 P.M., and it was dark before a complete decisive result could be obtained. The author of *Rasplata* writes that the Japanese fleet soon steered N.E., although the Russian course was N.W. at the time, and that the 'enemy . . . appeared no longer anxious to fight.' For reasons that have not been explained, the Japanese destroyers,

which were within reach, did not inflict any damage upon the Russian vessels. Probably the sea was too high for their effective action.

The Russian fleet succeeded in returning to Port Arthur, but with the loss of the battleship *Tsarevitch*, which proceeded in a damaged condition to Kiao-chao,¹ and the first-class protected cruisers *Askold* and *Diana*, which went to Shanghai and Saigon respectively. Four Russian destroyers also made for neutral ports. The second-class cruiser *Novik* escaped, but ran ashore at Korsakov² in Saghalien before the end of the month, to avoid Japanese cruisers. While the Russian losses in ships in the battle of August the 10th were considerable, the loss in *moral* of the personnel must have been even more serious. The Port Arthur fleet could no longer have been so serious a source of anxiety to the Japanese authorities, but the Imperial Headquarters had had experience of the powers of recuperation of the Russians, after the heavy blows suffered on former occasions, and the conclusion was come to that both army and fleet must continue their operations against the Port Arthur ships. Before we follow their fortunes, we must note that, on the 14th of August, Admiral Kamamura met the Russian Vladivostok cruisers in the Straits of Korea, north-east of Tsushima, and succeeded in sinking the armoured cruiser *Rurik*, the remainder escaping in a damaged condition to Vladivostok.

¹ See Map V.

² *Ibid.*

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After this engagement, Admiral Essen's cruisers were no longer an important factor in the operations, and Admiral Togo had less need to make detachments from the main body of his fleet.

The majority of Russian ships, after their defeat on the 10th of August, seem to have fled to Port Arthur by instinct as the natural retreat to make for, and I suppose that with fleets, as with armies, the natural tendency is to retreat along the former line of advance, when the influence of leaders can no longer be exerted after a defeat. Port Arthur was now by no means a desirable place of refuge. We have seen that even two 4.7-inch Japanese guns, without accurate observation of their fire, had made things unpleasant for the ships between the 7th and 9th of August, and it was to be anticipated that the Japanese would ultimately be able to bring more, and heavier, ordnance to bear as time passed.

The first requirement for the Japanese was a position from which the fire upon the ships could be observed and directed. Our official historian writes that two places would fulfil these requirements. The first he mentions is the peak of Wang-tai, situated in the centre of the north-east front of the Russian line of defence, and the second is 203 Metre Hill, situated to the westward. The latter position at this period was not nearly so strongly defended as the former. The Japanese concentrated their attention in the first instance upon the north-east front.

A heavy bombardment of the ships in harbour was carried out from the land side on the 12th of August, and between this date and the end of the month heroic attacks were directed against the fortress on the land side, chiefly against the north-east front. For the detailed story of these attacks I must refer you to our official account. Their determined nature may be gathered from the fact that the Japanese losses amounted to nearly 17,000 in killed and wounded, but in spite of all efforts it was found impossible to carry the defences by assault, and finally it was decided that the only course was to undertake regular siege operations. By the 19th of the month, the Japanese were employing 158 pieces of ordnance of over 4 inches calibre, and of these 88 had a calibre of 6 inches. They also had 108 field pieces, and 72 mountain guns, besides 3½-inch howitzers and naval 12-pounder guns. Bombardments were constantly tried, but we do not read of any serious damage being done to the ships; on the other hand, the fire from the ships is said to have been employed with some effect against the Japanese batteries.

On the 14th of August Togo's fleet carried out another bombardment, and on the 16th the Russian ships again made an attempt at a sortie, but were unsuccessful. This is the last we read of any attempts being made of this nature, and henceforward the personnel of the fleet were chiefly employed to assist in the conduct of the

defence, and all the lighter guns were landed for the same purpose.

The accounts of the regular siege operations which were commenced by the Japanese in September afford the most interesting and instructive example of the conduct of such work under modern conditions. The Japanese lost about 5800 in killed and wounded during the month, and suffered severely from sickness, owing partly to the unhealthy condition of the field of operations, on which it was impossible to bury the numerous corpses. Between July and September, 20,000 had been incapacitated by sickness, over two-thirds from beri-beri, the remainder chiefly from typhoid and dysentery. The most desperate fighting took place, including hand-to-hand conflicts, but so far the Japanese did not capture a position from which the result of fire upon the ships could be observed; 203 Metre Hill, amongst other positions, was attacked, but without success.

By the end of the month of September two Kobi companies of engineers, the First and Twelfth, had reinforced the besieging army, and some large howitzers of 11-inch calibre had been brought from the coast defences of Japan. Six of them had been mounted in the siege batteries.

These 11-inch howitzers produced such an important effect that I think that some details about them will be of interest. The weight of the howitzer itself was nearly eleven tons, its

carriage weighed over five tons, and the platform on which the carriage rested, nearly nine tons. Studying these weights makes us realise that it would have been almost impossible to land them on the beach where the original disembarkation took place, and bring them from thence to the Third Army, but the facilities afforded by the commercial harbour of Dalny were of the greatest use for the purpose. The weight of the shells fired was 485 lbs., and they could contain bursters either of black powder or of high explosives. The howitzers and their mountings were brought up by man power, and each piece required four loads. Each load was mounted on a sort of sledge with wooden trucks, and the heaviest required 130 men to drag it along. Beds of cement, about five feet thick, had to be laid for the pivots to be fixed to, and two rows of baulks of heavy timber were laid on the top of the cement. Tram lines were laid to bring the heavy ammunition up to the batteries.

The fire of these howitzers was directed against both ships and fortifications. On the 2nd of October the battleship *Peresvyet* was hit twelve times. On the 4th a hospital ship was hit. On the 7th the battleship *Poltava* was set on fire. On the 8th the battleship *Retvisan* was forced to move outside, but was attacked by torpedo boats and driven in again. On the 16th the armoured cruiser *Bayan* went out and took cover under Golden Hill, but was hit three times, and so on.

I cannot give you a continuous record of the hits obtained, or of the damage done to the ships, we must wait for that until the naval portion of our official history is published. What we must note is that the expenditure of ammunition was enormous, but, since the results of fire could not be properly observed, the damage done to the ships was only partial and not decisive. Decisive results were not attained until 203 Metre Hill was captured on the 5th of December.

The account of the struggle that culminated in this success, and the gallantry displayed on both sides in the siege operations, is a wonderful record of human endurance on both sides. The Japanese brought up 174 pieces of ordnance of 4-inch calibre and above, and 51 siege guns of less calibre, besides field and mountain guns, the latter being found of special use to bring up to close quarters. All sorts of wooden and other extemporised mortars were employed, as well as hand grenades and various incendiary missiles. A constant and nerve-shaking bombardment was carried out by day and night for the whole period, and sap trenches were pushed forward, and mines resorted to, in order to blow in the works of defence. Hand-to-hand fighting constantly took place, and the Japanese losses in killed and wounded between the beginning of October and the 6th of December amounted to considerably over 20,000. With the colder weather, the number of cases of sickness among the Japanese gradually decreased, but as

the siege progressed the numbers of sick inside the fortress became more and more numerous.

About the middle of November the Japanese were reinforced by three companies of sappers from the Guard, Sixth, and Eighth Divisions, and on the 18th the Seventh Division began to arrive at Dalny from Japan—a much needed reinforcement when we consider the enormous losses suffered by the Third Army up to this period. The series of desperate assaults against the various Russian positions, which culminated in the capture of 203 Metre Hill, was commenced on the 26th of November.

We must bear in mind that the Russian Baltic fleet left Libau on the 15th of October, and began to collect at Tangier on the 29th; they divided into two portions on the 5th of November, one portion making for the Suez Canal, and the other for the Cape. It has been asserted that the attacks against Port Arthur were pressed so strongly at this time on account of the approach of these reinforcements to the Russian naval forces. The serious attacks against 203 Metre Hill itself were commenced on the 28th of November, and on the 5th of December the heights were at last in the hands of the Japanese. Our official account says: ‘Directly the ridge was gained a naval lieutenant and three men were sent to the summit. There they built themselves with rocks and sandbags a recess in which they lay, directing, by means of a portable telephone, the fire of the

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Japanese guns against the Russian squadron, now clearly visible from the top of the hill.' With these facilities for observation, and with batteries of howitzers able to throw shell weighing nearly 500 lbs., so as to fall almost vertically on the decks, the fate of the Russian fleet could no longer be doubtful. We read that the war vessels in the harbour were soon crippled, and that on the 8th of December the only ship capable of moving was the battleship *Sebastopol*, which sought security and shelter from view of the observer on 203 Metre Hill by going out of the harbour, and anchoring close to the Tiger's Tail Peninsula. Here she was attacked by Japanese destroyers from the 12th to the 15th of December.

After the object of the Japanese, the disablement of the Russian fleet, had been attained, the garrison of the fortress still held out, and did not surrender until the 2nd of January. The surrender may have been somewhat hastened by the fact that, on the 15th of December, an 11-inch shell struck through the roof of a casemate, and killed General Kondratenko, who had been the life and soul of the defence, but in any case the issue was certain after the capture of 203 Metre Hill.

The destruction of the Russian fleet set free Admiral Togo's forces, and enabled them to refit in time to meet the Baltic fleet. In spite of their inactivity, the Russian war vessels, assisted by the garrison of the fortress, had succeeded in

'containing' not only Togo's fleet, but also an army of four Divisions, the First, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh, with a heavy siege train and other units. The total losses suffered by this army between the 26th of June and the surrender amounted to nearly 58,000 in killed, wounded and missing, and nearly 34,000 were incapacitated by sickness. How much these troops were wanted elsewhere we shall see when we study the operations against Kuropatkin's army.

We noted that there were 47,000 Russian field and garrison troops in the Liao-tung Peninsula when communication with the northward had been cut off. The Russian losses, killed or died of sickness, have been estimated at 7000. About 15,000 were in hospital wounded or sick at the time of the capitulation, and many wounded were among the 24,000 who marched out of the fortress.

In order to preserve the continuity of the narrative we have not referred to the naval operations from the 16th of August onwards, but Admiral Togo did not relax his activity during this period, and whenever a Russian battleship was forced out she was immediately subjected to torpedo attacks. As close a blockade as possible on the sea side was constantly maintained, but under certain conditions of weather it was impossible to ensure that no vessels entered or left the port. Thus we have records of Chinese junks getting in on the 3rd and 12th

of November and the 10th of December, on the 15th November a destroyer carried despatches to Chefoo,¹ and on the 12th of December a steamer carrying 800 tons of flour and other supplies ran the blockade. On the 24th of December the blockading fleet was somewhat reduced, probably in order that the ships should refit to meet the Baltic squadron, and on the 1st of January 1905 four Russian destroyers managed to get away to Chefoo. The Russians lost a sloop by mines on the 18th of August, and are reported to have had a battleship damaged by the same agency on the 23rd; on the 16th of November the destroyer which reached Chefoo was blown up by her own crew. A Japanese coast defence vessel was sunk by a mine on the 18th of September.

We have noted the disablement of the Russian war vessels by the land bombardment, but we must be careful not to draw the conclusion that the ships, although disabled, were actually sunk by the Japanese shells. The terms of the capitulation stipulated that the ships should be handed over in their existing condition to the Japanese army, but before the agreement was signed, Admiral Wiren, who was in command, had been warned by General Stessel that he had one night in which to destroy his war vessels, and the best use was made of the available time to sink as many as possible.

¹ See Map V.

Into the personal questions and controversies between the Russian generals in Port Arthur we need not enter. Although General Smirnov was nominally commander of the fortress, General Stessel, the field army commander, was senior to him, and there was constant friction between the two. It was General Stessel who opened the negotiations for surrender. Both were tried by court-martial and found guilty, the former of surrendering without convening a council, and on other charges, the latter of not taking measures to prevent the surrender.

The capture of Port Arthur and the destruction or disablement of the Russian war vessels at that place, and at Vladivostok, settled for a time the question of supremacy at sea in local waters. We have still to consider the Japanese operations against their other objective, Kuropatkin's field army. The successes against the Russian fleet had compelled the Japanese to divert, from the land forces employed against Kuropatkin, a powerful field army consisting of four divisions and other units. The strength of this force had to be kept up constantly by drafts of trained men, and the losses from all causes had not fallen far short of 100,000 officers and men.

Let us bear in mind that, in order to attain her limited object, which was to check Russian progress in the Far East, Japan's real objective was the Russian army. The Russian fleet was the preliminary objective, selected because it

might otherwise interfere with the military operations, and the Japanese were fortunate in destroying it before the expected naval reinforcements could reach the Eastern seas.

In order to deal with the complicated strategical situation, it was necessary to undertake offensive operations against both objectives at once, and this of course was the weak point in the Japanese plans. Against both objectives they were obliged to put forth their utmost strength. Their experience against the Chinese in 1894 had probably caused them to be dangerously optimistic about the early capture of Port Arthur, and their estimate of the probable strength of Kuropatkin's army was upset by the strenuous efforts of Prince Khilkoff to improve the carrying capacity of the Russian railway.

Having studied how the Russian naval forces were dealt with, we can now pass to the operations against Kuropatkin.

PART II

We read in our official account that as early as the 18th of November the Third Army, attacking Port Arthur, was obliged to send away to the northward two squadrons of cavalry and a regiment of field artillery. We are also told that, from the moment that the surrender was assured, the transfer of the Third Army itself to the northward was commenced. General Nogi made his

formal entry into Port Arthur on the 13th of January, but a large proportion of his troops were already on their way northward, and had never advanced beyond the line which they occupied on the 1st of January. When Nogi was set free after the Port Arthur surrender, the Russians expected his force to be employed either against Vladivostok, or against the rear of their main army *via* Possiet Bay and Kirin;¹ here again we note the great moral effect produced by a military force which can be moved by sea. Kuropatkin tells us that reinforcements were sent to Kirin to provide against such a movement. I propose that we shall now consider briefly the land operations, so that we may realise why more Japanese troops were so urgently needed in the northern area.

You will remember that in the China War of 1894-5 the Japanese drove their enemy's forces out of Korea, captured Port Arthur, defeated the Chinese fleet at sea, and finally destroyed it in the defended harbour of Wei-Hai-Wei, but, although the object of the war was thus attained, it was still necessary to defeat the Chinese field army near Liao Yang and to follow up that success, before the war could be brought to a close. A landing was also effected in the Pescadores Islands, in order that a claim to those islands should hold good when discussing the terms of peace. The course of the war with Russia

¹ See Map V.

followed somewhat similar lines, but on this occasion the Japanese were confronted with a far more formidable task. In order to defeat decisively the main Russian army it would have been necessary to drive it off its line of communication with Russia *via* Harbin, but since the conditions of the country, and means of transport available, compelled the main forces on both sides to move along the railway line, this was an almost impossible task. As long as the theatre of operations was near the coast, or in the peninsula of Liao-tung, the Japanese could use their amphibious power to threaten the Russian lines of communication, but the further the Russian army retired to the northward, the better it would cover its communications, and the nearer would it be to its reinforcements. Every ten miles of advance would increase the difficulties of the Japanese, because delay would be necessary to repair and alter the gauge of the railway, and to collect more rolling stock for use along the line. Under such conditions a complete strategic defeat of the Russian army by driving it off its line of communication could hardly be expected, and the question would then be whether Russia could ever be sufficiently exhausted by the severity of the struggle to agree to abandoning the objects for which she had contended.

We left our consideration of the land operations at the point when the Second Army, under Oku, was moving northward, after fighting the

battle of Telissu on the 15th of June.¹ The First Army, under Kuroki, which had pressed back the Russian army from the Yalu on the 1st of May, was holding a line covering Feng-Huang-Cheng, and was preparing to advance. The Tenth Division, under Kawamura, which was afterwards to form part of the Fourth Army, had begun to land near Takushan on the 19th of May, and the object of this force was to fill up the gap and keep up communication between the First and Second Armies.

The Japanese dominance at sea gave them the advantage of a wide base of operations, and they could land their troops at various widely separated places along the coastline. As soon as the secure harbours of Ta-lien-wan and Dalny were in their hands there could be no doubt that these places afforded the best facilities, not only because they were the best harbours, but also because a line of railway ran from them to the position where the Russians had concentrated in the greatest strength.

We need not consider the land operations in detail, because they were of a purely military nature, and we are studying the war from an amphibious point of view. We must note, however, that when the Russian fleet, on the 23rd of June, demonstrated its power of leaving Port Arthur, considerable anxiety must have been caused to the Japanese authorities, and we may

¹ See Map VIII. for positions of Japanese armies on 15th June, and subsequent movements.

assume that the chances of doing mischief possessed by Witgeft's fleet must have continued to have influenced the military strategy, and forward movement of the armies, until the final retirement of the fleet into Port Arthur after the naval battle of the 10th of August.

We notice that the Japanese First, Second, and Fourth Armies were at first very widely separated and were operating on exterior lines, a strategical disposition which is often necessary for various reasons, but which offers few advantages unless the separated armies can converge on the field of battle. Armies acting on interior lines can, as you know, obtain a considerable advantage by concentrating their strength against one of the hostile armies, while 'containing' the others with inferior forces, only strong enough to cause sufficient delay. One of the best examples of a campaign being skilfully conducted in this manner is the way in which Napoleon handled his forces in 1814, well described in Hamley's *Operations of War*.

In order to take advantage of this principle, Kuropatkin must have concentrated his strength either against the First Army to the eastward, or against the Second Army to the southward, and when pressed to relieve Port Arthur he considered these alternatives. He was averse to concentration in force against the First Army, because of the difficulties of transporting supplies, because he did not consider that his troops were

suitably trained or adapted to warfare in such hilly country, and because it would be open to Kuroki to retreat to the eastward, while Oku moved northward. When Kuropatkin did send a force to the southward he could not, or at all events did not, send a strong one with clear orders that the situation demanded decisive offensive action against Oku's army. The lines of communication of any Russian army operating in the Liao-tung Peninsula would be exposed to a blow from hostile forces which might be successful in effecting a landing north of such an army, on either side of the peninsula, especially at or near Yingkou (Newchuang), on the west side, where a landing in force seems to have been expected from the beginning. The Japanese naval demonstrations off Kaiping must have increased Kuropatkin's fears of such action. Dispositions must also have been made to 'contain' the Japanese First Army and the Tenth Division, which had landed at Takushan, for a long enough time to ensure the decisive defeat of Oku's force, and until the majority of the troops sent to the southward for this purpose could be brought back to strike a blow to the eastward.

We note how strong an influence the inactivity of the Russian fleet produced upon the military situation; it gave to the Japanese the choice of many landing places, and alternative lines of advance, which could be chosen as the situation developed. Kuropatkin, in his book on the war,

writes somewhat plaintively, 'Without doubt the main rôle in the war should have been played by our fleet.' In our own official account we find, however, that, 'The Japanese naval strength, if slightly inferior on paper to the Russian fleet in Far Eastern waters, was rendered more than a match for it by superior efficiency.' We have studied in detail the results of this superiority.

Whether Kuropatkin was right or wrong in not concentrating to strike a strong blow, either eastward or southward, against the separated Japanese armies, we cannot judge without more knowledge of the local situation than we shall ever possess. Many factors affect these decisions in war, and the most important of them seldom appear on paper. The result of his dispositions was that all his force fell back in the direction of a strongly defended series of positions in the neighbourhood of Liao Yang, and whether on account of the excessive attractions of strong positions, or for other reasons, no decisive counterstroke was launched successfully against the Japanese armies during the whole of the campaign.

The Japanese Second Army (Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Divisions, and First Cavalry Brigade) resumed their advance northward on the 20th of June, but although the cavalry occupied Hsiung-yao on the following day, the main body of the army was brought to a standstill by transport and supply difficulties, the

Russians having taken all the railway locomotives away with them in their retreat. Profiting by their experience, gained when the First Army was marching along the northwest coast of Korea in April, the intention had been to land supplies for the Second Army from transports sent round to Hsiung-yao for the purpose, but the sortie of the Russian fleet on the 23rd of June, and the difficulty of providing naval escorts for the transports, seem to have produced such an effect upon the Japanese authorities that this plan was abandoned. Instead of transports, about seventy Chinese junks were collected by the 11th of July, and these were to take stores from Chinchou Bay to Hsiung-yao, or places to the northward which might be available. Railway trucks were dragged by man power, sixteen men to each vehicle, along the railway line, and Chinese carts constantly plied from Pu-lan-tien. By the 6th of July the Second Army was enabled by these arrangements to resume its advance on Kaiping, which was captured from the Russians. On the 23rd of July the advance was resumed, and from the 23rd to the 25th Oku's army engaged a Russian force at Ta-shih-chiao and succeeded in driving it back towards Haicheng with a loss of about 2000, the Japanese losses amounting to about 1000. Yingkou (Newchuang), being in Japanese hands, the difficulties of supply were much reduced. On the 1st of August, Oku

reached Haicheng, and there established communication with the Fourth Army (Tenth Division and Tenth Kobi Brigade), which had helped to cause the Russian retreat.

The landing of this Tenth Division, which was commenced near Takushan on the 19th of May, presents several features of interest. Nineteen transports, of a total gross tonnage of 54,932 tons, were available to transport this force from Japan. I believe that, for embarkation purposes, the total establishment of a Japanese division on a war footing was estimated at over 19,000 officers and men, and about 5600 horses, but I do not know whether the full complement of non-combatants and of draught horses was taken on this occasion. As usual, the Japanese maintained the most perfect secrecy regarding the destination of this division, and the Russians were misled by some large launches being sent from Chinampo to the mouth of the Yalu on their way to Nanchien, near Takushan. A party from the First Army had previously reached Takushan by sea, and had opened a telegraph office, which could easily be connected with the cable which the Japanese had laid from Pitzuwo to the mouth of the Taitong river.¹ This gives us another example of the Japanese forethought in cable strategy, and in providing the material necessary to keep Headquarters in touch with all the forces employed.

A naval force belonging to Rear-Admiral

¹ See Map V.

Hosoya's command assisted the army, by the provision of torpedo boats to fire upon some Russian scouts observed on the coast, and by sending a landing party of bluejackets to precede the troops and cover the landing. The disembarkation of the military force commenced at Nanchien early on the 19th of May. A regiment of infantry was at once pushed inland to cover the operation, but no resistance was met with, and the weather conditions were favourable. Nine battalions, one squadron, four batteries, and three companies of engineers were landed by the end of the month of May, but whether on account of shortage of sea transport, or for other reasons, the last portions of the division did not reach Takushan until the 30th of June.¹ As early as the 7th of June some of the fighting troops of the division commenced their forward movement, and Kawamura continued this movement, although the sortie of the Russian fleet on the 23rd, and the transport difficulties of the Second Army, forced Imperial Headquarters on the 24th to come to the conclusion that it would be necessary to postpone the decisive battle near Liao Yang until after the rainy season.

We have already noted the effect which Kawamura's decision had in facilitating the advance of the Second Army, by causing the

¹ Our official account says that the whole division was on shore by the 9th of June. The Tenth Kobi Brigade had reached Takushan by the 30th.

Russian opposing force to fall back more hastily, on account of the threat against their line of retreat. Kawamura was opposed by the Russians at Hsiu-yen (8th June), and Fenshui-ling (27th June). The advance of the Fourth Army was much facilitated by the movement on its right of a brigade of guards, from the First Army, placed temporarily under Kawamura's command by Kuroki, and ultimately by the troops on the right flank of the Second Army. On the 12th of July, the Tenth Kobi Brigade arrived at Hsiu-yen and joined Kawamura's command. On the 16th of July General Baron Nodzu assumed command of the Fourth Army. He was opposed by the Russians at Hsi-mu-cheng (31st July-1st August).

We left the First Japanese Army (First, Second, and Guard Divisions), under Kuroki, in the neighbourhood of Feng-Huang-Cheng awaiting the advance of the Second and Fourth Armies, in order that the three armies might move forward, timing their advance so as to combine in the neighbourhood of Liao Yang. On the 24th of June, Kuroki began his advance, which proved to be a most formidable task owing to bad roads and difficulties of transport and supply. Heavy rains fell between the 27th of June and the 5th of July, and as a result some of the troops were almost starved, and would have had to fall back on Feng-Huang-Cheng if the weather had not improved. As much as eightpence per five miles was paid to the inhabitants for transporting loads of

60 lbs., and free rations and forage were given to men and animals so employed; but although a carter could thus earn £3 a day, the system broke down, and advance was only rendered possible by the patriotic exertions of thousands of the military coolies, many of whom had given up good positions in Japan in order to accompany the forces in this capacity. The Japanese First Army was attacked by the Russians in the Mo-tien-ling pass (4th and 17th July), and fought actions at Chiao-tou (19th-20th July), and at Yu-shu-ling, Yang-tzu-ling (30th July-1st August); the right flank of the army by the 1st of August was about twenty-five miles from Liao Yang.

We therefore find the Japanese forces on the 1st of August in two groups, the Second and Fourth Armies about thirty-five miles south-west of Liao Yang, and the First Army on their right, and separated from them by about thirty miles of difficult and mountainous country. Marshal Oyama, who had left Japan for Kaiping on the 6th of July to take command of the armies in the field, left that place for Haicheng on the 22nd of August.

The delay in the Japanese advance, due to the sortie of the Russian fleet on the 23rd of June, and to the transport and supply difficulties, which were accentuated by the bad weather in July, had enabled the Russians to increase their strength in the field by bringing up reinforcements by the single line of railway from Europe.

The result was that in the battles near Liao Yang the Russians were in greater strength than the Japanese, and it is generally admitted that an opportunity was afforded for a decisive counter-stroke.

To the subsequent land operations we need only briefly refer. From Kuropatkin's accounts we may gather that reinforcements arrived at the rate of about two-thirds of an army corps per month over the first year of the war. Had it been possible to run even one more train a day from the outbreak of war, he estimates that his force at Liao Yang might have been stronger by two army corps. He complains that too many complete units were sent, and he would have preferred to have received drafts to make up wastage in the units already at the front. These units were so depleted by losses, and by the employment of large numbers on non-combatant duty, that it is very difficult to form a correct estimate of the numbers actually in the field during the several battles. It is impossible to calculate even a rough average of the number of men from the number of units in the front line. Kuropatkin calculates that, if drafts had been sent up during the period allotted to one army corps, he would have received in that time an addition of about 95,000 instead of 25,000 to his fighting strength. Taking his figures as regards the number of troop trains, I find that with drafts the average per train comes to 950 fighting men,

while with an army corps and its necessary equipment the average is only 250 fighting men per train. From the beginning of the war, until the armistice in September 1905, we are told that 1,290,000 officers and men, 230,000 horses, and 700,000 metric tons of material were sent along the line to the front. The total strength of the field army at this latter period was about 930,000.

In addition to the Japanese divisions referred to above, the Eighth Division landed at Dalny and joined the Fourth Army¹ in October 1904. It was conveyed in twelve transports of about 68,800 total gross tonnage, and the numbers embarked in one trip were 16,030 men and 3000 horses. Another army, the Fifth, was formed at Feng-Huang-Cheng in February 1905, and Kawamura from the Fourth Army was placed in command. The Eleventh Division, which had been engaged in the siege of Port Arthur, formed the nucleus of this army, which also included several Kobi brigades. It ultimately moved northward, and was kept on the right flank during the Japanese final advance.

The great feature of the Japanese organisation was the constant replacement of casualties by drafts and reserve troops. By March 1905 there were thirteen divisions, thirteen reserve (Kobi) brigades, and a reserve division in the field. Instead of sending the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Divisions from Japan to

¹ The Eighth Division was ultimately placed in the Second Army.

the seat of war, the policy adopted was to use all the extra men available to keep up the strength of the units at the front.

Liao Yang was occupied by the Japanese on the 4th of September, after five days' severe fighting, the Russians falling back towards Mukden. Kuropatkin then attempted an advance southward, but was driven back across the Shaho river as a result of actions lasting from the 9th to the 16th of October. He again attempted the offensive against the Japanese about Sandepu and Hei-kou-tai between the 25th and 28th of January 1905, but was driven back over the Hun-ho river on the 29th of January. These engagements tended gradually to exhaust the Japanese ; the Russians, although driven back on each occasion, had not been driven off their line of communication, and the further they were driven to the northward the stronger they became, because they were falling back on their reinforcements.

There seemed to be no reason from the strategical point of view why the war should not have lasted indefinitely. The further the Japanese advanced, the greater difficulty they would experience in increasing their forces at the front. You will probably recall constant references to this point in writings upon the general conduct of war. Perhaps it is put most effectively by Von der Goltz in his *Conduct of War*, where he writes : ' It is characteristic of the strategical offensive that the foremost body of troops of an army, the

portion which fights battles, amounts to only a comparatively small fraction, frequently only a quarter, or even one-eighth of the total fighting strength employed, whilst the fate of the whole army depends throughout on the success or failure of this fraction. Attacking armies melt away like snow in the Spring.'

The Japanese having made wonderfully good arrangements for the provision of drafts and reserve units, the number of troops present at the decisive land battle of the campaign, which was fought about Mukden between the 1st and 10th of March 1905, is said to have been about 220,000.¹ A light railway from Antung, *via* Feng-Huang-Cheng was constructed as a line of supply for the troops on the Japanese right. The number of Russians present is difficult to estimate, because so many of the units were very weak; it was probably about 290,000.¹ Railways were run out from the main line to supply the flanks.

After this colossal struggle, which was fought on a front of over eighty miles, the Russians again fell back to the northward without being driven off their line of communication, and according to Kuropatkin they then concentrated an army of nearly a million men ready for offensive operations. He adds: 'We believed in the possibility and certainty of victory, and if it had not been for the serious internal disturbances in Russia, we

¹ Rifles and sabres only. Gun detachments and other services in addition.

should undoubtedly have been able to prove the truth of our belief in battle.’¹

After this brief reference to the main operations on land we must turn our attention again to the situation at sea. We noticed how critical the position of the Japanese armies would have been at the end of June if the Russian Port Arthur fleet had achieved even a partial success against Admiral Togo’s squadron. Since that time the Japanese armies had been largely increased, and the resources of the country had been further exhausted, so that sea communication was of still more vital importance. The crippling of the Port Arthur fleet at sea on the 10th of August, after it had been forced out of harbour by the Third Army, had relieved the situation, and its final disablement on the 1st of January had set Admiral Togo’s vessels free to go back to Japan and prepare to meet the Russian Baltic fleet which was on its way to the Far East.

For an account of the voyage of Rojestvensky’s² fleet from the Baltic to the theatre of war I must again refer you to *Rasplata*. That book describes most graphically the state of *moral* of the officers and men of the Russian fleet, and their deficiency in training. The paper strength in-

¹ *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*, vol. ii. p. 197. John Murray.

² The *j* is employed to represent the Russian letter pronounced like the *j* in the French word *je*. I believe that the letters *zh* are used to represent this sound in English according to official rule, but this rule is little known.

cluded seven first-class battleships and two armoured cruisers, besides protected cruisers and destroyers. I am enclosing further details in this letter, and I have added a list of the remnants of the Russian Vladivostok squadron which were left after the action with Kamamura in August 1904. Against these forces Admiral Togo had four first-class battleships and eight armoured cruisers, with a considerable number of unarmoured vessels. Reading *Rasplata* impresses upon one the importance of not estimating entirely by paper strength, and of remembering that battles by sea, like battles by land, are ultimately won by men, and not by material appliances and machinery.

Rojestvensky's fleet was accompanied by a large and unwieldy convoy of colliers, storeships, and other vessels. Russia possessed no coaling stations or harbours along the route, and, in the opinion of many, it was thought that the conditions of international law would prevent his ever finding accommodation in neutral harbours, to enable him to coal and refit in order to reach his destination. Although the Sultan of Morocco is said to have expressed his official ignorance of a state of war, and of the existence of the Japanese, because their country was not represented at his Court, yet this condition would not apply to other powers possessing harbours along the route. Nevertheless, the portions of the Russian fleet which had proceeded by the Suez Canal and by

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the Cape combined successfully at Nossi-Bé, north of Madagascar, on the 9th of February 1905. After this date there was a long delay to await the arrival of Admiral Nebogatoff's vessels, which did not leave Libau until the middle of February, and were coming by the canal route. Rojestvensky left Nossi-Bé on the 16th of March without waiting for Nebogatoff. On the 8th of April Singapore was passed. The fleet remained in the French territorial waters of Annam as long as the authorities sanctioned, and were finally joined by Nebogatoff at sea on the 14th of May.

The combined Russian fleet then steamed for Vladivostok, but met the Japanese fleet in the Straits of Tsushima on the 27th and 28th of May, and was completely destroyed, many of the vessels being sunk by gunfire. Russia, after this disaster, could no longer hope to compete for the command of the sea in local waters, and from thenceforward the struggle must be fought out between the armies.

Japan had succeeded in attaining her limited object, she had destroyed the Russian fleets in Eastern waters, had captured Port Arthur, and had driven the Russian armies away from Korea, and out of Southern Manchuria. In these operations she had lost two of her first-class battle-ships, and nearly half a million of her fighting men had been killed, or disabled by wounds and disease. The question whether she could

impose her will upon Russia, and bring about satisfactory terms of peace, was still in the balance.

No decisive operations were undertaken by the main armies after the battle of Mukden in March, although both sides were getting ready for further struggles. On the 8th of July, the President of the United States suggested to both combatants the possibility of peace negotiations, and, on the 8th of August, plenipotentiaries assembled at Portsmouth in the United States. On the 12th of August the Anglo-Japanese treaty was renewed, with some alterations.

The Japanese, on the 10th of July, had landed a force on Saghalien, which island was captured by the 31st, and we can look upon this operation, like the occupation of the Pescadores Islands in 1895, as intended to influence the terms of peace, rather than the issue of the war. Operations for the latter purpose were always directed by the Japanese against mobile forces, fleets, and field armies, and never against geographical objectives. 'Success in war can be attained only by the defeat of the enemy's mobile forces,' as we read in the *Field Service Regulations*.¹

The peace conference lasted from the 9th to the 29th of August, and on the 5th of September an agreement was announced. Under the terms of the treaty Japan gained a free hand in Korea. She also held Port Arthur and its neighbourhood, and the railway for a short distance to the north-

¹ Part II., p. 23.

ward. About half the island of Saghalien was also ceded to Japan.

Under the conditions of pure military strategy there would appear to have been no reason why Russia should not have continued the struggle. Her army was the stronger, although somewhat demoralised by continual retreats, her communications had been much improved, and her population vastly exceeded that of Japan. Kuropatkin tells us, however, that not Russia, but the Russian army, was fighting on the one side, while Japan was fighting on the other side. The war was unpopular in Russia, while it was enthusiastically supported by the population of Japan, who felt that they were fighting for very existence. Towards the close of the war Russia had internal troubles, and the army was called upon to maintain order ; this was another factor which led to a desire for peace, but, as far as one can gather, the main reason for the conclusion of the struggle was financial exhaustion on both sides.

This conclusion has not been come to without consulting many financial authorities who should be in a position to judge, but of course you will form your own opinion on the subject. The whole question of the influence of financial considerations upon modern wars is one of extreme complication, and we need not consider it in detail, because it applies to all modern wars and not only to the amphibious wars to which we have been devoting our special attention.

The importance of studying amphibious wars in an Empire like ours cannot be gainsaid. In writing these letters I have not aspired to give you anything but a brief sketch of each of the wars of this nature which have occurred in the last twenty years. All of them merit a more detailed study from the official and other accounts which have been published, and all contain the most valuable lessons. If I have persuaded you to take an amphibious, rather than a purely military, view of the operations I shall be well content. Concentration of effort against the enemy's mobile forces, be they fleets or armies, is without doubt the secret of success in strategy, and the Japanese have taught, or rather have reminded us, that it is possible to combine the efforts of both fleets and armies to bring about the destruction of a hostile fleet, or the defeat of a hostile army.

It stands to reason that an advantage is gained if the operations of both fleet and army can be so combined, and the amphibious operations we have studied show us how such combinations have been effected in recent wars. We found that in three out of four cases, where fleets have been destroyed in the last twenty years, an army has assisted in the operation. Shafter's expedition to Cuba in 1898 was partly instrumental in forcing Cervera's vessels to their destruction by Sampson's squadron outside Santiago. The Chinese fleet, which survived the naval battle of

the Yalu in 1894, was driven from Port Arthur by a Japanese army, and destroyed at Wei-Hai-Wei in 1895 by the combined action of army and fleet. Most of the Russian Port Arthur fleet in 1904 was destroyed by a Japanese army. The Baltic fleet under Rojestvensky was sunk at sea in 1905 by the Japanese fleet, and this is the only case out of the four in which a fleet has been destroyed by naval action alone. Even in this case, Admiral Togo's task was much simplified, because Port Arthur had been taken by the Japanese army, and Rojestvensky was therefore obliged to pass through straits where he could be easily located and cut off.

Whilst we have noted cases of armies helping fleets to gain their objects, we have found examples of equally effective work being done by fleets to help armies. With the assistance of their navies, military forces have been able to take full advantage of the comparative rapidity of movement by sea; armies have landed unexpectedly at various points on hostile coasts; naval demonstrations in various directions have prevented hostile armies from concentrating; naval brigades have covered the landing of troops; marches, otherwise impracticable, have been rendered possible by supplies being landed on the coast; lines of communication of friendly forces have been guarded, and those of hostile forces have been threatened; and finally, war vessels have assisted armies by gunfire in battles fought within range of the coastline.

For fleets and armies to work together for a common object the most loyal co-operation is required between all ranks of both services. In the old days the want of such co-operation between our own naval and military commanders was notorious. The Japanese have taught us that by the intimate association of naval and military officers in peace time, and by the avoidance of mutual recriminations and criticism in war time, it is quite possible to work together. The Russians have taught us that friction between the two services must at all costs be avoided.

With these words I will close this series of letters. If you would like to do so, I hope that some day we may continue our correspondence, and try to investigate more carefully the principles guiding the combined action of naval and military forces in 'amphibious strategy.'

STRENGTH AT SEA IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR, 1904-5
SECOND PHASE—AFTER THE FALL OF PORT ARTHUR AND
ARRIVAL OF THE BALTIC FLEET

CLASS.	JAPAN.	RUSSIA. ¹
Battleships, . . .	<i>Mikasa, Asahi, Shikishima, Fuji</i> <i>Chin Yen</i> (second-class)	<i>Suvaroff, Orel, Emperor Alexander III., Borodino, Oslabya, Sissoi Veliky, Navarin, Emperor Nikolai I.</i>
Coast defence ships, .	<i>Fuso</i>	<i>General Admiral Aprazin, Admiral Oushakoff, Admiral Senyavin</i>
Armoured cruisers, .	<i>Yakumo, Idzumo, Inate, Tokiwa, Asama, Adzuma, Nisshin, Kasuga</i>	<i>Admiral Nakhimoff, Dimitri Douskoi, Vladimir Monomakh, Rossia(a)(b), Gromovoi(a)(b)</i>
Cruisers—		
First-class, protected, .	<i>Varyag (c)</i>	<i>Bogatyr (a)(b)</i> <i>Aurora, Oleg</i>
Second-class, protected,	<i>Tsushima, Nisutaka, Chitose, Kasagi, Takasago, Akit-sushima, Hashidate, Matsushima, Itsukushima, Naninwa, Takichiko</i>	<i>Izumrud, Zemchug, Svetlana, Almaz (a)</i>
Third-class, protected (Fast), .	<i>Chikaya, Suma, Akashi, Chiyoda (b)</i>	
(Slow), .	4 in number	
Third-class, unprotected (Fast), .	<i>Yacuyama</i>	
(Slow), .	7 in number	
Torpedo gunboat, . . .	1 in number	
Destroyers, . . .	18 in number	13 in number (a)
Sloops and gunboats, .	15 in number	3 in number (a)
First-class torpedo boats,	57 in number	10 in number (a)
Second-class torpedo boats	27 in number	15 in number (a)
Submarines, . . .		8 in number (a)

(a) At Vladivostok.

(b) Damaged.

(c) Prize, reported raised but damaged.

¹ Excluding 1 battleship, 2 first-class protected cruisers, 10 destroyers, and 1 sloop disarmed in neutral ports.

N.B.—This list is compiled from unofficial sources, no official statistics being accessible.

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